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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD MILLARD, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 041300401 
Transcript of: 
THIRD TRIAL DAY 
(VOLUME III) 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE RANDALL N. SKANCHY 
TOOELE COUNTY COURTHOUSE 
47 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
TOOELE, UTAH 84074 
DECEMBER 13, 2005 
REPORTED BY: SUZANNE WARNICK, RDR, CSR 
238-7529 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
JMR. CUNDICK: Your Honor, the State would call Susan 
Hyatt. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear the testimony 
you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and 
nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WIWESS: I do. 
COURT CLERK: Please be seated-
Please state and spell your name, 
THE WITNESS: Susan Hyatt, S-u-s-a-n H-y-a-t-t. 
COURT CLERK: Thank you. 
SUSAN HY&3T 
called as a witness by the State, having been duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMIimTION 
BY MR. CUNDICK: 
Q Do you know a Don Millard? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q How do you know Mr. Millard? 
A I was married to him for about five years. 
Q When you were first married — when did that marriage 
occur? 
A 1992. 
Q And did there come a time that you became separated? 
A Yes. 
Q And eventually divorced? 
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Q When were you separated? 
A In 1997. 
Q Now; subsequent to the time of your separation, would 
you describe the relationship with Mr. Millard? 
A Umm, well, it started off good. But I would say that 
he lied a lot. 
Q Did it become strained. 
A Yes. And it became hard to have a real relationship 
with him. 
Q And as part of the divorce, was he ordered to do 
certain things? 
A Yes. 
Q Financial things? 
Q What type of financial things was he ordered to do? 
A He was ordered to pay child support and to pay half 
of the medical insurance costs and a portion of the daycare 
costs every month, 
Q And did he do that? 
A No. He paid one check when he went to court once, 
but he did not pay them every month. He paid them very late, 
and he didn't pay all of them. 
Q So what type of payments did he not make? 
•A He has paid none of the medical insurance and none of 
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the daycare. And he has paid some of the child support — in 
the beginning. 
Q And as of September 11th, 2004, how much money did he 
owe you? 
A Everything. It was about $20,000. 
Q Now, on turning your attention to September 11th — 
actually, withdrawn. You can identify Mr. Millard, correct? 
A Yes, I can. He's sitting on the right side with the 
white sweater on. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that Susan Hyatt 
has identified Mr. Millard today. 
MR. CUNDICK: Okay. 
Q (By Mr. Cundick) Now, on September 11th, you recall 
an incident at your home that involved an assault on your 
person. Correct? 
A Yes. 
Q About what time of day did that occur, or evening. 
•A It was approximately 7 p.m. 
Q And were your children home? 
A No. 
Q Were they supposed to be home? 
A Yes. 
Q And were your children — had they been on a visit 
with Mr. Millard? 
A Yes, an unscheduled one. They were supposed to be 
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home the previous weekend. But I was told that they were 
going on a cruise and they did not come home. 
Q When were they supposed to get home to your house? 
A After the cruise — I forget the exact date, but I 
think it was a Thursday or Friday. When 1 called him, he 
would extend the date. And I forget now how many times I 
called to see when he would return them* I think it was three 
or four times that I called when they weren!t there when they 
were supposed to be. And he would give me a new time when 
they were supposed to be there, 
Q In fact, when was the last conversation you had with 
him as to when your children were supposed to be there? 
A It was September the 11th, hours before. I forget 
the time. Maybe two hours but I have forgotten now. 
Q At 7 o'clock were you waiting for the children to 
arrive? 
A Yes. 
Q And what happened at 7 o*clock or thereabouts? 
A A man knocked on the door, and I answered it. 
Q Hold on right there* Could you identify that person 
that knocked on the door? 
A Yes, I could. 
MR; CUNDICK: With the Court's indulgence. 
(Mr, Cundick goes to the door of the courtroom.) 
MR. CUNDICK: Well, wefll move on. 
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Q A man rang your doorbell, correct? 
A Yes. 
Q All right. And what happened then — oh, excuse me. 
Withdrawn. 
Detective Chamberlain has brought a gentleman into 
the courtroom. Do you see him? 
A Yes. 
Q Susan, is this the gentleman that attacked you that 
night? 
A Yes, it is, 
Q And when you indicate 7 o'clock and you answered the 
door, was this person the one at the door? 
A Yes, it was. 
Q And if you could just identify him for the record? 
A He has a blue shirt on with a white undershirt and 
has handcuffs on, with dark hair. 
THE COURT: The record will reflect that Miss Hyatt 
has identified Mr. Brinkerhoff. 
MR. CUNDICK: Thank you. 
Q (By Mr. Cundick) When you answered the door, what 
did this gentleman say, if anything? 
A I forget exactly. But, in general, he asked about 
Don. He was looking for information about Don. 
Q And take me through the scenario. What did he say; 
what did you say. And let's go through that? 
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A This is close to what we said. I can't remember 
exactly. But he said that he was a type of private 
investigator. He was looking for information about how to get 
ahold of Don* It was some kind of financial matter. 
And I told him that Don should be there in the 
evening. And, you know, I forgot what we talked about. We 
talked about something about Don but I forget what at this 
point. 
Q Okay. At some point did he indicate that he wanted 
to call? 
A Yes. And then he reached as though he was reaching 
to get his cell phone, and then he said, Oh, I've forgotten my 
cell phone; can I use your phone to call Don? 
And I had my cell phone just up the stairs. So I 
went up the stairs and I got my phone and I brought it to him. 
And I dialed Don's cell phone number. And I hit "send" on the 
cell phone and then I gave him the phone. 
Q And did you hear what he had to say to Don? 
A You know, I stepped back a little bit into my house 
and I don't remember. I didn't hear very clearly what was 
said. I remember hearing something about, he had "got the 
papers," or "the information.11 It was a very short phone 
call. I didn't hear everything. 
Q When you say "short phone call," was it less than a 
minute, more than a minute? 
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A Probably 30 seconds, less than a minute. 
Q And did he hang up? 
A Yes. 
Q And what did he do then? 
A He lunged in my door and shut the door real quickly 
and pulled out a knife„ 
Q Where did he pull the knife from? 
A I think it was his right side towards the back side 
of him, maybe back pocket or something. 
Q Could you describe the knife? 
A Yes. It was about a six- or seven-inch long hunting 
knife. 
Q And when he retrieved the knife, what did he do with 
that knife? 
A He moved as though to stab me in the chest or maybe 
my neck area, 
Q Would it be fair to say that he lunged at you? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q And did he actually strike you? 
A No. I grabbed the blade of the knife with my hand. 
Q Okay. What did you do when you grabbed the blade of 
the knife? 
A Well, I grabbed the blade, and I also grabbed at his 
hand on the handle, and we started struggling over the knife. 
Q Okay. How long did you struggle with that knife for? 
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A It may have been two to five minutes. It seems like 
a long time, but it probably wasn't very long, 
Q And what happened? 
A Umm, we fought over the knife. You know, I didn't 
think I was going to live. At some point he got me pinned 
down on the floor and I couldn't move. But I still had ahold 
of the knife with the blade and the handle on top of his hand. 
But I couldn't move. 
Q While you had your hand on the blade and the handle, 
did he touch your person, any other part of your body? 
A Not yet. He did later. 
Q Okay. Then tell me, when did that occur? 
A We were — I was struggling, trying to get out from 
underneath him. And then he pushed me down the stairs. And I 
tumbled and I hit the wall at the base of the stairs and he 
was on top of me and pinned me down again and with my arms 
underneath him. 
Q Before you go on, you say you tumbled down the 
stairs. How many stairs were there? 
A It!s like a half a flight of stairs. Maybe eight to 
ten, 
Q So quite a few. 
A (Witness nods.) 
Q That's a yes? 
A Yes. 
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r ~ 
I against 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
knife? 
A 
All right. So then you said he had you pinned 
the wall? 
On the floor. 
On the floor? 
Um-~hmm. My head was in the corner by the wall. 
Did you still have — were you still holding 
1 had the knife. He did not have it at all. 
the knife. 
Q 
A 
my neck. 
When you had the knife, what did he then try 
He had me pinned to the floor. And he tried 
He tried to snap it back and forth a number 
times, probably four or five times. And I was trying 
my arms 
onto the 
I had 
and do? 
to break 
of 
to get 
out from underneath me because I had the knife. 
And, as I was moving, he started to try and 
me and I couldn't breathe. And I did finally get the 
strangle 
knife 
out from underneath and I tried to stab him. But then he 
stopped 
Q 
and we both stood up then. 
When you tried to stab him,, did you actually 
his person with the knife? . 
A 
Q 
he then 
A 
Q 
Ho. 
touch 
But once you started to stab him, you indicated that 
stopped? 
Yes. He stood up. 
And the struggle stopped? 
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knife. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. He stood up and he grabbed my hand that had the 
Okay. So youfre both hanging onto the knife? 
Yes. 
Was anything said during this time? 
I remember him. He was panting very hard. And he 
said that he had changed his mind; that he wanted to take my 
money or something to that effect, I can't remember the exact 
words. 
Q Did you respond to that request? 
A Yes. I told him my wallet was upstairs and I would 
show him where it was. 
Q So now you're. You're both holding the knife? 
A Um-hmm, 
Q What conversation occurs after you're holding the 
knife? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
agaxn. 
Q 
A 
He asked for the knife. 
What did you say? 
I told him no. 
Why did you tell him no? 
Because I thought he might try to attack me with it 
Okay. So you continued to hold onto the knife? 
Yes.: 
Q What did you do then? 
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A I suggested that we both hang onto the knife and walk 
up to where my wallet was, just both of us hanging onto the 
knife together, 
Q And what did he say? 
A He said okay. 
Q So you walked up the stairs together? 
A Yes. 
Q And you walked up the eight stairs that you had 
fallen down. 
A Yes, and then another flight of stairs. 
Q And how many stairs then? 
A I think i t l s the same number. 
Q Okay. Then you walk up that flight? 
A Yes. 
Q And then you go where? 
A My wallet was in the bedroom, which was three or four 
steps from there. 
Q Did you go into the bedroom? 
•A Um-hrnm. 
Q Did you give him the wallet? 
A I showed him where it was. And he said that he 
changed his mind and he said that he wanted to go. And he 
again asked for the knife• 
Q And you said what? 
A I said no. 
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Q And what did he do then? 
A Well, he asked if he could get washed up then. 
Q And you said what? 
A I said yes. And he let go of the knife and he walked 
into my kitchen and he washed his hands, 
Q And what was he washing off? 
A My blood. 
Q And so you held the knife while he did that? 
A Yes. 
Q And what happened then? 
A He offered to give me his name and phone number if I 
would give him the knife. And I told him that there was paper 
and could write it down himself but I wasn!t going to give him 
the knife• 
Q Did he write down his name? 
A No, he didn!t. . . 
Q What did he do? 
A He wanted to leave. And he asked for the knife a 
number of times and I always said no. And he wanted to leave. 
And so I walked down the stairs ahead of him, maybe six feet 
ahead of him, and he followed me. And I opened the door and I 
walked out. And he walked out and he asked for the knife 
again. 
Q And what did you do? 
A Well, he demanded the knife actually. Excuse me. He 
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1 said he wasn't going to go until he got his knife. 
2- j Q I see. 
3 J A And I told him that I would throw the knife, and I 
4 asked him which direction should I throw it. And he pointed 
5 down the road towards the main street in Grantsville. 
6 I Before he left, he actually picked up my cell phone 
7 which he had dropped outside. And he said, Here's your cell 
8 phone. And I told him no because I didn't want to get close 
9 to him* 
10 Q So what did you do to get your cell phone? 
11 A You know, I don't remember. But I know he backed off 
12 because I threw the knife down the road and I walked back in 
13 the house and I locked the door. 
14 j Q After you locked the door, what did you do then? 
15 A I called 911 and then I went around my house and made 
16 sure all the doors were locked and the windows were shut. And 
17 I got my gun just in case he came back with other people. And 
18 I waited for the police. 
19 I Q Okay. How long was it until the police arrived? 
20 j A 1 think it was about ten minutes. It seemed like a 
21 I long time. 
22 Q Miss Hyatt, you received injuries as a result of this 
23 attack? 
24 A Yes, I did. 
25 Q Can you describe those injuries? 
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A I had neck injuries. I couldn't move my neck for a 
long time. I had marks on my neck where you could see the 
finger marks. 
Q Did you have marks and your hands? 
A I had cuts on my hands from the knife. 
Q I'm handing you what's been marked as State'*s 
Exhibit 15, 16 and 17, and I would ask you to review those. 
A Yes. 
Q Is that you in the photographs? 
jrk Ju e S f It 3L S « 
Q And do those portray a fair and accurate 
representation of the injuries that you sustained? 
A Immediately after. I had many, many bruises that 
surfaced after and injuries that came out later that I didn't 
realize the injuries that I had. 
Q When were these pictures taken? 
A That was that night. 
Q That night? 
A Yes. These were that night I went to the police 
station. 
MR, CUNDICK: Move for the admission of Exhibits 15, 
16 and 17. 
MS. ISAACSON: No objection. 
THE COURT: They will be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit Hos. 15, 16 & 17 
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were received into evidence.) 
MR. CUNDICK: May I publish those, your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (By Mr. Cundick) Mow, you! d indicated that those 
were the only injuries that were visible on that evening. 
A Yes. 
Q And you had other bruising that showed up later? 
A Yes. 
Q And where did that show up? 
A I had a lot more on my neck that showed up. And I 
had bruises all up and down my arms and my legs and really big 
ones on my hips, I think from when I went down the stairs. 
And I had a serious injury to my shoulder cuff, which is a 
permanent injury. 
Q Would you describe the injury to your shoulder, 
please. 
A It's the bone injury where you can't lift your arm up 
without pain. 
Q If I said the name "rotator cuff" — 
A Rotator cuff, thank you. That's what they call it. 
Yes. 
Q So you would say you had a rotator cuff injury? 
A And neck injuries. The doctor said it was equivalent 
to getting in a car accident were the type of injuries that I 
had. 
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MR. CUNDICK: With the Court's indulgence. 
Nothing further, your Honor. 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. ISAACSON: 
Q Ms. Hyatt, am I accurate, in the evening that you 
were interviewed by Detective Chamberlain, you told him that 
you thought that Brinkerhoff, the individual who was in your 
home, seemed scared when you were struggling? 
A At what time? Say the last few words, 
Q When he was in the hall and you were scuffling? 
A Towards the end, yes, 
Q He seemed scared; is that right? 
A I don't know if I would say "scared." He was 
breathing really heavy. Whether it was tired or scared, it 
was one or the other. 
Q Now, you mentioned that, at some point during the 
struggle or after the struggle, Brinkerhoff mentioned that he 
wanted your money. Is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q And is it accurate that he told you that someone had 
told him that you had a lot of money? 
A Yes, he did say that. 
Q Did he tell you at some point that he realized that 
he actually had the wrong person so he wanted to leave? 
A Yes. The second time he changed his mind. When he 
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wanted to go, he said that. 
Q And another thing he said to you is, I've got the 
wrong address because things aren't matching up here? 
A 
Q 
receive 
He did say something like that, yes. 
Okay. Now, at least on the night of 9-11, you didn't 
any formal medical care. You didn't go to the 
emergency room or anything like that; is that correct? 
A The ambulance. They treated me there in the 
ambulance. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
informat 
A 
Q 
A 
looked. 
Q 
front of 
Just there at the scene? 
Yes, 
Did you require any stitches or anything like that? 
Ho stitches. 
How, is it true, that in the fall of 2004, your 
ion was listed in the phone book? 
Yes. 
And your full name, address and phone number? 
Yes, as far as I know. I have to admit, I never 
MS. ISAACSON: Will you mark that. 
May I approach, your Honor? 
(By Ms. Isaacson) I'll have you take a look at the 
this. Can you tell me what date this phone book is 
good through? 
A It says through Hovember of 2004. 
599 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q 1!11 have you take a look here on the white pages. 
Is that your full listing here in the white pages, "Susan 
Hyatt; 79 South Worthington"? 
JHL xes f JLTI xs , 
Q And then the phone number: (435)884-6204, was that 
your phone number at the time? 
A I think thatr s correct, yes. 
M>„ ISAACSON: I would move for admission of 
Defendant's Exhibit 18. 
MR. CUNDICK: No objection. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 18 
was received into evidence.) 
MS. ISAACSON: That's all I have. 
THE COURT: Any redirect? 
REDIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CUNDICK: 
Q So the name was listed as "Hyatt." Correct? 
A Yes. 
Q It was never listed as "Millard"? 
A That * s correct. 
MR. CUNDICK: Nothing further. 
THE! COURT: You may step down. 
Any additional witnesses today? 
MR, SEARLE: Judge, pursuant to stipulation by 
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DAVID DRAKE, USB #0911 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAH ~ 3 2001 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH. 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD MILLARD, 
Defendant/ Appell ant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20060336 "0 A 
Trial Court Case No. 041300401 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. ' 
County of Salt Lake) 
DONALD MILLARD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and if required to do so 
I could and would competently testify thereto. 
2. I have never been arrested prior to this incident and had no criminal history. 
Prior to trial, I never made any inconsistent statements in this matter. 
1 Throughout Wally Bugden's ("Wally") and Tara L. Isaacson's ("Tara") 
representations of me, I was constantly told I would be testifying in my own behalf. Prior 
to my arrest and conviction, I had no criminal record. I had not given prior inconsistent 
01038 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
statements, and it was felt by all that I needed to testify in order to counter the allegations 
against me. To this end Tara prepared me to testify. Doug Maack, the private investigator 
hired by Wally and Tara, was also preparing me to testify. Tara went through phone records, 
police interviews, and prior witness statements in order to prepare him, 
4, As a point of emphasis, prior to trial, at least a dozen times at a minimum, I told 
Wally I wanted to testify and Wally and Tara created the expectation that I would testify especially 
to fill in the blanks with know/ledge peculiar only to me. The first time I knew I was not going to 
testify was Tuesday night of the trial when Wally and Tara told me I was not going to testify in my 
own behalf That was i t - a command that. I was not going to testify. This was the night before 
I was going to testify. (On Wednesday of trial, Wally came out of the courtroom and told my 
mother Glenda Millard that she would not have to testify and could come in and see the 
remainder of the trial) 
5, Not only did Wally and Tara tell me I was not going to testify, they never 
informed me that I was the one who should make this choice. They never informed me that 
I had a constitutional right to testify. I was not made aware that I could have demanded the 
right to testify until I met with Mr, Drake who informed me I had a Constitutional right to 
testify at my trial. 
6, In addition to telling me I was not going to testify, Tara and Wally were not 
interested in reviewing my notes of the trial, especially where the testimony did not make 
sense, contradictory, and was .inconsistent with other testimony; For example, Susan Hyatt, 
my exwife, testified at the preliminary hearing that she struggled with Mr. Brinkerhoff, the 
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person who allegedly tried to kill her, for five to ten minutes while she was holding the blade 
of a six to eight inch knife, that the knife blade she was holding onto was being see-sawed 
back and forth through her hand while she was grasping it tightly, and the blade was very 
sharp. However, at-trial, she testified this struggle with her holding the blade end of the knife 
occurred from only two to five minutes. She indicated that this struggle with the. knife was 
a life or death struggle. Wally and/or Tara never pointed out this time inconsistency during 
the trial Wally and/or Tara never questioned Ms, Hyatt about the wounds on her hand, that 
they were very minor, that she did not require stitches. Wally and Tara never called as 
witnesses the EMTs who were called to the scene after Mr. Brinkerhoff left in order to have 
them testify about their treating Ms, Hyatt's wounds, that they were very minor (as was stated 
in the police report), 
7. Wally and Tara never called a medical expert to testify that had Ms. Hyatt's 
version of the attack occurred, her hand would have been severely damaged, including 
severed tendons, nerves, fingers, and vessels. This testimony was critical to rebut the 
testimony of Susan Hyatt which was a critical element of the state's case. Moreover, my trial 
counsel promised me after the preliminary hearing on December 21, 2004 that they would 
obtain a medical expert to testify that Susan's version of how she received the injuries to her 
hands were not consistent with the actual injuries, 
&, Moreover, Ms, Hyatt testified during direct examination at trial that she had 
been badly bruised as a result, of her struggle with Mr. Brinkerhoff, that she had torn her 
rotator cuff or other injury to her shoulder, that she had cut up her hand quite badly. She put 
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her personal medical status into issue; yet, Wally and Tara never attempted to subpoena her 
medical records dealing with her claimed injuries, They had ample time to investigate her 
injuries since she testified about them at the preliminary hearing on December 21, 2004,. 
almost one year prior to trial. R.489, In fact, had they not been able to obtain her medical 
records through the criminal process, they could have attempted to do so through the civil 
process in my divorce case in the Third District Court. 
t . With Susan's medical records in hand, my trial counsel could have impeached 
her testimony about these supposed injuries, demonstrating she was not telling the truth-. 
ML. Wally and Tara allowed an edited tape of my police interview to be presented 
to-the jury. In feet, they assisted in the editing of the tape. The part that was edited out were 
my statements to the police that I would be willing to take a polygraph to prove my 
innocence. Moreover, the police, during that same interview and toward the end, brought up 
the fact of the polygraph and. how it was very accurate and that they would be willing to set 
it up, They even told, me they would, call me with an appointment to take it. They never did 
and no one was polygraphed. Yet, all mention of the polygraph was redacted from the taped 
interview. The polygraph itself was not an issue. My willingness to take the polygraph to. 
proclaim and prove my innocence was the issue. Moreover, if Wally and Tara were so 
concerned about me not testifying, why did they allow a tape of my statements to the police: 
to be presented to the jury? (They did so without any objection.) It seems inconsistent that 
they would not allow me to testify to put the recorded interview into perspective. I said 
nothing during this interview that was incriminating (this was even agreed to by Wally and 
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Tara) and protested my innocence during the whole of the interview. 
11, The tape presented to the jury should have never been edited. Wally and Tara 
took out portions of the interview that dealt with me wanting to take a polygraph 
underscoring my protestations of innocence, Even Detective Chamberlain stated he would 
be willing to have me be polygraphed. Whether a polygraph is reliable is not the subject of 
this interview or tape; however, I understand that this was the reason for the redaction even 
though taking apolygraph was not the issue. Wally and Tara. never argued that the polygraph 
was not the issue. What was at issue was my willingness to then, and there.take a polygraph 
to prove my innocence. It showed what I was willing to do, 
12, I repeatedly requested that Wally and Tara subpoena ORS to obtain records of 
my child support payments to Ms; Hyatt which they promised to get and produce at trial, The 
state declared my alleged motive for killing my exwife was to terminate child support 
payments and not having to pay an existing arrearage of approximately $21,000. No child 
support payment records were ever produced. The only direct testimony on this issue was 
that of Ms, Hyatt who testified that I owed her at least $20,000 and that I hadn't paid child 
support for an extended period of time. This was not true and could have been rebutted by 
the testimony of an ORS records keeper and ORS child support records being placed into 
evidence, Wally and Tara never produced any evidence whatsoever refuting Ms. Hyatt's 
statement concerning child support. They did not ask her critical questions concerning how 
she arrived at the $20,000 figure, what records she had to support that figure, or to produce 
those records, This was critical. Had they done so, it would have been determined that she 
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was not telling the truth. I would have testified that the amount claimed was very inflated. 
13, Wally and Tara promised me they would subpoena Susan's payment records 
and the ORS records, If they were unable to in the criminal court, they would do so in the 
civil court, since she testified to an alleged arrearage at the preliminary hearing almost one 
year prior to trial They had sufficient time to prepare for this issue at trial • yet, they never 
did (from December 215 2004 to the time of trial). 
14, They also promised me they would subpoena Susan's medical records to see 
whether she told the truth in the preliminary hearing about the injuries she received. Yet, 
they never did so and were not prepared for the issue of her injuries and whether she was 
telling the truth. In fact, they should have Icnown that her very slight injuries were very 
inconsistent with a Iife-and-death struggle over the knife when she had a hold, of the blade 
which she described as very sharp. This unbelievable story could have easily been 
challenged; but, it was not even though they promised me they would investigate her 
statements of her injuries to see whether she was telling the truth. In fact> both defense 
counsel told me this was one of the weakest parts of the state's case and it would be easily 
proven that Susan was not attacked as she said she was. They also promised me they were 
investigate this issue to see what Brinkerhoff s statements were in this regard. They felt that 
if Brinkerhoff s version of what occurred, differed from Susan's story, this would raise 
enough reasonable doubt for the jury to not believe Susan, resulting in an acquital. . 
15, Even though defense counsel felt as stated above, they never cross-examined 
Susan about her injuries. They never subpoenaed her medical records. They never 
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subpoenaed the ORS records. They never investigated Brinkerhoff s version of the alleged 
assault. They never called Brinkerhoff as a rebuttal witness to rebut what Susan testified, to 
regarding the assault. He was not in the courtroom to hear her testimony, making him 
vulnerable to impeachment or for her impeachment. Had they done so, I believe the jury 
verdict would have been different. 
16. Wally did not even challenge Susan's testimony that I owed her $21,000 with contrary 
documentary evidence, even though the state relied on this erroneous information to show motive. 
Subsequent to the trial, my appeals attorney learned from David Cundick, a co-prosecutor, that this 
was a weak part of their case because they had no documents substantiating this amount and the state 
had to accept Susan's word for it. Yet, Wally and Tara did not meaningfully cross-examine her 
regarding her allegation that I owed her at least $20,000 in back child support, My trial counsel 
never asked me for any documentation to counter the statements of arrears by Susan when 
they first learned of it at the preliminary hearing during December 21, 2004, which I could 
have provided and testified to had I been called as a witness. 
17. Subsequent to the trial, I learned from my appeal attorney that it could have been easy 
for Wally and Tara to have a writ issued demanding the presence of Davie Desvari at. trial. Even 
•though Davie Desvari was listed on W ally's and Tara's witness list, they never made any attempts 
to compel his presence at trial. His brother Ben Desvari knew that Davey was incarcerated at 
a federal facility in Safford, Arizona, R.502:314. 
18. Based upon what he told me he was willing to testify to, had he been called to 
testify, David Desvari would have testified of his relationship with Ben Desvari and to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
fact that he was released from the Salt Lake Comity Jail right before Brinkerhoff went to 
Susan Hyatt's home. He would have testified that I allowed him to use my phone to make 
many calls, The Magnaphone call that was so critical to the state's case was made by David 
Desvari. R.5G3:386. I never called the number in question, especially since I knew no one 
in Magna. 
19. Based upon what he told me he was willing to testify to, had David Desvari 
testified, he would have stated he was anxious to see me when 1 got home from my vacation 
(on September 11, 2004) because I have construction work for him and he desperately 
needed it. He would have testified that when he was leaving the place he shared with Ben 
and his family to come to see me that evening on September 11, Ben wanted to use his cell 
phone so David Desvari left his phone with Ben and told him to call me and let me know he 
was on his way to my avenues apartment, (The phone records indicate that my phone 
received a phone message from Ben Desvari at about 8:51 p.m., a duration of 74 seconds, 
long enough to leave a short message.) His testimony would have been that he came to my 
apartment and found me taking luggage from my vehicle into the house. He would have 
testified that he asked to use my cell phone while I was doing this and took it inside my 
apartment. He would have testified that he called the number of 801 -508-7514 in Magna to 
speak to Brinkerhoff (his testimony would have included that earlier in the month, he was 
with Brinkerhoff in the Salt Lake County ADC) about obtaining something personal. He 
would have testified that I never spoke to Brinkerhoff that evening when he was with me 
about anything to do with Susan Hyatt, His testimony would have been that I allowed him 
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to use my cell phone many times. He also would have testified that he and I called each other 
frequently. He would have testified that the three times I called his number on September 
11,2004, it was to speak to him about the construction project we were starting the 12th of 
September, 2004 and various ideas I had. He would have testified that I didn't call to speak 
to Ben Desvari but to him. He would have testified that at 6:07 p.m. on September 11,2004, 
I called him while on the road returning from my vacation to tell him at about what time I 
would be home and if he could meet me there, at about 9:00 p.m. 
20. Based upon what he told me what: he was willing to testify to? David Desvari 
would have testified that it was impossible for me to meet with Brinkerhoff in Magna that 
evening during the time he was with me in my avenues apartment. Moreover, he would have 
testified discussing the construction project with the Polly anna Apartments to begin the next 
day and that he was going to meet in during the early morning of September 12, 2004 to 
begin the project 
21, Based upon what he told me he was willing to testify to, David Desvari would 
have testified that Ben spoke to him about the trouble he was in with the Grantsville police 
and that Ben told him that I was not involved in any way. David would have testified that 
he told Ben not to implicate or finger me or he would be in big trouble with David, His 
words to me were he told Ben not to sell me out in order to get himself out of a jam. David 
also would have testified that he said this same thing to Brinkerhoff after September 1L 
David would also testify that he never heard me speak of wanting to kill my exwife. He 
would also testify that he never heard Ben or Brinkerhoff say anything about me hiring them 
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to kill his exwife or that they were involved in a plot to do so. He would also testify that he 
never heard anything from his brother, Brinkefhoff} or me about killing my exwife. 
22. Equally important is that as he told me, David Desvari would have testified that 
Ben told him the police were really leaning on him, creating great pressure to testify against 
me3 that Ben thought the police wanted him to say things that were not true about me in order 
to have me convicted of plotting to kill my exwife, 
23. I feel that had. David Desvari been called as a witness and testified as indicated 
above,,such would have resulted in a jury verdict in my favor. My trial counsel rendered 
ineffective assistance by not calling him as a witness. I was prejudiced by this 
ineffectiveness. I believe that had the jury heard testimony from Ben's brother that I was not 
involved in a plot to kill Susan, that would have created reasonable doubt, Had David been 
called to testify, the jury would have known that I called his cell phone often to speak to him. 
The jury would have known that the very phone number the prosecutor stated was the 
physical tie to me being involved in the conspiracy was the number David called that night, 
not me. Based upon the prosecutor's closing argument and the emphasis he placed on this 
Magna phone number, David's testimony would have created a great deal of reasonable 
doubt, resulting in an acquittal. David's testimony concerning what Ben told him about 
pressure from the police could have made a big difference to the jury. 
24. During my many interviews with defense counsel, I told them it was imperative 
that David Desvari be subpoenaed to trial to testify in my behalf I also told them to what 
David Desvari would testify (as set forth in the previous paragraphs). They agreed he was 
01089 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a necessary and material witness, especially since he would testify he was the one who made 
the call to 508-7514 and that when I called the Desvari cell phone, it was to speak to him. 
They thought it was important because his testimony would refute Brinkerhoff s statements 
that I contacted him on the evening of September 11, 2004. Overall, they were convinced 
that David Desvari had to testify, So sure were they of this that he was listed as a witness on 
the designation of witnesses they prepared. R.192. 
25. Had I testified, I would have refuted Brinkerhoff s testimony that I met him at 
his sister's house in Magna. R,503:386. I would have testified I never called, his sister's 
number on September 11,2004, I never met with him at his sister's house, I never agreed to 
repair his sister's home, I never spoke to him about killing my exwife. I never said I would 
pay him for killing my exwife because the subject was never discussed. However, none of 
this came out at trial because Wally and Tara refused to allow me to testify. They never 
informed me that the choice was mine and that I had a constitutional right to testify. I would 
have testified that I never conspired with anyone to kill my exwife. She is the mother of my 
children. I would never have put my children through such a traumatic experience. I have 
never thought of killing my exwife. I. would have completely refuted the testimonies of Ben 
Desvari, James Brinkerhoff and Ted Anthony. 
26. Moreover, I have always been a copious note taker. I could have testified from 
my notes regarding dates, times, and other material information that would have refuted all 
of the testimonies of the above-mentioned threesome. In fact, I showed these notes to my 
trial counsel and the fact that what was described therein was written down close in time to 
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of the occurrence. My trial counsel never seemed interested in using these and never 
investigated them. These notes would have shown that I did not make the call to Magna on 
September 11,2004, that it was Davey Desvari who did. However, trial counsel never used 
them, 
27, At the end of Tuesday's day of trial, Wally instructed me to meet him later at his 
office. Tara met me at the front door and said without going into the inner office, "We were 
presented with problems today concerning the phone records. Specifically, a call placed from your 
cell phone to a number in Magna.5' She didn't say what the number was (and neither was it made 
clear at trial), but did say that it was very bad and we don't know what to do. She asked whose 
number was that and why did you call I said, TU have to check my notes/5 I reiterated I didn't 
know any number in Magna and went out to the truck to check my notes. I went to my truck and got 
the notes. I looked at them and discovered that on the date in question, I had entered into my notes 
that this was when Davie Desvari was at my apartment using my ceil phone and this refreshed my 
recollection of what Davey Desvari told me concerning his testimony. I reminded Tara of this and 
told her that if they would have subpoenaed Davey Desvari, we would not be in this dilemma, 
because lie would have testified he was the one who called the Magna number. I also reminded her 
that the reason why Davey Desvari was going to be called as a witness was because he was the one 
who called this number. I told her that since Davey had not be subpoenaed I would testify that 
pursuant to my notes, I not only documented the feet that Davey used my phone to call that number^  
I could testily I did not call that number. I begged her to let me testify. All of this fell on deaf ears 
and my trial counsel refused to allow me to testify. She told me it just wasn't going to happen. 
28. The fact that my defense counsel had a problem with this Magna phone number 
01087 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
indicates they did not listen to what I said to them about David Desvari being in my apartment on 
the evening of September 11,2004, used my phone to call the Magna number, that I never called the 
Magna phone number. My trial counsel never listened to what I said to them. It didn't seem to 
matter what I said to them. If what I said did not fit into their scheme of things, it did not matter. 
It also indicates that they didn't analyze or investigate the Sprint records that had been previously 
furnished Wally and Tara 10 months prior to trial. Furthermore, Waily and Tara knew about this 
issue of the phone call to Magna from the prosecutor's opening statement and during tire second day 
of trial R.502:319, 320, 386. Yet, they never questioned me about this during that day of trial or 
that evening. They were unprepared for the next day of .trial when this Magna phone number issue 
again arose. 
29. I went back into the office with the notes and showed Tara that this was where Davie 
Desvari came to my apartment and used my phone to call Magna. Again, this was in my notes. I 
certainly didn't have time to go to my truck, make up these notes and then walk back in to Tara's 
office and show them to her. Moreover, the notes I showed her were in sequence with other notes 
I had made on other times and dates throughput that day and this day's notes were in sequence with 
the notes of other days. These notes could have been used at trial since they were made 
contemporaneously with the actions described therein. Additionally, it would have been necessary 
for me to testify about these notes so their content could have been explained to the jury, However, 
Wally and Tara would have none of that These notes had been shown and discussed with Tara and 
Wally many times and could have been used as an exhibit(s).! 
1
 These notes consisted of many pages and this entry was mixed in with other notes in 
chronological order and could not have been manufactured in the length of time it took me to go to 
the truck and return with them. No spaces were left between the lines so I could not have written 
this in during my time to the truck and back to Tara's office, 
~J3-
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3:0, During June, 2007, the Tooele County Attorney provided my appeal attorney with 
an e-mail showing that these Spring phone records had been e-mailed to Tara and Wally by the 
Tooele County Attorney during February, 2005, approximately 10 months prior to trial. Therefore, 
the issue of the phone records should not have come as a shock to Wally and Tara had they 
adequately prepared. However, Tara looked at my notes and said, "Even though its written here, 
we're not prepared to deal with it at this juncture and I believe we have cast enough reasonable doubt 
anyway. You are not going to take the stand tomorrow and that's all there is to it period." I told 
them that had they subpoenaed David Desvari, as they told me many times they would, they would 
not have been in this predicament and would have been prepared because Davie Desvari would have 
testified that he did, in fact, use my phone many times during that period to make many calls 
(becmiss he had just been released from jail) and on the day in question, he continuously used my 
cell phoned I again told her I wanted to testify, that there were too many questions raised by the 
prosecution that my testimony could have answered; however, she told me that I was not going to 
period, no discussion. She emphasized this by saying, "Don't bring up your testifying again.'5 Never 
once did she or Wally tell me that I had the right to testify and that only 1 could decide whether I 
would. I only found this out after speaking to my present appeals attorney, David Drake, 
31. For at least ten months of trial preparation, Wally and Tara never discussed with me 
2
 During closing argument, Gary Searle, the prosecutor, spoke about the frequence of cell 
phone use during this period and interpreted such, to be furthering the alleged conspiracy, that I was 
calling Ben rather than David Desvari, However, had Wally and Tara subpoenaed David Desvari 
as they promised, he would have testified that during this same period, he had just been released 
from the Salt Lake County Jail and made many calls to catchup for his prolonged absence in jail. 
Moreover, since I had hired him to work on my construction projects, this, coupled with the release 
from jail explanation, would have been a very plausible explanation to the erroneous assumption of 
the prosecutor. However, by denying me the right to testify, none of this was ever presented to the 
jury to rebut the prosecutor's mistaken assumption. This further underscores the fact that I needed 
to testify and should have been advised of my right to do so, 
44-
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in any detail the phone records they received from the Tooele County Attorney. They never went 
over any of the phone records with me even though they had them for at least ten months and I told 
them about David's testimony, except to speak to the number called from my cell phone to Magna, 
Had they taken the time to review these records with me prior to trial, they would not have been 
found wanting during the trial Moreover, had Davie Desvari been there to testify, this looming cell 
phone issue which arose during Tuesday of the trial could have been easily explained by Davie and 
Wally and Tara*s excuse to prohibit me from testifying, would have evaporated. Then, Davie's 
testimony would have been buttressed by my testimony, 
32. Wally and Tara listed me as a witness who would testify. This demonstrates that I 
was going to testify. However, had I known that I had a constitutional right to testily, I would have 
even stood up in court and insisted that I testify. Again and as point of emphasis, I was never told 
by Wally and Tara I had the constitutional right to testify. 
33. I told Tara there were a lot of things I could clear up by testifying and this phone call 
was no big deal because there is no way the state could refute that Davie Desvari used my phone to 
call that number. This whole burden rested on me because Wally and Tara had failed to subpoena 
him for trial In fact, my present understanding is that Wally and. Tara never sought a writ to compel 
David Desvari5s attendance at my trial3 I also requested that Wally and Tara engage in thorough 
cross-examination in order to ferret out to whom this phone number belonged. They did not do so. 
Moreover, I was never advised by my trial counsel, that they stipulated to my phone records coming 
is as evidence. Why would my trial counsel make it easier for the state to convict me? 
3
 At the time of my trial, my understanding was that David Desvari was in federal custody. 
Wally and Tara could have obtained a writ from the court to command his presence at trial. This 
they never did. 
-75-
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34, Another thing Davie Desvari would have testified about was the meeting at the home 
I was renovating in West Valley City between Ben Desvari and James Brinkerhoff (known by me 
to be Brad) and how they met to discuss what each would do to fix up the house, that no conspiracy 
to harm my exwife was never discussed because there was none. This would have refuted the 
prosecution's testimony that I allegedly met the co-conspirators at Granger High School to 
specifically discuss the conspiracy. I never met any of the three at Granger High School. I would 
have stated under oath that Mr. Desvari, Mr. Brinkerhoff; and I met at the house I was renovating 
in West Valley City and all we discussed was what was needed to be done, what supplies were to 
be obtained, and what each person's job was. Nothing was mentioned about killing Susan, finding 
a way to kill Susan, or any other thing involving Susan. This was never mentioned, even in jest, and 
was never spoken about by me during this time or at any other time. At this time, I asked Mr. 
Brinlcerhoff if he could obtain some permits concerning alteration of a structure, etc., for me which 
he |gr§gd to do, I asked him if he could do this while I was on vacation and I would pick these up 
from him after my vacation ended. At that time, I told him when I would be back from vacation. 
3 5. Had 1 been called to testify, I would have honestly stated under oath that I did not take 
Ben Desvari to Grantsville to show him when Susan Hyatt lived, Ben Desvari spent much time in 
my apartment management office and often used the phone on my desk, On the desk near the phone 
was correspondence from Susan Hyatt with her return address thereon. It would have been very easy 
for him to have copied down her address. Mr. Desvari's testimony that I took him to Grantsville to 
show him where Susan Hyatt lived is simply false, R,502:296, I would have also testified under 
oath that I never spoke to Brinkerhoff about where Susan lived. 
36. Had I been called to testify, I would have truthfully stated that I never knew that Ben 
Desvari went out to Susan Hyatt's house many times. As far as I knew, he mvtr had a reason to go 
»16~ 
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there, He testified that he went there several times to "do his homework1'. When asked if he told 
me of this he only answered, "He knew it." When asked how I knew it, he said, "It's common 
sense, you know, It's all common sense,f' He never gave a direct answer and my trial counsel 
never pressed him on this. R,502:297. In fact, my trial counsel never pressed him. on any 
matters directly dealing with the alleged conspiracy, My trial counsel never cross-examined 
him concerning his statements to my parents, Diane Martin, and me in the Murray park, 
37. Had I been called to testify, I would have truthfully stated that on August 16, 
2004, Ben Desvari never called me from a Chevron Station in Grantsville, And, contrary to 
what he testified to, I would have testified I was not on vacation on August 16 and could 
have proved it. R.502:299,307, (His answer that I was on vacation was in response to a 
leading question by the prosecutor, never objected to by my trial counsel, that I was on 
vacation.) My testimony in this regard would have again demonstrated that Ben Desvari was 
not telling the truth, Ben Desvari never called me later thai day (he testified, he couldn1! 
remernber that conversation, implying there was one which there was not - R,5G2;3Q7). 
38. Had I been called to testify, I would have truthfully stated that the first time I 
learned of Ben's foray into Grantsville was after I was arrested. Prior to that I never knew 
that he had been arrested in the area when he was out in a field catching lizards, snakes, and 
other such critters, 
39. During trial, Ben testified that after Brinkerhoff allegedly called him and told 
Mm what happened at Susan's house (according to Detective Chamberlain, Brinkerhoff was 
at her house at approximately 8:00 to 8:15 p.m. - R.5Q2:275), Ben testified that on 
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September 11,2004 (after 8:15 p,m.)> he called me a dozen times. This never happened. In 
fact, reviewing Ben's phone records (the cell phone he used really belonged to his brother 
Davey Desvari so the phone records were Davey's), that cell phone number called my number 
2 times. The first call, was at 8:51 p.m. and lasted i minute 7 seconds indicating a message 
was left. This call was from Ben Desvari telling me Davey Desvari told him to tell me Davey 
was on his way to my apartment to discuss a renovation project we were working on at the 
Pollyanna Apartments on the avenues in Salt Lake City. The second call was made at 9:34 
p.m. Ben had called to leave a message for Davey Desvari. This call's duration was 1 minute 
13 seconds. In spite of the foregoing, my trial counsel never even questioned Ben about 
these records. In. fact, they were never even brought up during cross-examination. Had my 
trial counsel effectively cross-examined Mr. Desvari, it could have been demonstrated he was 
not telling the truth. 
40. Wally and Tara simply did not prepare for trial. At the inception of their 
representation, they informed me that their private investigator, Doug Maack, would 
interview witnesses and investigate the allegations promoted by the state, They then told me 
that he would testify at trial in my behalf. Mr. Maack shared with me many things to which 
only he could testily. Yet, Wally and Tara never had him testify. Their excuse was that he 
would appear too biased. However, the state never had a problem with Detective 
Chamberlain being too biased and he was their number one witness. Even though we spoke 
about the phone records and my notes numerous times, Wally and Tara never investigated 
my notes, never did an in-depth investigation of the phone records supplied to them 10 
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months prior to trial, never investigated Susan Hyatt's claim that I owed her more than 
$20,000 in child support never investigated or obtained any ORS records to refute this claim 
even though they promised me many times they would, and never investigated any of Susan 
Hyatt's claimed injuries or her medical records to impeach her testimony, All of this would 
have made her out to be a liar, As such, it was if I went to trial without any representation, 
Infactj with Wally's sell out of me to the judge in chambers (I was never in chambers at this 
time even though the record says I was - 1 was in the courtroom waiting for the judge and 
attorneys to come out), I really went to trial without counsel. 
41. Had I been called to testify* I would have stated that I did have a child support 
arrearage; however, as I had done in the past, I purchase at minimal cost a home that 
renovating, renovate it, sell it for much more than I purchased it, and use whatever amount 
of proceeds is necessary to bring my child support and other children-related obligations 
current. However, since I was never allowed to testify, all the jury heard was Susan's 
rendition of the facts which she twisted in her favor. The conduct of my trial counsel by 
never advising me of my right to testify, really prejudiced me since Susan's child support 
testimony was totally uncp.n.troverted. 
42. Moreover, Wally and Tara never filed a motion in limine to prevent Ted 
Anthony from testifying about what Idrese Richardson allegedly told him about hiring a hit 
man or paying him to obtain a hit man or anything regarding this hearsay testimony, They 
had 10 months from the date of the preliminary hearing to prepare to exclude or prevent his 
testimony in this regard. In fact, many times I asked them what they were going to do about 
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his testimony at trial. They told me they would take care of it. 
4 1 When I got released from the Tooele County Jail on October 1, 2004,1 told 
Wally and Tara about me being in the cell next to James Brinkerhoff; a co-conspirator. 
When I was in Tooele County jail, I was next door to Brinkerhoff. A couple of days later, 
I realized that James Brinkerhoff was in the cell next to me; however, I knew him as Brad. 
Bf ad admitted his name was James and that he had lied to me about his name. Then he told 
me that when I saw the police reports and what James had said against me, to disregard them, 
that the police were pressuring him into saying what they wanted him to say, and that he 
would not testify to back up anything he had told the police because it was all lies and bulls-4 
and not to worry about anything because I had done nothing wrong, I was never involved. 
In spite of this, Wally and Tara failed to even cross-examine James Brinlcerhoff concerning 
this conversation, Had they done so, I believe it would have created reasonable doubt 
Without effective cross-examination, the jury only heard Brinkerhoff s side of the story, The 
jury had nothing else to go on. They did not have me testify about the conversation which 
would have most certainly cast doubt about the state's presentation, Even after I told them 
about this conversation, they never followed through with it or mentioned it again. 
44 I also told Wally and Tara several times about meeting Ben Desvari at a park 
in Murray, Utah prior to me being incarcerated in the Tooele County jail during September, 
2004. Ben Desvari made arrangements to meet my parents and me at this park. He really 
pushed to see my parents, that he had something to tell ail of us. My parents, Duane and 
Glenda Millard, and I met him about 9:00 in the evening. Ben Desvari told all of us that he 
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had gotten into some trouble, that the police were pressuring him to accuse me of conspiring 
to kill my exwife Md wanting him to testify against me in this vein, and that: if he didn't, he 
would be prosecuted and sent to jail. He then told all of us that "Don is innocent", that "Don 
had nothing to do with anything. He wasn't involved in any conspiracy." He then reiterated 
that he wanted my parents to know about my innocence and lack of involvement. 
45. My parents and I told Wally and Tara about this meeting in the Murray park, 
However, Wally and Tara did nothing about it. They did not seem interested. In contrast, 
my former attorney David Brown stated this was good evidence and even offered to have 
Diane wired or prepared to record any further conversations with Ben. They never cross-
examined Ben Desvari about it, they never called Glenda Millard as a witness to testify about 
it. In fact, they never called her to testify. And, even though they called him to testify, they 
never questioned Duane Millard about it, Had all of us been allowed to testify about this 
encounter at the park, more doubt would have been created concerning the state's case. 
Consequently, I was prejudiced as a result since the jury was never informed of any 
statements Ben made contrary to his trial testimony, Again, this would have prevented such 
a one-sided presentation of facts without any challenge. It is one thing for Ben to lie about 
his prior testimony. It is another thing to see four live witnesses testifying to what Ben said 
on two different occasions that contradicted his trial testimony. 
46. I. also told Wally and Tara about the meeting at Diane Martin's home between 
Ben and me on prior to my parents, Diane Martin ("Diane"), and me meeting Ben in the 
Murray park, I told them what Ben had told Diane and me and that she would be a good 
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witness to testify in my behalf Wally and Tara promised me they would have her 
interviewed and would call her as a witness. They never did. 
47, I told Waily and Tara that Diane had called me on my land line phone at my 
Avenues apartment on September 11,. 2004 to talk to me about the trip I had just completed. 
I told them the length of the conversation. She called me at about 9:30 p.m. and we talked 
for about an hour. I told them it was important for them to have her testify since she had 
heard Davey Desvari at my apartment during the evening of September 11, 2004 saying 
goodbye and recognizing his voice. This would corroborate the fact that I did not make the 
phone call to Magna. 
. 4& Wally and Tara's performance was extremely deficient. They never kept their: 
promises to me about how they would handle die case. Simply put, they never prepared for 
this case. They were overly confident. 
49. There were three alleged co-conspirators - Ben Desvari; James Brinkerhoff>: 
and Ted Anthony. Prior to the preliminary hearings which lasted almost four days, Ted 
Anthony was interviewed in Salt Lake City. Prior to the preliminary hearings, Ben Desvari 
and James Brinkerhoff were interviewed by the Grants ville Police Department at least two 
times apiece. Then, all three testified at the preliminary hearings. Then, all three testified 
at trial. Each one of these persons' testimony and/or statements were inconsistent with their 
prior statements. Yet, Waily and Tara never seriously challenged them on their prior 
inconsistent statements concerning the alleged conspiracy and never impeached them. They 
also failed to call witnesses they designated in order to challenge their testimonies and create 
42-
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a vast quantum of reasonable doubt 
50. Conspiracy requires that there be a meeting of the minds amongst all the co-
conspirators as to the terms of the conspiracy. There was never any consensus amongst the 
three as to what was agreed to and the amount to be paid. Yet, Wally and Tara never pursued 
this issue with these witnesses. 
51, On page 369 of the transcript (R,502:369), Ben testified that I hired Bruce 
Oliver to represent his brother Davey Desvari and he felt obligated to lie for me as a result. 
Ben stated that he thought I had already paid a clown payment (on the conspiracy) by hiring 
Bruce Oliver. Had Wally had me testify, I would have stated that Davey and I had multiple 
conversations while he was in jail and Davey instructed me to sell certain tools in order to 
hire Mr, Oliver, I sold these specified tools and took the proceeds from the sales and hired 
Bruce Oliver, I paid none of my own money to hire him. By not having me testify, the jury 
never heard the other side of the stories presented by the alleged co-conspirators. Had David 
Desvari been subpoenaed and testified, he would have stated under oath that he did instruct 
me to sell his tools that he specifically identified and that I took the money from the sale of 
these tools to Bruce Oliver to retain him for David, He would have testified that he I 
provided him with an itemization of the tools that I sold, in order to retain counsel. Had 
Wally and Tara allowed me to testify, I would have produced this itemization (which I had 
previously showed them) in order to demonstrate that I did not use my own funds to retain 
counsel, that the funds came directly from the sale of David Desvarfs tools, contrary to what 
Ben Desvari testified to. However, my trial counsel never even cross-examined Ben about 
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these facts and the itemization which they could have entered into evidence, JL5Q3:369. 
52* Wally Budgen, while in chambers and away from me, and without my 
knowledge or authorization to do so, stated that nI think there was a conspiracy. The goal 
of the .conspiracy was to harm Ms. Hyatt And Mr. Desvari was enlisted for that 
purpose in the beginning and was unsuccessful He continued to work with Mr* Millard 
.and work with Mr, Brinkerhoff and Mr, Desvari continued to have a role." R.504:614. 
This was a complete sellout of me. I feel this is incompetence and ineffectiveness at its 
highest level No wonder Wally and Tara failed to adequately represent me. No wonder they 
failed to call Glenda Millard, Idrese Richardson, Doug Maack, David Desvari, Melody 
Oliverj Diane Martin, and me to name a few, who could have refuted the state's witnesses 
and created reasonable doubt in the minds of the jury* Again, I never knew Wally said this 
until I was shown the trial transcript by Mr. Drake, Wally never told me he said this. I never 
authorized him to say this because it was not true. I should have been called to testify there 
was never a conspiracy that involved me. I have never desired to kill my exwife. I have 
never hired anyone to do such a thing. I would never place my children through such a 
dastardly ordeal. I never worked with- Ben Desvari or James Brinkerhoff to engage in any 
criminal enterprise. 
53. This is amazing that Wally would sell me out like this. This statement clearly 
indicates that I was denied my right to counsel in this trial. Wally should have been honest 
with me and told me he didn't believe in my innocence, His ethical responsibilities which 
he breached dictate that he be completely honest with me rather than appear to be something 
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he is not. By him being honest with me about him not believing m% this would have given 
me the opportunity to get other counsel I truly believe that the only reason Wally and Tara 
represented me in light of the fact they did not believe me was that they had been paid 
approximately $137,000 (including so-called investigation fees) to represent me. They led 
me astray. They lied to me. They committed a fraud on me, saying one thing to me and 
another to the court when I was not present. They did this to induce my reliance of paying 
this exorbitant sum. This is why they didn't have me testify. How could Wally have made 
this sellout statement to the trial court and then justify not calling Glenda Millard, and me as 
witnesses by saying we were not needed because they had created enough reasonable doubt? 
It is obvious that wasn't willing to do anything that would, challenge his belief that I was 
guilty, 
54. I heard Ted Anthony's testimony at the preliminary hearing, how he lied about 
what Idrese Richardson supposedly said to him. I found this very disturbing. Based upon 
my many conversations with him after hearing Ted's preliminary hearing testimony, I know 
that had Idrese Richardson ("Idrese") been called to testify, he would have testified that he 
never had any of the conversations with Ted Anthony to which Ted testified. Idrese would 
have testified that he never asked for a hit man for me. He did not keep calling Ted to 
question him about retaining a hit man. In feet. Idrese Richardson would have testified that 
no conspiracy to harm my exwife or anyone else was ever talked about Idrese would have 
refuted all of the hearsay evidence that Wally allowed to come in without objection when 
Ted testified. R.5G3:439-450. In fact after the preliminary hearing, I spoke to Idrese about 
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the conversations to which 1 ed testified he had with Idrese, specifically, that Ted said that 
Idrese called and/or spoke to him numerous times about getting a hit man for me to harm my 
exwife. Idrese responded, saying, "That's bulls-t. I never, ever spoke to him about any hit 
man. The subject never came up." I told this to Wally and Tara and told them it was 
imperative for them to investigate Idrese and to have him. as a. witness. 
55. During April or May, 2005,1 brought Idrese to the office of Wally and Tata. 
Doug Maack spoke to him alone. Tara spoke to him also, Afterward, Idrese came outside 
and told me again that Ted never spoke to him about a hit man and he never asked Ted to get 
a hit man, that everything Ted said was not true. Again, it was all bulls-t. 
56. I tried to get an appointment with Wally and Tara and Idrese during November, 
2005 so Idrese could be prepared to testify. However, Wally or Tara would not make the 
time available to speak to him or to prepare him to testify. 
51* After December 2, 2005,1 made several appointments for Idrese to come to 
Wally and Tara's office. Every appointment I made was canceled by either Wally or Tara, 
They never did speak to him between December 2 and December 15, 2005. I found this 
disconcerting in light of Wally's and Tara's December 2, 2005 letter to me-about the 
importance of having Idrese come to their office to be interviewed. I also found this strange 
that they did not asses Idrese when he first came to their office in the spring,. 2005. A true 
and correct copy of this letter is attached hereto, incorporated hereat, and marked Exhibit A. 
58. Exhibit A also addresses the phone records issues. My trial counsel had these 
records since February, 2005. Why were they so suddenly concerned about them on the eve 
01073 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
/<"X 
of trial, This letter demonstrates that they were not prepared, 
59. On December 8,2005,1 spoke for the lasttimetoldrese. He was still available 
to come in and testify and was willing to do so. As an aside, since I have been in prison, he 
disappeared. Mutual contacts have not heard from him since about a month after I was sent 
to prison; 
60. I needed to be called as a witness to rebut all of the nonsensical statements of 
Ted, Left alone, they could be very damaging. I told this to Waily and Tara and they agreed 
that these statements, left alone, could be extremely harmful to me. However, in my trial 
preparation, they never fully prepared me to testify to rebut the preliminary hearing testimony 
of Ted even, though I could since he lied constantly in his testimony. I knew he was very 
angry with me because of Melody, 
61, About the time we first met, he confronted me about Melody and even though 
I repeatedly told him there was no romantic involvement, he told me he did not believe me, 
He was very angry with me when he said this. He accused me of attempting to pull the wool 
over his eyes. He told me he had been around too long to allow this to happen. 
62, With this backdrop, it makes no sense that I would tell Ted, who was angry 
with me and told me so and accused me of lying to him and that he didn't trust me, that I 
wanted to get the name of a hit man from him in order to kill my exwife. Why would I place 
myself in this position with a man who hated me? Why would I give him something to hold 
over me? Yet, during trial, my trial counsel never effectively cross-examined him about this. 
In fact, over my strenuous objection while sitting at counsel table with them, they did not 
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make any objections to Ted's hearsay comraeafs concerning Idrese. 
I I , I also told Wally and Tara about a strange call I received from Ted Anthony 
after I met him at the apartments I managed in September, 2004. He told me he found a hit 
man for me who could take care of my exwife. I told him I had no idea what he was talking 
about. He kept pressing this hit man theme. I again told him I had no idea what he was 
talking about and to get the hell off from my phone. I told him he was crazy! Ted's 
conversation was out of the blue and I found this to be very strange. In retrospect, I believe 
he was wired and the conversation was being recorded, that Ted was an agent for the police. 
If this is trite,, my response to Ted's nonsensical statements would be mitigating 
circumstances which obligated the prosecutor to give a copy of the recording to my attorney; 
however, such was never provided my attorneys and,, as far as I know, my trial counsel never 
investigated this, never put in an additional discovery request and never contacted Detective 
Mitchell to see whether (1) Ted contacted Don at their request; (2) was wired or the*. 
conversation was recorded; (3) what Don said or what his response was. 
64. After the preliminary hearing, I. also told Wally and Tara about the 
confrontation Ted had with me when he accused me of having sex with Melody, I told them 
that Ted told me to stay away from her, that she was his girl. I also told them I had spoken 
to Melody who told me Ted was so angry with me and jealous that he swore to her he would 
get even with me, that he would set me up and take me down. I informed them that it was 
essential that Melody testify to this in order to establish a motive for Ted to lie during his 
testimony, that his testimony was part of him taking me down, 
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65. After the preliminary hearings, specifically Ted's testimony, my trial counsel 
promisedme they would get the information from DMV concerning Ted's Toyota SAV4 that 
he said was jointly owned by his fiance Keomi Cohn and him in order to impeach his 
testimony, .However, they never did. I feel that this would have been a good way to impeach 
Ted's testimony and. credibility by demonstrating he lied under oath during the preliminary 
hearings, They failed to investigate these facts in order to impeach Ted. 
66, Bill Penrod should have been called since Ted Anthony stated he had spoken to 
Penrod about this case and was hoping for leniency, R.491:19-20,24, I told Wally and Tara that it 
was important for Bill Penrod to testify to what Ted said during the preliminary hearing about 
speaking to him about the case which was completely untrue. I told them I had spoken to Penrod 
who told me that Ted did speak to him. Penrod told me when I spoke to him that Ted bragged he 
would take me down. He even said to Penrod, "How can Don mess around, with my girl [Melody] 
when he is in prison?" Penrod also told me his modus operandi was to lie about people to the police 
so he would get lenient treatment, that Penrod had seen him do this on past occasions. Trial counsel 
promised .they would investigate him and have him testify at trial. Even though named on the 
witness list, they failed to subpoena him and have him testify. 
••67. After the preliminary hearing, I spoke to Idrese Richardson about Ted 
Anthony's testimony that Idrese had contacted him many times about getting a hit man. 
Idrese just scoffed at this. He told me that the subject of a hit man never came up. He told 
me that Ted never told him about any east coast man helping him find his car. When I told 
him about what Ted had said. Idrese told me this was all made up (except he used several 
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expletives), 
68. Brmkerhoff testified he went to Susan's house hoping to meet with me to give 
me papers I requested R.502;382~83. He didn't know if I would hire him; liowever, at the 
West Valley City home to he renovated, I asked him to pull some permits and get documents 
forme so we could begin renovation. I told him that if I didn't get these permits, I would not 
be able to hire him. I didn't know he went to Susan's to meet me until after I was notified by 
the police of his involvement in the investigation. Had I been called to testify, I would have 
stated this, 
69. Without any of the foregoing being presented as a result of my trial counsel's 
ineffectiveness, I was prejudiced because all the jury heard was a very one-sided presentation 
of the evidence. My trial counsel did nothing to prevent this, and because they failed to make 
timely objections, really assisted the state in convicting me. On the other hand, had the jury 
heard my testimony as set forth herein, and the testimonies of Davey Desvari, Idrese 
Richardson* and William Penrod, as set. forth herein, the one-sided presentation would have 
stopped and this would have influenced the jury. My counsel should have cross-examined 
Ben Desvari and James Brinkerhoff at length about the phone records if they had come in 
over objection (which my counsel did not make) in order to destroy their credibility. Since 
that did not occur, I have been prejudiced as a result, 
70. Moreover, my counsel's failure to obtain an expert to testify about Susan's 
statements concerning her injuries prejudiced me. Without such and proper cross-
examination, all the jury heard was her uncontroverted version of the assault. 
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DATED January 2,2008. 
Da*~tJj M*A/' 
DONALD MILLARD 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me January 2,2008. 
My Commission Expires: 
Notary Public 
'Lr 
not km PUBLIC. 
P.O. Box 250 ' 
i#-f Drsp#r, Utah 4M020V 
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S A L T L A K E CITY, UT 84lO-<=> 
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December 2, 2005 
TAI=(A 'L. I S A A C S o hi 
Donald Millard 
1060 [.last Country Lane Road 
Salt Lake CiV, UT 84117 
PRJVILIzGBD 
A TTQRNEY/CLIEN T GOMM(MWATl9N 
Re: State v. Millard / Case No. 041300401 
D©ar Don: 
This letter will serve to confirm the multiple conversations we foav© hao thisMmsk 
and a lengthy conversation I had with your father on Friday. 
As you know, Wally and I have been aggressively preparing to defend you.. We 
are both prepared to shred the Government witnesses, However., we do not wTOtyqu ' 
to either Ignore or cavalierly dismiss our evidence concerns. I always think life 
important to confirm, in writing, what we m? thinking about the cas.& so thaf thare* is nb 
misunderstanding. 
As we have been meeting and preparing, I have triad to emphasize our moM 
serious issues. Specifically, we are most concerned about the phone* records., I have 
explained io you repeatedly how those records are going to be used by the. prosecutor. 
The timing of many of the calls are going to be used against you. 
At this point",'we are recommending.that you testify, -it is. ultimately yourdecfeion, 
but there are loo many explanations that can only come from you, We wjj.l continue ip 
prepare you for this experience. 
Another concern is Id res© - thus far, you have bean unable to get him in to meet 
with us to assess whether to call him for thai, if he doesn't back us up, our dofenseMs 
weakened. Wo cannot simply subpoena him for trial without assessing what lie will 
say. it needs to be your top priority to gel him in hare. We can anmng^ to ma&t with: 
him .any time on Tuesday the 61h, or we will find another time. We may decide not to 
call him. He may be too unreliable and dangerous, but we would like to m$®i with hltn 
to assess his usefulness, 
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BEC/l3/20D7/TflE 02:25 PM TDOELB CO ATTORNEY FAX h , 435 843 3127 P, Wi 
B U G D E N & I S A A C S O N 
December 2, 2005 
Page 2 
I do not want to even think about a negative outcome, but if is important that you 
understand the potential penalties in this case. Each charge is a First -Degree Felony. 
W|h multiple counts, they can be run consecutively ~ one after another, The potential 
penajty-on each count is 5 years to life. It is impossible to predict how much time you 
to did do if yo.u-were found guilty, it is ultimately up to the Board of Pardon:©.. The time 
cofcild: literally .be anywhere between 5 years to life in prison. We cannot make, ^rty 
g.uarantees OF .even reliable estimates about how-much time you.would sarva ifw@ wort 
unlucky afid thli}g:s do not go our way. ' ' 
-Our focus right now is on waning your case.. I will look forvyard to meeting wife 
you aptn .en tv3ond,ay;to continue preparations, 'Prepare, prepare, prepare! 
Tifew 
E;nclesime 
cc; Dy#ne Millard 
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DAVIDDRAKE5USB#0911 U ™ ^ I I A T E CGURU 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. mp .„
 q mu 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 H/ , l t ° 'UUB 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) SECOND AFFIDAVIT OF 
) GLENDA MILLARD 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
) 
vs. ) Appellate Case No. 20060336 V ^ 
) 
DONALD MILLARD, ) Trial Court Case No. 041300401 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant, ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
County of Salt Lake) 
GLENDA MILLARD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and if required to do so 
I could and would competently testify thereto. 
2, On or about September 115 2004,1 was notified, by my husband Duane Millard 
("Duane") that a meeting had been set up between Ben Desvari ("Ben"),a ™m listed by the 
state of Utah as a co-conspirator in the above-captioned case, Duane, me, and Don. Millard. 
("Don") for that evening. The meeting was to occur at a park located at approximately 4225 
South 1100 East, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
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3, At about 9:00 PM, the meeting did occur at the park in the southwest corner 
near the concession stand adjacent to the edge of the baseball diamond. Initially, my husband 
Duane spoke alone with Ben, while I was speaking to my son Don, Moments later we joined 
Ben and Duane. I heard Duane ask Ben why Don was being threatened with an arrest. Ben 
said, "Don hasn't done anything wrong. But, the police are making me say certain things about 
Don and I waited you know they are not true/' Duane asked," Why in the hell would you do that?" 
Ben said, "I've got myself into trouble and have to do and say certain things to get out of it" 
4 Ben told us he had been at Susan Hyatt's ("Susan") house in Grantsville chasing 
lizards when the police apprehended him. After he had been collared while doing this, he 
told us that Detective Chamberlain from the Grantsville Police Department went to his home 
in Salt Lake County and threatened him in front of his family, that if he didn't testify the way 
Detective Chamberlain wanted him to against Don, that Ben would be put in jail and 
prosecuted. He never once told us that when he was apprehended he was near Susan's home 
or that he was there to threaten or harm Susan. 
5, During this conversation in the park, Ben reiterated that Don had done nothing 
wrong and that he felt compelled to meet with us to tell us that, that Don was innocent and 
that he [Ben] was being coerced by Detective Chamberlain to make statements against Don, • 
6, Several time 1 told Wally Bugden ("Wally") and Tara L, Isaacson ("Tara") 
about this conversation with Ben in the park and the statements Ben said about Don's 
innocence and that he was being coerced into making accusations and untrue statements 
about Don, They never said much to me about any of this. By the way they conducted the 
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trial, it is obvious they never investigated or followed through with this information and 
never had me testify concerning what Ben told us during this conversation in the park* They 
did not cross-examine Ben about meeting my husband, Don, and me in the park and his 
statements to us that Don was innocent, that Don had nothing to do with what had happened 
to Susan, that Ben was only saying what Detective Chamberlain told him to in order to avoid 
being thrown in jail If Wally and Tara had me testify about this and properly cross-
examined Ben, it would appear to me as a layperson that reasonable doubt would have been 
established. 
7. Wally and Tara prepped me to testify at trial; however, they never prepped me 
regarding this incident with Ben at the Murray park or the incident when Detective 
Chamberlain called me and threatened me, even though I previously told them about both 
incidents. They only prepped me regarding Don's children which were in the custody of 
Susan. In fact, Wally and Tara> several times, cautioned me about what I should say about 
Susan, to always remember she was the mother of the children and the victim in this ca.se. 
(Why they used the word '"victim" is beyond me since she was not a victim until Don was 
convicted.) They never once commented on how incredible and unbelievable her story was, 
especially in light of the fact that the actual injuries she received were not consistent with her 
testimony as to how she received these injuries. In fact, it appeared to me that with their 
spineless attitude, they empowered Susan to lie under oath and get away with i t They never 
made her account for her mendacious testimony. 
8; Prior to this incident with Susan, my daughter-in-law's mother committed 
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suicide. As a result, Susan's and Don's children had been speaking of killing or death. Of 
course* Susan and Detective Chamberlain took this as if the children overheard Don or Don's 
family speaking of killing Susan, (Susan probably told the children that Don and his family 
planned on killing her.) This was never the case. The children had heard about this smcide 
(we had them with us on a vacation to Hawaii just prior to the incident with Susan and not 
long after the suicide incident) from things that were said by my family members. I was 
supposed to testify about this; however, Wally and Tara never had me do so. In fact, they 
never fully investigated my testimony regarding this. 
#. Wally and Tara promised us they would obtain a methamphetamine expert to 
testify about the effects of continued meth use, that it affected memory, made the user 
paranoid, and made the user easy to manipulate by playing on his unfounded and baseless 
fears, The meth expert's testimony was going to address the meth addictions of Ben, 
Brinkerhof^  and Ted Anthony and how such could have affected their memories and 
testimonies. No meth expert was obtained and none testified. 
10. In addition to Don and Duane informing Wally and Tara about the issue of 
child support payments and. how Don paid these, Wally and Tara promised to subpoena the 
records of ORS in order to demonstrate that it was Don's history to make large, lump sum 
child support payments and that he did not owe what Susan claimed that he owed. However, 
Wally and Tara never did subpoena these records which would have refuted Susan's 
testimony. Moreover, had Wally and Tara had Don testify, he could have testified thai he 
and a Salt Lake attorney had recently purchased a home to be renovated and then sold and 
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that Don's share of the proceeds would have then been paid to ORS as and for child support. 
11. I also learned that Doug Maack, the private investigator Wally hired, was not 
going to testify even though he had a wealth of information concerning Don's innocence and 
his complete lack of involvement in the so-called conspiracy, Mr. Maack had shared in my 
presence the fact that Don was the "cleanest guy he had ever seen." Yet, Wally and Tara 
never had him testify. 
12. In addition, to Don informing Wally and Tara of the Incident involving James 
Brinkerhoff at the Tooele County Jail, I also spoke to Wally and Tara about what happened 
when Don had been in jail in Tooele County and in a cell next to James Brinkerhoff 
("Brinkerhoff'), that Brinkerhoff told Don that he was being forced by Detective 
Chamberlain into testifying against Don; otherwise, he would not get his complete immunity. 
I also informed them that Brinkerhoff had told Don that he knew Don was completely 
innocent. Wally and Tara did absolutely nothing with this information. They did not have 
Don testify concerning this conversation and they did not cross-examine Brinkerhoff about 
the conversation. Once again, a golden opportunity to create reasonable doubt was ignored, 
13. Weeks prior to trial, Wally and Tara told me that Don would testify, that his 
testimony was very important, especially since he could testify to things that were only 
known by him or only about which he could testify in order to refute the state's case. In fact, 
they prepped Don several times for his trial testimony. 
14. On the day Don was scheduled to testify, I learned that Wally and Tara told him 
he was not testifying. I could not figure why they did this. Don's testimony was critical to 
-J-
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his defense. He had nothing to hide. He had no criminal record. His statements to the police 
were very straightforward and consistent. He could have provided an explanation to the 
issues raised by the state's witnesses. He could have caused the jury to have reasonable 
doubt. Since he was not allowed to testify, the jury heard no explanation and never 
considered those facts which Don could have provided to establish reasonable doubt. By him 
not testifying, the statements of the co-conspirators, were not refuted or challenged. 
15. I was involved in conversations where Don told Wally and Tara that it was very 
essential to have Davey Desvari testify in his behalf, that Davey would testify he used Don's 
cell phone many times to contact his brother Ben Desvari and make other calls because he 
did not have a cell phone. The phone call to Magna was discussed. I heard Wally and Tara 
promise Don they wouid subpoena Davie Desvari; however, they never did and he did not 
testify at trial Again, Wally and Tara missed another golden opportunity to create reasonable 
doubt. Ditto for my testimony had they called me to testify. 
16. For more than one week prior to September 11,2004, defendant, his children, 
his father, others, and I were on a cruise in the Pacific. The cruise lasted approximately 4 
days. At its end, defendant and the others indicated above visited various amusement parks 
in Southern California for another three days. We then traveled by car from California to 
Salt Lake City. 
17. We arrived in Salt Lake City at approximately 8:00 p.m. Defendant had 
decided to have his children stay overnight with my husband and me. The children wereput 
to bed and Don helped bring in our luggage. Don then left for his home on the Avenues at 
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the Pollyanna Apartments. The time he left was approximately 8:40 p.m. It would take 
^proximately 15 to 20 minutes to drive from my home to defendant's apartment. 
i 8. I called Don at about 5 minutes to 9:00 p.m. to see whether he got home okay 
because he was quite tired after the drive from California. He confirmed he got home okay 
and told me that Davey Desvari had just called him and was on his way over to Don's 
apartment so they could plan their construction project on the Pollyanna Apartments. 
19. At about 10 or so minutes after 9:00 p.m., I called Don on his land line phone 
to ask him about various items he had left at our home that I had just found. These items 
included his camera, laptop computer, and toiletries bag. Davey Desvari. answered the land 
line. I asked him how he was doing and he replied okay. He then told me he was speaking 
to a friend on Don's cell phone and asked me to hold for a minute because Don was out to 
his truck getting his luggage from the trip to bring into the apartment, (I knew Davey's voice 
because he had done some electrical work for us on our home and I frequently spoke to him 
during this project.) 
20. While I was waiting for Don to come back to his apartment, I heard Davey in 
the background speaking on the cell phone to someone and Davey was discussing getting 
some stuff "in order to ease [their] pain" and was speaking about how much money it would 
take. Evidently, money was not an issue because Davey then said he would drive to Magna 
to get the stuff As he was saying goodbye, Davey said he would be leaving the avenues 
soon and would see the person he was speaking to in a short while. 
21. Don finally came to the phone and I told him about the personal items he had 
~7-
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left at my home. Don told me he would pick up these items in the morning when he got the 
kids to take to Susan's home. 
22. Don called our home on September 11,2004 at approximately 10:35 p jn. to 
tell us that Susan called him and demanded that the children be returned that evening. Don 
told us that he was coming to our home from his apartment on the avenues in Salt Lake City 
to pick up the children and take them to Grantsville. He requested that my husband and I 
accompany the children and him. We agreed, 
23. Don arrived at our home at approximately 11:00 p.m. Don called Susan's 
phone number from our home and left a message to the effect that he was on his way with 
the children. 
24. We traveled to Grantsville which took us about 3/4 of an hour to get to Susan 
Hyatt's home. 
25. During the drive, Don made several calls to Susan Hyatt's home and left 
messages because no one answered. 
26. When we arrived at Susan's home, we were met by the police at Susan Hyatt's 
home. At approximately 11:45 p.m., defendant was taken to the police station and 
questioned for almost one hour, My husband and I waited for him and eventually picked him 
up at the Grantsville Police Department. Defendant called us at 12:39 a.m. to pick him up. 
We then traveled together straight back to Salt Lake City without any stops, 
27. Early Tuesday evening after the third day of trial (December 13, 2005) my 
husband and I had dinner with Don. During dinner, Don informed us that after dinner he was 
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going to Wally's office to again prepare to testily for trial in the morning. After 9:00 p.m., 
I received a call from Don who was very upset. He told me he had just mot with Tara and she 
would not allow me to testify the next day. He really felt like all was lost because the jury would 
never ...hear any contrary testimony to the testimonies of Ben, Brinkerhoff3 and Ted Anthony, that 
their testimonies would remain unchallenged. 
28. On the fourth clay of trial, I was scheduled to testify. As 1 was waiting outside the 
courtroom waiting for witnesses to be called, Wally Bugden came out into the hall, walked up to me 
and told me that I was not going to testify. In about the same breath, he told me (my husband was 
standing next to me) that he and Tara had decided that Don was not going to testify (that is exactly 
how he put it), that they had raised enough reasonable doubt. Wally told me they would not let Don 
testify because it may destroy any reasonable doubt they had created with their cross-examination. 
Wally then walked off with my husband, evidently to discuss his testimony. 
29. To this day, I cannot understand why Wally and Tara did. not mount a vigorous 
defense, why they failed and refused to subpoena witnesses material to Don's case, why they did not 
allow Don to testify, why they didn't ask Duane any questions concerning meeting Ben Desvari in 
the Murray park, why they didn't have Diane Martin testify about her meeting Ben Desvari in her 
home and hearing him say that Don did nothing wrong, that Ben was being pressured by Detective 
Chamberlain to testify against Don, and why they did not allow me to testify to show- that 
Btinkerhoff was lying when he said he met Don the evening of September 11, 2004 in Magna 
because all of Don's time had been accounted for during that evening. 
30. My testimony in this regard would have shown that Brinkerhoff was not telling the 
truth. Don could not have met with him on September 11 > 2004. First he was traveling ail day from 
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Southern California to Salt Lake City. Second, we all arrived at our Salt Lake City home at about 
8:00 p.m. Don stayed there to put the children to bed and assist my husband and I in carrying in 
luggage (some of which was conuninglecl with his). He then left at about 8:40 p.m. to go to his 
apartment in the avenues. I then spoke to him twice, the second time on his land line, confirming 
he was home. He then called me at about 10:35 and told me he was coming to get the children to 
go to Grantsville. He arrived at our house at about 1-1:00 p.m. and we then went to Grantsville, 
arriving there at about 11:45 p.m. Thereafter, Don met with Detective Chamberlain until about 
12:39 a.m. on September 12, 2004. 
3 L Brinkerhoff testified that Don came to Magna to meet with him after Brinkerhoffleft 
Susan's and went to sister's home, R. 502:3 86, However, he never testified on direct to when, where, 
and how long, and Wally and Tara never even asked him these questions in their cross-examination 
of him. Consequently, the jury was never made aware of any of these details. Without speciics, 
Brinkerhoff s testimony could not be challenged. Moreover, by asking questions about details, many 
times such questions lead to the witness contradicting himself or saying he can't remember or 
whatever, anything to attack his credibility. Trial counsel never did. this however. 
32, Since trial counsel did not cross-examine Brinkerhoff in this fashion, it was never 
established how when and where Don met him. Ditto for how long. If Brinkerhoff said that Don 
met him late in the evening, in light of Detective Chamberlain's testimony, such a meeting would 
have been impossible since Don was with Chamberlain. Another answer could have been elicited 
through proper cross-examination to show that Brinkerhoff was lying. Don was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's lack of effective cross-examination because there was no testimony to challenge what • 
Brinkerhoff stated. 
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33. Had proper cross-examination occurred, Don, Diane Martin, and I could have testified 
that there was no way Don could have driven all the way from Southern California to Salt Lake City, 
get in at 8:00 p.m., then go to his place, meet Davey Desvari, speak to me, speak to Diane Martin, 
and then come to my house and pick up his kids and my husband and I, travel to Grantsville, be 
iiaterviewed by Detective Chamberlain and then begin to travel home with his parents at about 1:00 
a.m. 
34. Since I was with Don driving from Grantsville to Salt Lake City, I know for a fact that 
Don did not stop in Magna and see Brinkerhoff. Once we left Grantsville, we made a beeline to Salt 
Lake City, I would have testified to this. Moreover, trial counsel knew this but failed to investigate 
or act upon it. During our conversations about the phone records, I informed trial counsel what I had 
heard Davey Desvari say on Don's cell phone while I was waiting for Don to pick up his land line 
and speak to me. They heard what I said but never went any further. They failed to investigate my 
statements in comparison to the phone records. 
35. Had the jury heard our testimonies concerning the foregoing,! am certain this would 
have created a great deal of reasonable doubt. However, Wally and Tara did not call any witnesses 
to directly challenge the testimonies of any of the co-conspirators. My testimony could have directly 
challenged what Ben Desvari stated, about Don's innocence when he met with Don, Duane, and 1 in 
the Murray park. There were three witnesses to what Ben admitted in the park and four witnesses 
that he met with us in the Murray park. 
-77-
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) AFFIDAVIT OF DIANE C. MARTIN 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
vs. ) Appellate Case No. 20060336-\c A 
DONALD MILLARD, ) Trial Court Case No. 041300401 
) 
Defendant/Appellant, ) 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
DIANE C. MILLARD, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1.-,. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and if required to do so I could 
and would competently testily thereto. 
2; Prior to Wally Bugden (" Wally") and Tara Isaacson (Tara") entering an appearance 
of counsel, I told David Brown, Don Millard's former attorney, about a meeting I had with Don 
Millard ("Don1'), Ben Dcsvari ("Ben"), and me in my home on or about September 15, 2004 (with 
the passage of time, the exact date is fuzzy). Earlier that day, Don called me and told me his name 
was being mentioned on the radio and he wanted to speak to me. Later that day, Don and Ben came 
to my house in separate cars,. Ben following Don. Evidently, Don wanted to speak to Ben with me 
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being present to see who this friend was that had been mentioned on the radio - that Don had hired 
a friend to kill his exwife. They arrived separately at my house and I invited them in. Ben told both 
of us but speaking directly to Don, "I know that you [Don] wouldn't do nothing wrong. You didn't 
hire anyone to kill your exwife/' I was standing next, to Ben and clearly heard him say this. Ben 
said, "Whatever happened didn't have anything to do with you Don, you didn't have any part in this 
plot to kill your exwife, and you didn't do anything wrong." We spoke for a few moments. Ben 
seemed somewhat distracted. He then said, "As far as I know? the cops are shooting in the dark, they 
are only guessing," He reiterated, "You did not have anything to do with this." Had I been called 
to testify, I would have truthfully testified to this. 
3. A day or two later after this meeting with Don and Ben in my home, I was contacted 
by Don and was told that Ben wanted to meet with his parents and him in a park in Murray. Don 
didn't want Ben to know where his parents lived so this park was suggested as a meeting place, Don 
wanted me to take him to the park and then pick up his parents and bring them to the park (probably 
because I have a small car and couldn't take all of them in it). I took Don to the park somewhat prior 
to 9:00 p.m. Ben was not there yet. I then went to Dtiane and Glenda Millard's home and picked, 
them up> When we got to the park, Ben was there with Don, Duane and Glenda Millard exited my 
car and walked up to Don and Ben. They all spoke to each other for a few moments. I saw Don and 
Glenda Millard ("Glenda") walk away from Duane Millard ("Duane1*) who was speaking to Ben. 
Then Don and Glenda came back to Duane and Ben and all of them spoke together. This park 
meeting lasted about 30 minutes. 
4 Later, I also told David Brown about what Ben told Don and me at my home and this 
meeting in the park. Because of Ben's admissions in my home that Don had nothing to do with any 
"plot" to harm his exwife Susan Hyatt, David Brown was extremely interested and stated that this 
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was compelling evidence in favor of Don. David Brown even went so far as to suggest that I get a 
recorder and call or meet with Ben and get him to repeat what he had said about Don's innocence so 
I could record this and David Brown would use it as evidence in favor of Don to show that Don was 
completely innocent of any involvement in any attempts to harm Susan Hyatt. I never had the 
opportunity to do this. Again, had I been called to testify, I would have truthfully testified about 
these events, 
5. Shortly after the above events, David Brown was replaced by Wally Bugden 
(" Wally") and Tara Isaacson ("Tara"). Subsequent to taking over the case, Tara interviewed me. The 
interview lasted, about 10 minutes. She never once asked about any conversations I had with Ben 
Desvari or about the meeting that occurred in the park between Don Millard, Duane Millard, Glenda 
Millard, and Ben Desvari. She never spoke to me about my conversation with Don at about 9:30 
p.m. on September 11,2004, that I heard Davey Desvari in Don's apartment saying goodbye to Don, 
I thought this was strange since I assumed Wally and Tara would have obtained David Brown's file. 
All Tara talked to me about was how long I had known Don, how I knew Ben, how long I had known 
Ben, if I ever socialized with Ben and his wife, and other minor and seemingly irrelevant things 
concerning Don's character. She told me at the end of the interview that if she or Wally had .any 
questions, they would contact me. They never did and never followed through. 
6. Subsequent to this conversation with Tara, I was contacted by Doug Maack who 
identified himself as a private investigator for Wally and Tara and would report to them any 
information he got from me. I met with him several times. I told him about the meeting in the park 
between Don, Duane, and Glenda and my involvement in taking them to the park and seeing Ben 
speaking to them there. I also told him about Ben and Don being in my home and what Ben said 
about Don being innocent, that he had nothing to do with any plot to harm Susan, that he was not 
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involved in any way, I even suggested that Doug Maack have me wired so I could contact Ben and 
record his conversations. I told him I was willing to testify for Don at trial and my testimony would 
include what the information I gave him concerning my personal loiowledge of the admissions of 
Ben Desvari. I also informed him that I called Don after 9:00 p.m. on September 11,2004 and heard 
Davey Desvari in the background saying goodbye to Don, that this would provide proof that Davey 
Desvari could have made the call to Magna. However, nothing ever came of this, There was no 
follow-through and I had no indication whatsoever that Wally and Tara ever further investigated my 
involvement in this case. 
7. Even after my several conversations with Doug Maack, I was never contacted by 
Wally or Tara about anything that I told him, I found this to be very strange; again, indicating that 
Wally and Tara were unwilling to thoroughly investigate my involvement, 
8, Many times prior to trial, Don told me that he was going to testify at trial. He was 
quite anxious to do so because he told me he had been framed and he wanted to sot the record 
straight and tell the jury that he was not involved, that he had nothing to do with any plot or 
conspiracy to hurt Susan Hyatt, and that he could contradict the testimonies of James Brinkerhoff, 
Ben Desvari,, and Ted Anthony that they gave at the preliminary hearing. He was anxious to produce 
all of his notes that he had taken, as a matter of course, of the events that occurred during the spring 
and summer of 2004, I have seen these notes prior to Don being charged with conspiracy to commit 
aggravated murder. I know that they were prepared at the time the events described therein occurred 
because I saw some of them right after they had been written (this was prior to his being charged and 
when there was no controversy pending). Don informed me that these notes were not used a trial. 
I cannot imagine why because, in my opinion, they would have exonerated Don or provided 
reasonable doubt concerning his innocence. 
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9. These many times Don told me that he was going to testify at trial, he never once 
showed any reluctance to testify, In fact, he was excited to testify. He was also excited about having 
David Desvari testify at trial He told me he felt certain that if he and David Desvari testified that 
he would not be convicted. Don told me that David Desvari would testify that Don was not involved 
in any plot to kill his exwife. He told me that David Desvari would testify to the fact that he used 
Bon's cell phone many times and. in feet, did so during the evening of September 115 2004. He also 
told me that if I testified at trial regarding my involvement with Ben Desvari, he felt that would 
create the quantum of reasonable doubt to exonerate him. 
10, I knew- Davey Desvari quite well since he had done electrical work on my home in 
Midvale. He also did electrical work on a house Don and I were renovating in Midvale, 
1L Based upon my relationship with Don and his family, I was aware that the family had 
taken a short cruise to Mexico and then visits to various theme parks in Southern California for a 
couple of days. I knew that Don and his family would arrive in. Salt Lake City during the evening 
ofSeptemberll,2007. 
12. During the evening of September 11,2004,1 called Glenda Millard's home to see if 
Don were there. Glenda informed me that he had gone home to his apartment in the avenues in Salt 
Lake City. My recollection is that I called Don at his apartment (using his land line) around 9:30 
p.m. He answered die phone and we talked about his trip and how much the children enjoyed being 
with him and their grandparents, He told me his children didn't want to go home and wanted to stay 
with him and his parents, 
IS Don also told me that Davey Desvari and he were starting a. construction project on 
the Pollyanna Apartments in the morning. 
W. During this September 115 2004 conversation with Don, Don told me to hold aminute 
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and he left the line. I heard him say goodbye to Davey. I heard Davey (I recognized his voice) reply 
that he would bring Monte with him to do the project in the morning and would see Don then. I also 
heard Davey say that they expected Don to spring for breakfast since they were coming that early. 
15. I spoke to Don on his home phone until he told me he had to answer his cell phone 
to see who kept calling him. He left the line again and I heard him answer his cell phone. I heard 
him in the background say that he would not bring back the children that evening because they were 
already in bed at his parents1 place, Don then came back to the phone and told me he had to say 
goodbye because Susan was demanding that he bring, .the children back to Grantsville that night. 
Based upon my recollection*-we terminated our call around 10:30 p.m. on September 11,2004. Had 
I been called to testify, I would have truthfully testified to these facts. 
16. I was interviewed by David Drake regarding the facts in this affidavit. He informed 
me that my testimony would have been crucial since I could have testified at trial about what Ben 
Desvari told me, told Don, and that I had personally witnessed Ben Desvari meeting with Don and 
his parents at the Murray park. David Drake also informed me that my testimony was critical to 
contradict James Brinkerhoff s testimony that Don met with him in Magna after about 8:00 p.m. on 
the evening of September 11, 2004. 
17. There is no way that Don could have been to Brinkerhoff s sister's home in Magna 
from the time I called since I called him on.his land line at about 9:30 p.m. and the call was ended 
about an hour later. I believe my testimony would have been critical to challenge Brinkerhoff s 
credibility, demonstrating that he was not being truthful during this trial. 
18. I have never heard Don say anything about wishing his wife were dead or making any 
similar statements. He has always spoken respectfully about her whenever she came up in our 
conversations. This, coupled with what Ben said to me and. others, demonstrates his innocence. 
- & • 
01 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DATED tbis ifL day of November, 2007, 
'DIANE C.MARTIN / 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this i l day of November, 2007. 
. • • ; 
•-" Y\ 
Z . . - ' -~ — _,-" y / 
Notary Public' 
My Commission Expires: 
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DAVID DRAKE, USB #091 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Attorney for Appellant 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURT 
MAR-3» 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF YIPPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
DONALD MILLARD, 
Defendant/Appel 1 ant, 
AFFIDAVIT OF MELODY A. OLIVER 
Appellate Case No. 2G060336-SCA 
Trial Court Case No. 041300401 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
; ss. 
County of Salt Lake) 
MELODY A. OLIVER, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says: 
1. I have personal knowledge of the facts stated herein and if required to do so 
I could and would competently testify thereto. 
2. I would be available to testify in the event of a retrial or a remand. What is 
contained in this affidavit is what I would have testified to had I been called as a witness for 
Don Millard at his trial during December, 2005. 
3. As of December, 2005,1 had known Ted Anthony ("Ted") on and off for about 
13 years. During this period of time, I know that Ted's pattern, and practice when he had 
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criminal cases pending against him, was to be a confidential informant against others so he 
could receive favorable treatment on the charges pending against him at the time he was a 
confidential informant. This was so even if he had to make up things against the person he 
was turning over to the police. I know this because I have heard him say things that were 
simply not true in order to obtain favorable treatment* 
4. During July, 2004, Ted came back into my life after an eight-month absence. 
At the time, I was a tenant in the apartments in Midvale, Utah that Don Millard ("Don") was 
managing. Ted thought I have having a romantic relationship with Don and this made him 
extremely jealous. He accused me of this and questioned me at length aboutmy relationship 
with Don. I told him that I had no romantic relationship with him. Ted obviously did not 
believe this. I told Ted that Don was a very good person and was a good example and 
influence in my life and was inspiring me to change my life. Ted did not want to hear this. 
He told me many times he hated Don and wanted to destroy him. I believe my statements 
about how good Don was/is made him more jealous of Don than he was before he spoke to 
me about him. In fact, Ted mentioned that he would get even with Don, no matter what it 
took, He told me he would testify against Don and say whcitever was necessary to get him 
convicted because he hated him so much. 
5. During 2004, Ted was arrested for various crimes. When I researched this 
further, I discovered that Ted had been spying on me and stalking me. I called his father and 
told him Ted was in jail. This is when I discovered that Ted was an informant against Don, 
that he was trying to get Don in trouble so he would receive favorable treatment on his 
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current charges and was hoping they would be dismissed because of what he planned on 
saying against Don. 
6. I brought this up to Ted, that he was taking away a person away from me who 
was the only good influence in my life by attempting to get him in trouble. I was referring 
to Don and Ted knew this. He didn't care. In fact, I believe this made him more angry. 
7. Had I been called to testify, I would have been able to testify about Don's 
character. He was a very good man. He was always helping others. He couldn't stand to see 
others in trouble. He was the most level-headed, even-tempered, forgiving person I have 
ever encountered. In fact, even today, I attempt to emulate his example. He went to church 
every Sunday, He lived his religion. He was always willing to listen and speak to people who 
had problems and would bring their problems to him. He would go the extra mile. He was 
always willing to help me. 
8. Don was very devoted to his children. He always spoke of them and was a very 
good father to them. In the more than two years I knew Don, I never heard him say that he 
wished any harm to his exwife. 
9. I was around Don when he had his children. He was very attentive to them and 
sensitive to their needs. I never heard him say anything negative about his exwife, I heard 
him on the phone with them. If they asked if he could come over to play, he would first ask 
if they cleared it with their mother. I witnessed that he was supportive of their mother when 
I was with Don and the children. 
-£-
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DATED this, day of October, 2007. 
U^M^t 
A. OLIVER 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 12= day of October, 2007. 
M&A (1/U d i ^ U 
Notary Public 
My Commission Expires: 
2~) I7(2e>& / 
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DAVID DRAKE, USB # 0911 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
6905 South 1300 East #248 
Midvalc, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF TOOELE, TOOELE DEPARTMENT 
RULE 52(b) MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS AND MAKE ADDITIONAL 
FINDINGS (VERIFIED BY DAVID 
DRAKE) 
Trial Case No. 041300401 
Appellate Case No. 20060336 
Judge Mark S. Kouris 
COMES NOW defendant, by and through his attorney of record, David Drake, and hereby 
files this Rule 52(b), U.R.CI v.P., motion and supporting memorandum to amend the findings entered 
by this Court on March 6,2009 concerning the remand hearing pursuant to the remand order issued 
by the Utah Court of Appeals. Defendant requests that this Court amend its findings to confonn to 
the objections contained herein, specifically that this Court find that defendant was not properly 
advised of his right to testify, that he did not waive his right to testify, and that defense counsel were 
ineffective in not informing him that he had a constitutional right to testify. Consequently, that he 
did not voluntarily waive his right to testify. Moreover, that this Court find that defense counsel 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DONALD MILLARD, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
a ) 
) 
) 
) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
were not credible witnesses, especially Ms. Isaacson due to her statements contradicting David 
Drake's letter and the fact that she stated she did not get the letter. Moreover, defendant requests 
that this Court amend the findings in the manner set fortli in the incorporated supporting 
memorandum. 
This motion is timely in that Rule 52(b) requires that it be made within 10 days of the entry 
of the findings, The court docket indicates that the findings were signed by Judge Kouris on 
February 20,2009 and were entered, on March. 6,2009. In light of Rule 6(a), U.R.Ci v.P., this motion 
and memorandum which is being filed on March 20.2009 is timely. 
DATED March 20, 2009. 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
A v A $ 
David Drake 
-2-
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MEMORANDUM 
Finding 5, is not supported by the evidence. For example, Mr. Bugden did not manifest 
knowing about the exhibits supposedly manufactured by Ms. Isaacson and never testified to their 
content. Moreover, even though. Mr. Bugden had the phone records for at least 10 months prior to 
trial* he admitted he never went over the phone records with defendant during that whole IQ-moiath 
period. P.3L transcript. 
Referring to the affidavit of David Drake. Mr. Bugden was asked, "[dj-id you ever do this type 
of analysis when you were looking at the phone records against the backdrop of Desvari and 
Brinkeroffs testimonies? A. I didn't. Tara would have done that. P.42, transcript. 
These examples demonstrate little or no corroboration between Mr. Bugden's testimony aid 
Ms. Isaacson's testimony. 
Finding 6 regarding the credibility of Mr. Bugden is not supported by the evidence. On December 
2, 20Q5, Mr. Bugden sent Mr. Millard a letter, a copy of which is attached hereto, incorporated 
hereat, and marked Exhibit A. This letter made one little mention about Don testifying: "At this 
point, we are recommending that you testily. It is ultimately your decision, but there are too many 
explanations that can only come from you.M That is all. this letter stated. When Mr. Bugden testified, 
he was not. forthright about what, he stated in his letter to Mr. Mil lard about testifying. His testimony 
stated that in the December 2, 2005 letter he said. "It was ultimately your decision, and only you 
could make that decision.M Only you can make that, decision is not in the letter. And, as quoted 
above, it says, "but there are too many explanations that can only come from you. We will continue 
to prepare you for this experience." Mr. Bugden was adding language not contained in the letter. 
See p. 24 remand transcript. See also Exhibit 21 and objection to Finding 29. 
-J-
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Moreover, Mr. Bugden was arrogant and acted cute, almost as if "how dare he be challenged" 
attitude. With this attitude, everything he stated concerning critical issues, such as right to-testily, 
having certain witnesses testily, etc, would all he self-serving. An example of his euteness and 
arrogance is found at page 76, remand hearing transcript, 4iQ. Mr. Bugden, your cuteness is noted. 
Let's get to the issues at hand. You never sent out a letter to Don confirming that he had told you 
that, did you? A. No." 
Finding 9 is not supported by the evidence. See the objection to Finding 5. 
finding 10 is not supported by the evidence. Ms. Isaacson attempted to introduce documents into 
evidence that had never been seen by Mr. Drake and. were not contained in the files delivered to him 
by Ms. Isaacson.1 Defendant's motion and memorandum to supplement the remand record 
demonstrates her veracity is in question. Moreover, this Court granted defendant's motion to 
supplement the remand record allowing defendant to place into evidence two documents 
demonstrating that Ms. Isaacson was not telling the truth during her testimony. Under examination, 
she first denied that Mr, Drake had ever requested her whole file. Then, when Mr. Guyon read her 
a letter from Mr. Drake's computer requesting the whole file several times, in that letter, she denied 
receiving the letter. The order granting defendant's motion to supplement the remand record 
contained two exhibits, one, the actual letter and two, copies of bank records showing that Ms. 
Isaacson endorsed and negotiated a check in the amount of $506.25 which was contained in the letter 
she denied receiving. Obviously, she is not telling the truth. She first denied Mr. Drake requested 
1
 On Tuesday, September 30, 2008, Mr. Drake drove to Tooele and met Gary Searle outside the 
courthouse to discuss the issue of exhibits. Mr. Drake asked Mr. Searle whether it had filed its list of 
exhibits. Mr. Searle told Mr. Drake that the State did not have any exhibits to be introduced into evidence. 
Defendant relied on that statement, obviously to his detriment. Surprise, at the hearing, Ms. Isaacson 
introduced several exhibits that had never been seen by Mr. Drake and had not ever been furnished to Mr. 
Drake. 
• - 4 . 
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the whole file. Then when confronted with the fact that Mr. Drake sent her a letter requesting the 
whole file, she denied receiving the letter. However, Ms. Isaacson cannot deny that she received the 
letter when she endorsed and negotiated the $506.25 check contained in that letter. These: facts 
clearly demonstrate that Ms. Isaacson was not a completely credible witness. Attached hereto, 
incorporated hereat. and marked Exhibit B is defendant's memorandum filed in support of his 
motion to supplement the remand record. 
Finding .12 is not supported by the record. Mr. JBugden did not personally subject defendant to 
rigorous cross-examination to prepare him for trial citing R. at 22: 13-20. That portion of the 
transcript states: "Our conclusion was that Don might be a passable witness, and we did believe that 
there were a number of areas where Don could fill in the cracks, if he could hold up on cross 
examination. But always in the back of our mind, without being too sycophantic to Gary Searle, was 
the concern that Searle is - he is a good lawyer and a tough cross examiner, and that Don might not 
hold up to Gary Searle's cross examination." 
Finding 13 is not supported by the record. This finding states that "phone records corroborate this 
claim". That is not true and such language is not found at 11,22:13-20. The phone records do not 
corroborate what Brinkerhoff testified to. See Affidavit of David Drake, filed in support of the Rule 
23B motion, a copy of which, is attached hereto, incorporated hereat, and marked Exhibit C> In fact, 
it is defendant's argument, that Mr. Bugden and M.s. Isaacson never did do an in-depth review of 
these phone records. Otherwise, they would have been able to see that Brinkeroff s testimony did 
not match the phone records. See *JH| 8-13 of the Affidavit of David Drake. 
Finding 20 concerning their statements to defendant that he had an unequivocal right to testify is 
not suppoited by the record. There is no written evidence to substantiate the very self-serving 
.5-
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statements of .Mr. Bugden and Ms, Isaacson that they advised him he had a right to testily. Finding 
19 states that the defense team concedes they did not advise defendant that he had a constitutional 
right to testify, How, then, could they advise him of a right to testify if they failed to explain the 
actual right? How could defendant be expected to know where this right came from if his defense 
counsel failed to explain the nature of the right and the right? 
Finding 29 is not supported by the evidence. The phone call where defendant told Ben Desvari that 
he had not arrived home was not part of the police interview. In other words, what defendant told 
Mr. Desvari while answering his phone call had nothing to do with the interview with Det 
Chamberlain. It was during this interview that defendant received a phone call from Desvari. Only 
defendant's side of the conversation was recorded. Not to Det. Chamberlain, but to Desvari and in 
an attempt to get Desvari off the phone, defendant gave him a story to terminate the call. This is 
contrary to Mr, Bugden's testimony. Moreover, this one-sided statement to Desvari was not made 
under oath. Many times things are said to other persons to get them off the phone. On the other 
hand., there has been the testimonies of two other credible witnesses that they spoke to Don while 
he was at home that evening prior to going to the Grantsville Police Station. Mr. Bugden testified 
that ^During his interview at the police station he said he had never been home, that his luggage was 
still in the car, that he had not been home to his apartment yet. That's on a transcript, a transcribed 
statement of the defendant at the police station." That is absolutely false. Mr. Millard received a 
phone call from Ben Desvari while defendant was being interviewed at the police station and 
imbeknowst to defendant, his side of the conversation was being recorded. Defendant never made 
this statement to the police interviewer, as Mr. Bugden would have this Court believe. Again, this 
challenges Finding 6 concerning Mr. Bugden5 s credibility. A copy of the police interview is attached 
-tf-
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hereto, incorporated hereat and marked Exhibit C. 
Moreover, had defense counsel properly cross-examined Brinkerhoff about the timing of the 
phone calls, this issue never would have arisen. How could not asking Mr. Brinkerhoff the date ~~ 
or the time, the place and who was present, when he allegedly met with Don on the evening of the 
supposed attack on. Susan Hyatt be a strategic decision In light of the fact that defendant had just 
arrived back from California and met the police in Grantsville at about 11:30 pan/? Especially in 
light of the fact that the alleged attack -occurred after 8:00 p.m. Wally didn't even explore the 
possibility of an alibi for his client by failing to ask these very critical questions. R.30-31, This type 
of cross-examination is critical in light of the fact that Finding 38 speaks in terms of an "unexpected 
trial development or as Mr. Bugden put, the testimony of Brinkerhoff caused him to have a come-
to-Jesus meeting with defendant. That is how critical defense counsel viewed this phone call 
testimony. In light of this, the feet that Mr. Bugden failed to ask critical and simple questions of 
Brinkerhoff concerning the time he called defendant after 8:00 p.m. and the time defendant allegedly 
met him in Magna would have avoided this issue. These facts and omissions clearly contradict f 5, 
RULE 23B FINDINGS ON CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Finding 32 regarding the difficulty of making a note of handing a phone to a friend is not supported 
by the record. 
Finding 33 is also unsupported by the evidence. The Court stated that defendant's affidavit is 
riddled with numerous inconsistencies and contradictions. That is not true. Concerning the $20,000 
owed to ORS, defendant thought that he owed much less because he would repair homes, sell them, 
and give the proceeds to ORS toward back child support. Moreover, he was not otherwise advised 
by his divorce counseL But, what is overlooked, is the feet that defense counsel promised defendant 
*T>. 
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they would subpoena ORS records and use these in trial preparation. They never did this. Had they 
done so and the ORS records showed the amount owed this would not have been an issue. Had 
these records been obtained as promised and shown to defendant, which they were not, defendant 
never would have placed anything in his affidavit that contradicted the ORS records. His affidavit 
is a reflection of his perception of what he owed. Consequently, such is not a lie. 
However, had defendant testified, as it was his right to do so, he would have declared his 
method of payment - to refurbish a home, sell it, and apply the proceeds to past due child support-
In fact, he would have testified that he was in the process of remodeling a home at the time of the 
occurrence on September 11
 ? 2004. 
The only other seemingly inconsistency is a statement, not under oath, and not during a police 
interview, to Ben Desvari about having been at home and still having luggage in his vehicle. 
Otherwise, defendants affidavit is not riddled with numerous inconsistencies and contradictions. 
Finding 35 is not supported by the evidence. The Court manifested its doubt concerning a written 
journal entry handing off his phone to another. However, the affidavit of defendant demonstrates 
he is a copious note taker, something neither Ms. Isaacson or Mr. Bugden denied. Moreover, this 
record regarding the hand-off to Davey Desvari of his cell phone was directly discussed in 
defendant's affidavit, %% 27-29. 
What is very interesting is that Mr. Bugden admitted at the remand trial (R.40) that Davey 
Desvari would have been a relevant witness had he known that the phone exclusively used by Ben 
Desvari actually belonged to Davey Desvari. This clearly demonstrates that Mr. Bugden was not 
prepared for trial. He never reviewed the transcripts of the preliminary hearings prior to trial. 
Otherwise, he would have known that the phone Ben Desvari was using belonged to Davey Desvari. 
-S--
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Mr. Bugden knew that for two reasons: (1) at the preliminary hearing on December 2L 2004, Ben 
Desvari testified that the phone he exclusively used belonged to Davey Desvari; and (2) the phone 
records Mr. Bugden had for 10 months included Davey Desvarrs phone records -with his name on 
the records. Attached hereto, incorporated hereat, and. marked Exhibit D is a copy of that portion 
of the preliminary hearing transcript.2 Yet, Mr. Bugden never investigated this fact and rmvm took 
any measures to ensure that Davey Desvari vvould be there for trial (P. 15, vol U preliminary 
hearing transcript of Ben Desvari.) Moreover, at the preliminary hearing, Ms. Isaacson was 
exiimming Ben Desvari who testified that the Kricket phone he was using belonged to Davey 
Desvari, Seep.69, vol 1, preliminary hearing transcript. 
Furthermore. Mr. Bugden Failed to prepare for trial by overlooking the feet that Davey 
Desvari resided with Ben Desvari on the date of September 11 and afterward. On September 17 
(p.65% Dot Chamberlain arrived at Ben Desvari\s home: "Q. You were at home when the police 
arrived.; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Okay. So they spoke to your wife; isn't that correct? A. Like 
I said., I don't know. 1 was inside the house. I wasn't outside. Q. Okay. A. She was sitting outside 
with a friend. Q. The detective then spoke with your brother. David, who was living at the home. 
Is that right? A. When I walked outside, they were talking to David, yes." As set forth in 
defendant's affidavit, there are many questions that Mr. Bugden could have asked Davey, the most 
important being the use of Don's cell, phone on September 1L 2004. As admitted by Mr. Bugden3 
2
 Page 15 of the preliminary hearing transcript: "] had my brother's phone," The cell phone was 
registered under Ben's Desvari*s brother's name - David or Davey Desvari. Page 29, "Q. Did you call him 
from a cell phone or a regular land phone? A. I called him from my phone. Q. When you say 'your phone' 
is that your home phone? A. My cell phone. I don't have a home phone. The only phone I have is just my 
cell phone. Q. Your brother's cell phone? A. Yes, my brother's cell phone,5> Page 39 of the same transcript: 
"Q, Did you make the call on your cell phone? A. Yes. Q. And that's the cell phone registered to. your 
brother? A. Yes." P. 69, "Q. What is the phone number that's associated with Dave's Kricket phone that 
you're referring to; what is that number? A. it's 604-0408. Copies of these preliminary hearing transcript 
pages are included in Exhibit D. 
~9~ 
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had he known that the cellphone belonged to Davey Desvari, this would have made Davey 
Desvari a very relevant witness. However, since Mr, Bugden foiled to adequately prepare for the 
trial his performance was ineffective, This is an example of such. Moreover, since Ben Desvari 
admitted using Davey ?s cell, phone during the evening of September 11,2004 (see pp. 38,39,69, vol 
1 preliminary hearing transcript) BenDesvari's testimony about him having his brother's cellphone 
on the evening of September 11,2004 corroborates Don's testimony that Davey Desvari came to 
his apartment in Salt Lake City and during his sojourn there, used Don's cellphone since 
Davey rs was being used by his brother, Ben. Had defense counsel adequately prepared for trial, 
they would have known this fact, They would have called Davey Desvari as a witness even if they 
had to subpoena him. His testimony was critical Moreover, Ben's preliminary hearing testimony 
demonstrates that defendant did not look like a deer in the headlights, he still wanted to testify. He 
had a truthful explanation, corroborated by Ben Desvari's preliminary hearing testimony. In light 
of the tacts of this case, testimony of Davey Desvari would have probably created enough reasonable 
doubt to have obtained an acquittal Paragraph 6, RULE 23B FINDINGS ON CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL states that defense counsels performance or 
decisions did not prejudice defendant. In light of the foregoing, this is untrue and that finding should 
be omitted. 
Moreover, had defense counsel adequately reviewed the preliminary hearing transcripts prior 
to trial in addition to the phone records they had for more than 10 months, they would have been able 
to impeach Ben Desvari' s testimony at trial regarding the sequence and timing of calls. The attached 
pages of the preliminary hearing testimony of Desvari, specifically those found on pp. 38,39 Of vol,. 
1 preliminary hearing transcript, regarding the sequence and timing of the calls on the evening of 
September 11,2004 could have been easily impeached using the phone records in the possession of 
.-10-
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defense counsel for more than 10 months. See ff -8-13, affidavit of David Drake. 
Additionally, another corroborating fact concerning defendant's testimony is that Ben 
Desvari testified at the first day of the preliminary hearing that on September 17, 2004, Dei 
Chamberlain arrived at Ben Desvari *s home and had him execute an immunity agreement wherein 
Ben Desvari agreed to testily against defendant. In return, he would be granted total and complete 
immunity. On that same evening, he met with defendant and his parents, with Diane Martin present, 
at a Murray park and told them that regardless of what was going to happen, he wanted them to know 
that Don was innocent of any conspiracy to murder Susan Hyatt. This makes this Murray park 
meeting absolutely critical, especially in the context of the signing of the immunity agreement, This 
context makes Finding 47 objectionable. This context lends enough credibility to Glenda Millard's 
and defendant's statements concerning this park meeting to overcome the defense team's doubts 
since the meeting occurred right alter the immunity agreement was signed and Ben, due to his 
friendship with defendant and Diane Martin, would naturally want to make a statement to exonerate 
what would later be viewed as a betrayal Moreover, testimony concerning such a park meeting 
could create reasonable doubt. The whole trial transcript shows that defense counsel did nothing to 
create reasonable doubt, Their advocacy was very deficient. All one has to do to see this is read Mr. 
Bugden's statement to Judge Skanchy in chambers. Mr. Bngden stated to the judge, at the close of 
the state's case-in-chief, that he felt there was a conspiracy and defendant conspired with Desvari 
and others. This is nothing more than a sell-out. 
The point of all of this is that Mr. Elugden foiled to review the preliminary hearing transcripts 
in order to prepare for trial. Any effective trial attorney would have done so; yet, the defense team 
did not. Moreover, defense counsel did nothing to investigate whether this meeting occurred. They 
~ / l -
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admitted knowing about it Ben Desvari was never interviewed or questioned during his preliminary 
hearing appearance or at trial Defense counsel had nothing to lose by questioning Ben Desvari at 
trial about this Murray park incident. Had he acknowledged such meeting, then Glenda Millard, 
Duane Millard, Diane Martin, and defendant shouidhave been called to the stand. The very fact they 
failed to effectively cross-examine Ben Desvari in this regard demonstrates ineffective assistance 
of counsel and clearly contradicts the Court's finding in 1] 5, RULE 23'B FINIMNGS ON CLAIM 
OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, 
Finding 36 is nothing more than an unsupported conclusion The Court failed to articulate what was 
in defendant's demeanor to conclude he was not a credible witness. The Court tailed to articulated 
what was in defendant's temperament to conclude he was not a credible witness. The Court failed 
to articulate what actions of defendant led it to conclude he was not a credible witness. Previously, 
the Court faulted defendant concerning the child support arrearage. However, since that was 
defendant's perception, how can that be taken as a lack of credibility. Defense counsel has much 
to lose by this action. If they arc found ineffective, then Mr. Bugdetv $ arrogance will be shattered. 
The appellate opinion, will be made public and his reputation sullied. It is obvious* especially in light 
of Ms. Isaacson's attempt to manufacture evidence, that defense counsel has much to lose if they are 
adjudged ineffective. Their testimonies were too pat; too contrived; yet, they overlooked the fact that 
they failed to review phone records they had in. their possession for more than 10 months and 
adequately prepare therefor and failed to review the preliminary hearing transcripts. These facts and 
omissions clearly contradict % 5f RULE 23B FINDINGS ON CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Finding 37 is npt supported by the evidence. The defense team never told defendant he had a right 
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to testify and they certainly never advised him of this right in any writing. Mr. Bugden never advised 
Don he had a constitutional right to testify. The defense team never used the word constitutional. 
Mr. Bugden admitted that he never told Don his decision to testify could trump Mr, Bugden's 
decision not to have Don testify. R26:17-20. In fact, there was only one writing from them that said 
that ultimately it was his decision to testify but omitted the word "right". Moreover, Mr. Bugden and 
Ms. Isaacson stated they never had Don sign a waiver of his constitutional right to testify. Any 
competent attorney would have his client sign a waiver to avoid the very situation Mr. Bugden and 
Ms. Isaacson find themselves in in this appeal. The fact that the defense team did not advise 
defendant he had a constitutional right to testily, the {act that they did. not have him sign a waiver 
of his right to testify, and the feet that they made no mention, on the trial court record that defendant 
was waiving his right to testify contradicts 1[ 5, RULE 23B FINDINGS ON CLAIM OF 
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
Fmdiiig 38 is not supported by the law or the record. Since defendant was never advised of his right 
to testify, how would he be expected to know that when his defense team told him he was not going 
to testify that he could not testify? The law regarding waiver of a right is very clear as is set forth 
m Rowley v. Marrcresl Homeowners1 Ass% 656 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1982): 
*A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. To constitute 
a waiver, there must be an existing right benefit, or advantage; a knowledge of its 
existence and an intention to relinquish it It must be distinctly made 
Since the defense team never advised defendant of his constitutional right to testify, he never 
knew he had a right to testify or exactly what the right was or considered or the context in which the 
right could be asserted. See affidavits of defendant and David Drake. There was an existing right, 
benefit, or advantage by defendant to testify. Even the defense team's December 2,2005 letter stated 
-13-
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the obvious: that it was essential for defendant to testily to fill in the gaps. Moreover, the 
testimonies of Mr. Bugden and Ms. Isaacson are all self-serving on this point and are not 
corroborated by their own correspondence to defendant. If they had advised defendant he had a right 
to testify, why wasn't the word right used in their December 2, 2005 missive? On the other hand, 
defendant's affidavit and his testimony are clear that he intended to testify, that he wanted to testify, 
and that he Was never informed that he had a right to testify. 
Finding 40 is not supported by the evidence. Diane Martin's affidavit is clear that she was at the 
Murray park and saw Ben Desvari meeting with defendant and his parents. She also stated that she 
met with Ben Desvari and defendant in. her home right around September \1, 2004, During this 
meeting, she stated that Ben Desvari told her and Don that Don was innocent of any wrongdoing, 
that he did not engage in any conspiracy to kill his exwife, This is very important to establish 
reasonable doubt. Even defendant's prior attorney, David Brown, thought Ms, Martin should be 
wired so she could record any conversations with Ben Desvari. 
Finding 44 is not supported by the evidence. Mrs. Millard's affidavit indicates what she told 
defense counsel..3 Moreover, David Drake thoroughly analyzed the phone records and produced this 
analysis in his affidavit. See *|f 8-13 of the Affidavit of David Drake. Based upon their cross-
examination of Ben Desvari and Brinkerhof L it is obvious defense counsel failed to review and 
analyze these phone records. Had they clone so, they would have been able to effectively cross-
3
 Paragraph 34 of her affidavit states; "Since I. was with Don driving from Grantsville to Salt Lake 
City, I know for a fact that Don did not stop in Magna and see BrinkethofT. Once we left Grants ville, we 
made a beeline to Salt Lake City. I would have testified to this. Moreover, trial counsel knew this but failed 
to investigate or act upon it. During our conversations about the phone records, 1 informed trial counsel what 
1 had heard Davey Desvari say on Don's ceil phone while 1 was waiting for Don to pick up his land line and 
speak to me. They heard what I said but never went any further. They failed to investigate my statements 
in comparison to the phone records/' 
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examine these two state witnesses and cause reasonable doubt. 
Findings 47, 48, and 49 are not supported by the evidence. See objection to Finding 35. 
Finding 54 is not supported by the evidence, The only evidence of such finding came from the self-
serving testimony of defense counsel. The defense team was concerned that the jury would believe 
her testimony had been bought and paid for. The same could be said of die state and its witnesses 
especially with their immunity agreements. Defense counsel didn't even try. Again, they never put 
on any evidence whatsoever to create reasonable doubt. If called, they could have asked Ms. Oliver 
questions similar to those asked by the state of their two witnesses to overcome their two witnesses 
prior inconsistent statements. There are ways to deal with this type of scenario; however, defense 
counsel didn't even try. 
Findings 55 and 56 are not supported by the evidence, including Ms. Oliver's affidavit. These 
findings come from the non-corroborated statements of defense counsel. Ms. Oliver signed the 
affidavit admitted into evidence. She had no problem, with that. She demanded no payment, made 
no inconsistent statements, and willingly wanted to sign the affidavit to help Don. 
Finding 57 is not supported by the evidence. Again, all the Court has to do is look at Ms. Oliver's 
affidavit and its content to determine she was not and is not a wild card. Her statements are 
unequivocal. 
FAILURE TO CALL DAVEY DESVARI AS A TRIAL WITNESS 
All of the findings under this section are not supported by the evidence and are therefor 
objectionable* 
Finding 60 is not supported by the evidence. See ff 18-24 of defendant's affidavit concerning what 
Davey Desvari would testify to if called. See also -objection to Finding 35. 
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Finding:61 is not supported by the evidence. See objection to Finding 35. 
Finding 62 is not supported by the evidence. Moreover, this finding is inconsistent with Mr. 
Bugden's statement that had he known the cell phone used by Ben Desvari belonged to his brother 
Davey Desvari, this would have made him a relevant witness. The state had no problem placing 
witnesses on the stand with shady and criminal pasts. Because of defense counsel's deficient 
performance, no reasonable doubt was created by the use of these witnesses. Again, defense counsel 
didn't even try. They didn't even try to create reasonable doubt. Every witness they could have 
called, named in the. affidavits of defendant Glenda Millard, Diane Martin, and Melody Oliver, 
would have created reasonable doubt. By not doing so, the state's witnesses' testimonies went 
virtually unchallenged. 
Finding 63 is not supported by the evidence. See objection to Finding 35 and the findings under the 
subsection of Davcy DcsvarL 
FAILURE TO USE A METH EXPERT AT TRIAL 
Defendant objects to all findings under this section. The testimony in the affidavits of defendant and 
Mrs. Millard indicate that defense counsel promised them they would call a meth expert, Defendant 
and his mother were never notified that a meth expert would not be called. In fact, defendant's father 
paid for a meth expert. It is interesting to note that defense counsel did not provide anything in 
writing corroborating their testimonies about Dr. Verdeal No documentary evidence was produced 
to show she was retained or what her opinion was. (In fact, Mr. Drake was never provided any 
documentation from Dr. Verdeal when he requested the whole file.) Their testimonies were all self-
serving and uncorroborated, especially, during the questioning of Ben Desvari. James Brinkerhoff, 
and Ted Anthony at trial, defense counsel asked specific questions about how meth affects the 
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memory. That being the case, it makes defense counsel's testimonies concerning what Dr. Verdeal 
allegedly said very suspect (especially in light of Ms. Isaacson's attempts to manufacture evidence 
and make the denials she did about Mr. Drake's letter to her). 
FAILURE TO CHALLENGE THE NATURE OF THE VICTIM'S INJURIES 
Finding 74 has no support in the whole records. Defense counsel's strategy to make Susan Hyatt 
a heroine in effect, was a strategy to allow her to lie all she wanted about the attack and her injuries. 
She stated she struggled with a knife for 2 to 5 minutes, all the while holding the blade attempting 
to stop the thrust of a man who outweighed her by at least 80 pounds. She stated this was a life or 
death struggle. She also testified that the knife was very sharp. Her statements of how she received 
the injuries are not inconsistent with the actual very minor injuries she suffered.. Again, all their 
strategy did was deep six defendant in order to make her a heroine, never once being concerned that 
their strategy allowed Ms. Hyatt to falsely testify. According to their strategy, the best way to 
challenge her testimony would have been to do so indirectly. That would involve a medical expert 
who could have testified that had her testimony been true, her hand would have been eviscerated, 
the nerves, tendons, and vessels would all have been severed or severely injured. Why would 
defense counsel allow a witness to lie under oath at their expense of their client. How can this be 
sound trial strategy? (Using their strategy, it would be terrible to have this defense team represent 
someone charged with rape, especially dealing with the victim of rape. However, the only way to 
get such a client acquitted is to challenge, either directly or indirectly, the alleged victim's 
testimony.) One other compelling fact is that Brinkerhoff testified that while going out to Ms. 
Hyatt's residence, he changed his mind. He stated that when he got to her house, he did not attack 
her, he used her phone and conversed with her insider her residence after she invited him in, He then 
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stated that when he got up to leave, his knife fell out of its sheath to the floor. Both of them 
attempted to grab it and that is when Ms. Hyatt scratched her hand. However, never once did 
defense counsel even question Ms. Hyatt about this. Certainly, Brinkeroff s testimony about how 
she scratched her hand is totally consistent with her injuries. 
Finding 75 is also objectionable for the same reasons. Additionally, BrinkerofPs testimony 
corroborated the injuries she received. They were not self-inflicted. They resulted from BrinkeroiTs 
knife accidently dropping to the floor and both of them attempting to pick it up. 
Finding 76 is also objectionable and has no support in the record. All defense counsel's strategy 
did was allow Ms. Hyatt to fabricate what had happened. Certainly, her injuries were totally 
inconsistent with her rendition of how she received them. She even turned down an offer to be taken 
to the emergency room. She didn't require stitches even after she struggled with a man bent on 
killing her who lunged at her chest with a knife and she grabbed the blade with her hand and kept 
him from stabbing her even though he outweighed her by more than 80 pounds? This isn't sound 
trial strategy, it is deep-sixing your client. It is the result of failure to adequately prepare for trial. 
Finding 78 is imcorroborated exxept by defense counsePs self-serving statements. The feet is that 
defense counsel promised defendant they would subpoena these ORS records to ascertain the exact 
amount of child support arrears. They never did that. EVEN MORE COMPELLING IS THE 
FACT THAT IN THE DOCUMENTS GIVEN TO MR. DRAKE, EVEN AFTER HE 
REQUESTED THE WHOLE CRIMINAL FILE, THERE WAS NOT A COPY OF A $20,000-
COURT JUDGMENT FROM: MR. FRIEL OR ANY OTHER DIVORCE ATTORNEY. 
THEIR TESTIMONIES IN THIS REGARD ARE SUSPECT. 
RULE 23B(e) FINDINGS ON CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL: 
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Paragraph 1 is not supported by the evidence, based upon the foregoing. 
Paragraph 2 has no basis in the record. The use of the words "without exception" means there was 
mv^r an exception. This Rule 52 motion clearly demonstrates that the defense team did not 
thoroughly investigate the issues. For example, had they investigated the phone records, they would 
have been able to challenge the testimonies of Ben Desvari and Brinkerhoff by use of these records, 
which they did not. That is just an example. They never investigated Davey Desvari, for example, 
even though Mr. Bugden testified that had he known the cell phone used by Ben Desvari belonged 
to his brotlier David Desvari that would have made him a relevant witness. All of the foregoing 
clearly demonstrates no investigations were made and no adequate trial preparation was done, 
Paragraph 3 also suffers from, the same deficiencies. The defense team never put any witness on 
the stand, even though they had several who could create reasonable doubt, All of the foregoing 
demonstrates deficient trial performance. 
Paragraph 4 also suffers from the same deficiencies. Had David Desvari been allowed to testify, 
he would have stated he made the critical phone call from defendant's phone. Ditto for Olenda 
Millard, and Diane Martin. Ditto for defendant testifying. 
Paragraph 5 is also deficient based upon all of the foregoing. One more thing is the feet that Mr. 
Bugden testified he did not file a motion in limine to stop Ted Anthony from, testifying to the hearsay 
statements of Idrese Richardson even though Ted Anthony did so at the preliminary hearing, R J7: l -
9. Consequently and without objection, defense counsel allowed Mr. Anthony to make many 
damaging hearsay statements without one objection. 
Paragraph 6 is also unsupported in the record. Defendant was severely prejudiced by all of the 
foregoing - he was convicted of a crime he did not commit. 
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Paragraph 7 is aiso unsupported in. the record as has been discussed previously, 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully requested that this Court amend its findings 
according to the ofej ections made herein. Also, that this Court make additional findings as requested 
in the motion concerning right to testify and other-related issues. The whole record indicates that 
such remedy be selected in. order to find that overall defense counsers strategy was deficient and 
ineffective. 
DATED March 20, 2009, 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant: 
David Drake 
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VERIFICATION 
David Drake, deelares under penalty of perjury of the laws of the state of Utah that he has 
read the foregoing Rule 52(b) motion and supporting memorandum, that the statements made therein 
are true based, upon his personal knowledge, information, and belief. 
DATED March 20, 2009. 
lk{/l4 t\J4&l(S— 
David Drake 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, the undersigned, do hereby certify that on March 20, 2009 a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Rule 52 motion and supporting memorandum were hand-delivered, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Tooele County Attorneys Office 
Gordon R. Hail Courthouse 
Tooele, UT 84074 
And Originals Hand-delivered To: 
Third District Court. Tooele Department 
Gordon R. Hall Courthouse 
Tooele, UT 84074 
V ^ ft (l I 
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Thus, Defendant did not receive effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 
m US..668,. 687-94 (1984)."] 
% Failure To Investigate Facts 
See Argument I for the lack of investigation by defense counsel of the phone records. 
Had defense counsel investigated these phone records, they could have effectively cross-
examined Ben and Brjnkerhoff re their testimonies concerning the sequence of the phone calls, 
creating reasonable doubt thereby.11 However, their failure let the co-conspirators* testimonies 
,JDetective Chamberlain testified that he arrived at Susan's home at 8:30 p.m. on 
September 11, R,502:272. The phone calls in question had to occur subsequent to 8:00 p.m. 
Brinkerhoff testified that he called Ben Desvari from his sister's house in Magna after he left 
Grantsville, Brinkerhoff then testified that after he got to his sister's house in Magna, he 
called Ben from his sister's house to tell him he did not do it. R.502:385. Ben asked 
Brinkerhoff to give him his phone number and Ben would call him back. Brinkerhoff then 
said Ben called him back and then Don called. R.502:385. The Desvari phone records 
indicate otherwise. Assuming that the sister's Magna phone number was 801-508-7514 the 
Desvari phone records indicate that a call was made to 801-604-0408 (the Desvari phone 
number) from 801-508-7514 at 8:54-55 p.m., with a duration of 19 seconds (obviously, no 
conversation took place). Then at 8:58 p.m. a phone call was made from 801-508-7514 to 
801-604-0408, with a duration of 4 minutes 52 seconds. Not one call was made from the 
Desvari cell phone to 801-508-7514 until 10:5.8 p.m. mid that call lasted 11 seconds 
(obviously, no conversation took place). Even more interesting is that Don's cell phone 
records indicate that a call was made from his cell phone to 801-508-7514 at 9:0.8 p.m., on 
September 1 L 2004. That call lasted about 6 minutes. However, these combined records 
indicate that Brinkerhoff was not telling the truth. Had he spoken to Ben the second time a 
call was made to 801-604-0408 from this assumed Magna phone belonging to his sister (the 
first call from 801-508-7514 lasted only 19 seconds so obviously no conversation), then the 
phone records should indicate that 801-604-0408 would have called him almost right back 
(the phone records do not indicate this) and this call back would have occurred before 
Brinkerhoff received Don's call to 801-508-7514, which it did not. As stated above, there 
was no call back to 801-508-7514 until almost two hours after that number was called from 
Don's phone. 
Equally interesting is the fact that the Desvari phone records indicate that a call was 
made from 801-604-0408 to Don's number some 36 minutes after the 801-508-7514 phone 
call was made to the Desvari cell phone, indicating these witnesses were not telling the truth. 
See State's trial exhibits 19,20, 21. 
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the two of you, will today be brought cut, and your right to 
that confidentiality is now gone. Do you -understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
THE COORT: I find that he knowingly and voluntarily 
waives that right, so that privilege is now gone. If that's 
the case, Mr. Bugden, would you please approach. 
MR. DRftKE: One other thing, could we have the DOC 
just release his right hand? 
THE COURT: Do you have a problem with that? 
TRANSPORTATION OFFICER: No. 
THE COORT: Okay, we will do that. 
ic ie *k 
W&LTER BUGDEN, 
called as a witness by the Defendant, having been duly sworn, 
was examned and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Please state your name, and spell your 
last name for the record. 
THE WITNESS: My name is Walter Bugden, B~u^~d-e~n. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR, DRftKE: 
Q. Mr. Bugden, do you have there up at the witness stand 
a binder, a trial book binder? 
<&• xes. 
Q, You are a licensed attorney in the state of Utah; is 
that correct? 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
MR. DRAKE: He is the one that brought it up. 
MR. SEARLE: Is this new stuff again? 
MR. DRAKE: Listen, this is from State's Exhibit 3. 
THE COURT: I think we have exhausted the point. 
Move forward. 
Q (By Mr. Drake) Did you ever get a report from this 
Dr. Verdeal saying what you testified to on cross, a written 
report? 
A. Talk to Tara about that. It was Tara's witness, I 
don't know if we got a written report, or, again, if you are 
just going to be stuck with whether Tara is a liar or telling 
the truth. 
THE COURT: Don't editorialize. Go ahead, 
Q (By Mr. Drake) You made a statement about making 
Susan Hyatt a heroine? 
A, That's right. 
Q. Making her a heroine, does that gxve ner a carte 
blanche license to lie under oath? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Yet, you never did anything to challenge her 
testimony, did you? 
A. Because I believed her testimony was credible and 
corroborated by the witnesses. 
Q. It wasn't corroborated by Brinkerhoff, because 
Brinkerhof f on the second day of trial said he nBver attacked 
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her, and he said at a prelim he never attacked her. 
A. That's two, three questions, I donft agree with your 
interpretation. 
Q, Have you seen what I filed with the Court of Appeals? 
A. No, I haven1t. 
Q. Did you know that I took her deposition? 
THE COURT: We are off the track again. Where are 
you headed? 
MR. DRAKE: I am going back. I am bringing this 
back, 
THE WITNESS: I haven11 SBGXX it. 
Q (By Mr. Drake) How much did Brinkerhoff outweigh 
Susan Hyatt? 
A. He is a big man, bigger than you. 
Q. So letfs say her testimony was he lunged at her, 
lunged at her with a knife right to her chest. She grabbed the 
knife with the blade, with a hand, and struggled with him in a 
life-and--death struggle for two to five minutes. And, yet, 
that would have eviscerated her hand, wouldn't it have? 
A. I donTt know that. 
Q. Well, you never investigated it, then, did you? Yes 
or no? 
A. Did not investigate whether or not her hand would 
have been eviscerated. 
Q. She also testified about her medical injuries at the 
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prelim, and then she changed those medical injuries and 
expanded on them at the trial. Did you ever attempt to 
subpoena her medical injuries after the prelim — excuse ire — 
her medical files after the prelim? 
A. I did not* 
Q. Did you question Mr. Brinkerhoff, or did Tara? 
A. No, Brinkerhoff was all mine. 
Q-. Now, were you aware that Don told Tara during his 
testimony about the corroborating witnesses that he had, about 
where he was on the 11th of September, 2005? 
A. You will have to ask Tara that. But Tara never 
coraiunicated that to me, and I don!t believe it happened. 
Q. Were you aware that Don said, told Tara that there 
was no way ha was out to Magna treating with Brinkerhoff on that 
day? 
A. I think you should ask Ms. Isaacson that. 
Q. Your answer is, no, you are not aware of it? 
A. I am not aware of it. 
Q, You never really investigated Glenda, did you, as far 
as what she knew that would be relevant to the defense of Don? 
A. I don!t think that's true. We met with the parents, 
explained our theory of the case, asked thena for whatever ideas 
they had, whatever factual information they had, that might be 
helpful. Sane of it we believed would be helpful, some of it 
we believed would not be helpful. That had to do with the 
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going to call Ms. Isaacson. 
THE COURT: We will make arrangements, then, for the 
defendant to spend — I guess you will call the defendant after 
that? 
MR. DRAKE: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: If thatrs the case, given the short 
personnel at the prison, I guess we will make arrangements for 
Mr* Millard to spend the night tonight here at our comfortable 
hotel, and then they will be able to come pick him up tomorrow 
or Monday. We will prepare the court order so I can make sure 
that happens. 
MR. DRME: Just one question, with Mr. Bugden 
remaining in the courtroom, that means that he would be 
unavailable to be re-called, correct? 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
*k ic ic 
T&R& ISMCSON, 
called as a witness by the State, having been duly sworn, was 
examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Please state your name, and spell your 
last name for the record. 
THE WITNESS: Tara Isaacson, I^s^a^a-c~s~o~n. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. SEARLE: 
Q. Ms. Isaacson, are you a member of the Utah State Bar? 
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A, No. 
Q» Diane never mentioned anything like that to you? 
A. No, and neither did the parents mention that she was 
there, 
Q* Have you read the affidavits? 
A. I have. 
Q. In regard to the affidavits which you have read, 
did — 
MR. GUYON: You mean the affidavit of — 
0 (By Mr. Searle) Let me finish. In relation to Diane 
Martin, Melody Oliver, and Glenda Millard, you have read those 
three affidavits? 
A. Many times. 
Q. Did you ever before trial, up to the day trial 
started, did any of those three individuals ever tell you about 
any phone calls made to the defendant at his hone? 
A. I didn't hear it during the trial even, I didn't 
hear it before the trial, I didnft hear it at the trial. I 
didn't read it until I saw it in the affidavits. 
MR. SEARLE: All right, thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, Counsel? 
. * * * 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GUYON: 
Q. Ms, Isaacson, your name is Swedish, isn't it? 
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or anyone in his family. And that was well before trial. 
Can I ask someone for water? Is that an option? 
Q. It could be* I am going to sacrifice this. 
Ms. Isaacson, I would like to read from a letter to you from 
David Drake, concerning your testimony about what he had asked 
for, and see if you recall this. I only have one copy, and it 
is an electronic one. 
MR. DRAKE: I do have a printer, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thatfs okay, just see if it refreshes 
your recollection, 
Q (By Mr* Guyon) "Dear Tara: I received a copy of your 
September 7, 2006 statement from Don Millard. Needless to say, 
the amount of your statement was disconcerting since seme of 
your billing entries are subject to question. I can xmderstand 
the amount of time in your first entry to review the files for 
appeal in order to identify documents for me to organize and 
index. However, your billing entry implies I did not receive 
the whole file, only an edited version. Since I am doing the 
appeal for Don Millard, and as I requested from you during our 
initial conversation I want copies of your whole," in large 
black letters, "file, not the documents you deem are necessary 
for the appeal. It is necessary that I receive all documents 
in order to frame the issues I deem are relevant to the appeal. 
Have I received your whole," again in large black letters, 
"file? Please fax me the answer to this inquiry as soon as 
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possible. I do thank you for your cooperation to date.fr Do 
you recall getting that letter? 
A. I don't. I may have. I don't. 
Q. You would agree that that request, if it had been 
seat, would also include Exhibits 5 and 6, would you not? 
A. Yes, I'm sure they were part of the file. 
Q. Now, one of the things I heard you testify about, or 
at least I thought I heard you testify, had to do with the 
transcript of Mr. Millard's — of the telephone interview that 
involved Detective Chamberlain and Don Millard. 
A. Are you talking about the telephone interview or the 
interview at the police dapartirent? 
Q. I'm sorry, I think it is a video. It is not the 
telephone interview. But you know what I am talking about, 
right, wherein Mr. Millard said he had — it is on page 25, "I 
got to check my notes and see if he left a telephone number, 
yeah, last I checked it, too, yeah. I am trying to get hate. 
I haven}t even made it to ray place yet, just rny parents1 . I 
have all ray luggage in the back of my truck." That' s the thing 
you were testifying earlier in response to questions from 
Mr. Searle, correct? 
A. Correct. 
Q. That's one of the things that gave you heartburn, 
because you said you understood that to be an inconsistent 
statement of Don, correct? 
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A* It is not part of any of my practice previously, but 
it absolutely would have been a simple thing to do. 
Q. But it really would have teen simple, wouldnTt it? 
THE COURT: She has answered that. LetTs move on. 
MR* GUYON: It would be nice if she would answer my 
question. 
THE COURT: I think she answered it. Let!s move 
forward. I think we have beat that horse about as much as we 
can here. 
MR. GUYON: The dead horse objection? Thatfs all I 
have, Judge. 
THE COURT: Any follow-up, Mr. Searle? 
MR* SEARLE: No, Judge. Judge, the only thing at 
this point is we would move for the admission of 5 and 6. 
THE COURT: Any objection to that? 
MR. DRAKE: What was that? 
THE COURT: The admission of 5 and 6? 
MR. GUYON: The same objection, Judge, surprise. 
MR. DRAKE: Your Honor, here is another thing. I was 
just talking to Gary about this. 
THE COURT: Concerning these two exhibits? 
MR. DRAKE: Yeah. Or any of the exhibits. The two, 
5 and 6, those are the phone records, that sort of thing. It 
has now become necessary to have me testify as a rebuttal 
witness, because I never did receive those. Tara testified 
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that I never asked for the whole file. I did. I never 
received any of this» 1 
THE COURT: What will be the remedy here? Do you 
want a continuance or what do you want? 
MR. 
THE 
DRAKE: Put me on under oath. 
COURT: 1 understand what you are asking me to 
do. If I find, in fact, you didnTt receive these things, and 
they willfully withheld them from you, then what are you asking 
for? 
MR. 
evidence* 
THE 
that? 
MR. 
THE 
DRAKE: That they will not be entered into 1 
COURT: Mr. Searle, would you like to respond to 
SEARLE: Briefly, judge. Just a moment, sir. 
COURT: Go ahead. 
(A pause in the proceedings.) 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
stuff did you 
MR. 
MR. 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
SEARLE: Judge, we will withdraw 5 and 6. 
COURT: 5 and 6 are withdrawn. ] 
SEARLE: Ms. Isaacson, when you gathered your 
have 5 and 6? 
DRAKE: What's 4? 
HOGAN: 4 is her mock examination script. 
DRAKE: Did that come in? 
COURT: It has* 
DRAKE: Because I have never seen that before, 
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either . 
THE COURT: So 5 and 6 are disallowed, then. Aside 
fran that, is there anything else we need to do? Mr. Searle, 
do you plan to call any other witnesses? 
MR. SEARLE: No, I don!t have anything else, Judge. 
THE COURT: Mr. Drake? 
MR. DRAKE: We wanted to call a rebuttal witness, ray 
client. Can I have a few moments with him? I am not going to 
ask him many questions. He has his affidavit in, but there are 
a few things tinder rebuttal, say maybe 30 minutes, max. 
THE COURT 
MR. DRAKE 
THE COURT 
To meet with him or put him on the stand? 
Oh, no, no, no, no, no. 
How much time would you like to meet with 
him? 
MR. DRAKE: I have seven minutes to four. Ten 
minutes will be fine. 
THE COURT: That works out fine. Let's reconvene 
here right promptly at five after four. 
(Court was in recess.) 
THE COURT: All right, Mr. Drake, you may call your 
client. 
MR. DRAKE: We call Mr. Millard to the stand. 
THE COURT: Mr. Millard, please state your name and 
spell your last name for the record. 
THE WITNESS: Don Millard, last name spelled 
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LLC, were on brief, for appellee. 
Before SELYA, Circuit Judge, STAHL, Senior Circuit Judge, and LYNCH, Circuit Judge. 
SELYA, Circuit Judge. 
After a Massachusetts jury convicted petitioner-appellee Barbara Ouber on a drug-trafficking 
charge, she exhausted her state-court remedies and then sought habeas corpus relief in the 
federal district court That court granted the writ. The Commonwealth's ensuing appeal raises 
nuanced questions concerning the interplay between the proper resolution of claims asserting 
ineffective assistance of counsel and the deferential standard of review imposed upon federal 
habeas courts by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 
104-132, 110 Stat 1214 (1996). Although our reasoning differs significantly from the district 
court's as to the prejudice component of the ineffective assistance test, we agree that habeas 
relief is appropriate in the unique circumstances of this case. 
I. BACKGROUND 
To put matters into perspective, we recount the background facts, the case's procedural 
history, the genesis of the petitioner's conviction (including a precis of the evidence adduced 
at trial), and what transpired thereafter. 
The petitioner and her brother (Nick Tsoleridas) resided at 9 Beth Lane in Hyannis, 
Massachusetts. On January 25, 1992, Todd Shea, an undercover narcotics agent, 
accompanied by a confidential informant (CI), went to that address. Tsoleridas greeted them. 
He and the CI then went into the house. Shea was told to wait in the car. 
The CI emerged alone. He and Shea waited for Tsoleridas (a suspected drug dealer). After 
some time had elapsed, the two men grew impatient and approached the front door. The 
petitioner was standing just inside the entrance and Tsoleridas was descending from upstairs. 
Shea said something to the effect that he wanted to look at "the package" before turning over 
21 any money. Tsoleridas escorted his visitors outside, saying that he did not want to "deal" in 
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the house. After the three men drove a short distance, Tsoleridas sold Shea an ounce of 
cocaine for $1,100. He also gave Shea his ceil phone number and told him that he could 
supply much larger quantities. 
Tsoleridas delivered comparable amounts of cocaine to Shea on February 19 and March 2. 
At approximately 4:40 p.m. on March 8, Shea called Tsoleridas and indicated that he wished 
to purchase ten ounces of cocaine. Tsoleridas tried to persuade Shea to come to Boston to 
consummate the transaction. When Shea demurred, Tsoleridas offered to supply two ounces 
to tide him over, and told him to come to the parking lot of Bud's Country Lounge in Hyannis 
where Tsoieridas's sister would exchange the drugs for $2,000. 
Shea testified that the transaction occurred as follows. He reached the parking lot at the 
appointed time. He saw the petitioner arrive, driving a Toyota. When he entered the 
passengers' side of the Toyota, the petitioner identified herself as Tsoieridas's sister and 
handed him two sealed envelopes. Shea asked if this was the same "coke" as before and if 
the envelopes aggregated the agreed quantity. After receiving an affirmative response, he 
gave the petitioner $2,000. She counted the money and dropped the bills on the floor of the 
Toyota. Meanwhile Shea broke the seals, withdrew a clear plastic bag from inside each 
envelope, and inspected the contents. He then debarked, entered his own vehicle, and 
departed with the contraband. 
At the time of the transaction, the parking lot was deserted except for two law enforcement 
officers who were observing from a distance. They saw very little. One of them testified, 
however, that he watched the Toyota enter the parking lot and leave a few minutes after 
Shea exited the vehicle. 
On March 13, Tsoleridas sold Shea the ten ounces of cocaine that Shea had "ordered." 
Shortly thereafter, the authorities searched the house at 9 Beth Lane and found drugs, large 
sums of cash, and drugrelated paraphernalia. The petitioner was present during the search. 
When she asked to see the warrant, however, the officers claimed to have lost it. 
A Barnstable County grand jury subsequently indicted both Tsoleridas and the petitioner for 
trafficking in cocaine. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94C, § 32E(b). The petitioner was tried on a 
single charge, based upon her alleged complicity in the March 8 transaction. She stood trial 
alone (Tsoleridas having fled the country). Shea and the petitioner were the main witnesses, 
and they gave sharply conflicting accounts as to what had occurred inside the Toyota. 
Shea's testimony was along the lines described above. The petitioner, however, testified that 
she knew nothing of the drugs, but had been coerced by her brother into doing what she 
thought was a non-drug-related errand for him. Her version of what happened in the Toyota 
differed from Shea's in no fewer than four crucial respects. She denied having handed Shea 
the envelopes, saying that he removed them from the right front seat. She also denied that 
she and Shea had the conversation he described (or any conversation relating, directly or 
indirectly, to cocaine). She denied that she counted the money, instead saying that Shea 
threw it at her (with the result that the bills fluttered to the floor of the Toyota). And, finally, 
she denied that Shea opened the envelopes or inspected their contents in her presence. 
To buttress this account, the defense presented the testimony of the petitioner's friend, 
Patricia Gisleson. Gisleson testified that she was at the petitioner's home 
22 on March 8 and overheard Tsoleridas and the petitioner arguing. Tsoleridas wanted her to 
deliver two envelopes for him. After the petitioner succumbed to Tsoieridas's bullying, 
Gisleson helped to move the petitioner's Toyota out of the garage. In the process, she 
noticed that Tsoleridas had placed two sealed envelopes on the front passenger's seat. The 
petitioner then drove away. Gisleson was still at 9 Beth Lane when the petitioner returned. 
The petitioner seemed very upset. 
Due to the fact that the search party had been unable to display a warrant, a suppression 
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order issued. Thus, the Commonwealth could not introduce the evidence seized in the house 
search during its case in chief. After the petitioner testified, however, the trial justice allowed 
the Commonwealth to introduce that evidence for impeachment purposes. Following 
arguments of counsel and the court's charge, the jurors could not reach agreement and the 
trial justice declared a mistrial. 
The Commonwealth elected to retry the petitioner. Much the same proof scenario obtained at 
the second trial, except that Gisleson's testimony was much more detailed. She stated, inter 
alia, that Tsoleridas had slapped the petitioner when she initially refused to do his bidding. 
She also elaborated on the reason that Tsoleridas gave for wanting the petitioner to run the 
errand; the man she was to meet owed him money, and she was to give the man some drill 
bits and collect $2,000. Then, too, Gisleson volunteered that the petitioner had told her that, 
when she met Shea, he had thrown the money at her. Despite Gisleson's more expansive 
testimony, the jury deadlocked once again. 
This brings us to the third trial. Because of their relationship to the issues on appeal, we 
describe the events that played out during this trial in greater detail. 
As the third trial began,^ the petitioner's counsel — the selfsame lawyer who had 
represented her at the two earlier trial — selected to deliver his opening statement on the 
heels of the prosecutor's opening. In the course of this statement, the lawyer promised — not 
once, but four times — that the petitioner would testify. In the bargain, the lawyer 
emphasized the importance of this testimony. He pointed out that the case revolved around 
the petitioner's knowledge (or lack of knowledge) that the envelopes delivered to Shea 
contained cocaine, and that her version of the relevant events — particularly those that 
transpired in the car — was very different from Shea's. Counsel's peroration drove home 
these points. He told the jurors: 
The case is going to come down to what happened in that car and what your findings are as 
you listen to the credibility and the testimony of Todd Shea versus what you[r] findings are as 
you listen to the testimony of Barbara Ouber. 
.... You're going to hear a difference of opinion as to whether [the envelopes] were handed to 
Mr. Shea, whether he opened them in front of her; and as to the conversation. 
And you're going to have to decide the truth and veracity of those two witnesses; and that 
will be your ultimate decision in this case. 
As in the earlier trials, the Commonwealth's case in chief hinged on Shea's testimony. His 
23 direct examination yielded the version of the transaction described above. On cross-
examination defense counsel brought out a few inconsistencies (e.g., that Shea originally had 
claimed that the envelopes were unsealed when he received them whereas he now admitted 
that they were sealed). Defense counsel also attempted to show that Tsoleridas's actions on 
the occasion of Shea's first visit to 9 Beth Lane indicated that Tsoleridas was trying to 
conceal his drug trafficking from the petitioner. 
Up to a point, the defense case seemed similar to that presented in the previous trials. The 
defense paraded a large number of character witnesses before the jury, including an Eastern 
Orthodox bishop and several priests from the petitioner's community. These witnesses were 
unanimous in attesting to the petitioner's good character and reputation for veracity. A 
number of them did double duty, declaring that Tsoleridas was abusive and domineering 
insofar as his sister was concerned. Gisleson also testified along the same lines as at the 
second trial — although she again added new details. These embellishments included 
testimony that Tsoleridas had threatened to kill the petitioner if she did not go to meet Shea; 
that the petitioner told Gisleson, after she returned, that the man she met had tried to get her 
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to enter is vehicle; and that the petitioner never touched the envelopes.1^! 
The trial then veered dramatically from the previous iterations. Although the petitioner had 
testified in both of the earlier trials, this time around the defense tested without calling her as 
a witness. Closing arguments followed. In his summation, the petitioner's attorney apologized 
for not presenting "more of a case" as he had promised, but opined that elements of Shea's 
and Gisleson's testimony supported a claim that the petitioner lacked knowledge of the 
envelopes' contents. The prosecutor responded that Shea's testimony, taken as a whole, 
showed that the petitioner was fully aware that the envelopes contained cocaine, and that 
there was no reason to doubt his credibility. The prosecutor contrasted this testimony with 
Gisleson's, which, he argued, had been tailored to protect the petitioner. 
Jury deliberations began that afternoon, but court adjourned without a verdict. Deliberations 
resumed the next morning. Sounding a familiar refrain, the jurors soon reported that they 
were deadlocked. The trial justice urged them to deliberate further, giving them a 
supplemental instruction based on Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 364 Mass. 87. 300 N.E.2d 
192. 202-03 (Mass. 1973) (suggesting suitable language for a "dynamite" charge). Later that 
day, the jury found the petitioner guilty as charged. 
The petitioner moved for a new trial based on ineffectiveness of counsel. To understand the 
etiology of that claim, we must explore the genesis of the petitioner's decision not to testify. 
We glean the relevant facts, as did the state courts, primarily from affidavits submitted by the 
petitioner and her trial attorney in support of the ineffectiveness of counsel claim. 
The third trial lasted only two days. According to the lawyer, he first focused on the possibility 
24 of withholding the petitioner's testimony on the evening of the first day (after the 
Commonwealth had rested). A discussion took place in which several priests and other 
friends of the petitioner participated. The petitioner apparently wanted to testify, but the 
lawyer persuaded her that it would be in her best interest not to do So.^1 The following day, 
the lawyer conferred privately with the petitioner, but on the record (i.e., in the presence of a 
court reporter), so that the petitioner could confirm that she had decided not to testify. The 
affidavits and the record of that lobby conference make clear, however, that counsel's earlier 
promises to the jury were not discussed, and that the petitioner was never advised that her 
decision to refrain from testifying might be counterproductive in light of those promises. This 
confluence of factors — the decision to withhold the petitioner's testimony after having 
emphasized its importance and having repeatedly promised the jurors that they would hear it 
— constituted the essence of the petitioner's ineffective assistance claim. 
The state courts were unreceptive to the petitioner's plea. The trial justice denied the motion 
for a new trial, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the trial justice's order. See 
Commonwealth v. Ouber, 46 Mass.App.Ct. 1112, 707 N.E.2d 408 (Mass.App.Ct.1999) 
(table). The appellate court concluded that the petitioner's lawyer approached the question of 
whether she should testify "cautiously" and advised her to remain silent because she likely 
would suffer grievously in cross-examination. Because the attorney was "working with an 
intrinsically weak defense," the court, applying the test articulated in Commonwealth v. 
Saferian, 366 Mass. 89. 315 N.E.2d 878. 882-83 (Mass. 1974). found his performance 
constitutionally acceptable. As a fallback, the court observed that the attorney's advice did 
not prejudice the petitioner because the evidence against her was solid and the jury had 
been instructed not to draw a negative inference from her silence. The court made only a 
passing reference to the promises contained in counsel's opening statement, characterizing 
them as neither "dramatic" nor "memorable." The court added that, when the petitioner 
decided not to testify, she knew what the consequences would be because she had been 
through two trials and "[a]n inference about the jury's possible attitude would not be remote 
or difficult" 
In due course, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) denied further appellate 
review. Commonwealth v. Ouber, 429 Mass. 1104, 709 N.E.2d 1120 (Mass. 1999) (table). 
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The petitioner then repaired to the federal district court and prosecuted an application for a 
writ of habeas corpus against the appropriate state correctional official. See 28 U.S.C. § 
2254. The district court found the Appeals Court's decision to be an unreasonable application 
of the standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
S0LEd.2d674(1984). See Ouber v. Guarino. 158 F.Supp.2d 135, 149 (D.Mass. 2001). In 
the district court's view, the state court improperly focused on a peripheral matter — whether 
the petitioner was (or was not) fully informed about her right to testify when she decided to 
remain silent—and brushed aside the critical error in professional judgment: making a 
promise to the jury and then breaking it Id, at 150. The court found it unreasonable that the 
Appeals Court did not evaluate the attorney's advice in light of the initial promises that had 
been communicated to the jury. id. at 153. On this basis, the court concluded that the 
25 lawyer's actions fell below the Strickland benchmark and that the state court's application of 
Strickland's performance prong was unreasonable. Id. at 154. To cap matters, the court found 
that the state court had applied the wrong test as to prejudice and concluded that prejudice 
should be presumed in this case. See id. at 155. The court then went a step further and 
found, in the alternative, that the lawyer's error was outcome-determinative. Id. at 155-56. 
Consistent with these findings, the district court ordered the petitioner relieved from her 
sentence unless the Commonwealth vacated her conviction and afforded her a new trial 
within a stipulated time frame. See id. at 156. This appeal ensued. The petitioner has 
remained free on bail pending the outcome of the habeas proceeding. 
II. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
As said, this appeal turns on the interplay between the constitutional standard articulated in 
Strickland and the limited review permitted by the AEDPA in habeas cases. We comment on 
each of these elements. 
A. The Strickland Doctrine. 
The controlling principles for deciding ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims are limned in Strickland. 
Under these principles, a defendant alleging ineffective 
assistance of counsel must establish two elements in 
order to prevail: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires 
showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
"counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must 
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
As to the first element, M[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly 
deferential." Id. at 689, 104 S.Ct 2052. The practice of law is not a mechanical exercise (like, 
say, kicking a foot press), and an inquiring court must leave ample room for variations in 
professional judgment. See id. By like token, a reviewing court must not lean too heavily on 
hindsight: a lawyer's acts and omissions must be judged on the basis of what he knew, or 
should have known, at the time his tactical choices were made and implemented. Bell v. 
Cone. 535 U.S. . 122 S.Ct 1843. 1854, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002): United States v. 
Natanel, 938 F.2d 302. 309 (1st Cir.1991). Only if, "in light of all the circumstances, the 
[alleged] acts or omissions of counsel were outside the wide range of professionally 
competent assistance," can a finding of deficient performance ensue. Strickland. 466 U.S. at 
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690. 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
The second Strickland element ensures that, even if a lawyer's performance is 
constitutionally unacceptable, relief will be withheld unless the quondam client has 
demonstrated that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. 
While this level of prejudice may be presumed in a few settings, id. at 692, 104 S.Ct 2052. 
that is the exception, not the rule. For the most part, the petitioner must carry the devoir of 
persuasion and prove that he was prejudiced, i.e., that his attorney's parlous conduct may 
have altered the outcome of the case. See Smith v. Robbins. 528 U.S. 259, 285-86. 120 
S.Ct 746. 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000). In this regard, we caution that, although the possibility of 
26 a different out-come must be substantial in order to establish prejudice, it may be less than 
fifty percent See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. 104 S.Ct. 2052 (explaining that "a defendant 
need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely than not altered the outcome in 
the case"). 
B. The AEDPA Standard. 
Under the AEDPA, a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner only if the state 
court adjudication 
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States; or 
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of 
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
A state-court decision fits within the "contrary to" rubric if the state court either applies a legal 
rule that contradicts an established Supreme Court precedent or reaches a different result on 
facts materially indistinguishable from those of a controlling Supreme Court precedent 
Williams v. Taylor 529 U.S. 362. 405-06. 120 S.Ct 1495. 146 LEd.2d 389 (2000). Where a 
relevant but not factually congruent precedent exists, the state court need only apply a test 
consistent with the one announced by the Supreme Court in order to avoid the toils of 
section 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" clause. 
The "unreasonable application" component of section 2254(d)(1) comes into play when the 
state court identifies the correct legal principle, but unreasonably applies that principle to the 
facts of the prisoner's case. Williams, 529 U.S. at 407-08. 120 S.Ct. 1495. The "unreasonable 
application" clause also encompasses situations in which a state court either unreasonably 
extends a legal principle derived from Supreme Court precedent to an inappropriate context 
or unreasonably refuses to extend that principle to an appropriate context. Id. In ail events, a 
state-court decision must be unreasonable, as opposed to merely incorrect, before a federal 
court can grant habeas relief. Id at 410, 120 S.Ct 1495. 
The AEDPA also requires that the relevant legal rule be clearly established in a Supreme 
Court holding, rather than in dictum or in holdings of lower federal courts. Id. at 412,120 
S.Ct. 1495. This does not mean, however, that other federal court decisions are wholly 
irrelevant to the reasonableness determination. "To the extent that inferior federal courts have 
decided factually similar cases, reference to those decisions is appropriate in assessing the 
reasonableness vel non of the state court's treatment of the contested issue." O'Brien v. 
Dubois, 145 F.3d 16. 25 (1st Cir.1998). Reference to such cases may be especially helpful 
when the governing Supreme Court precedent articulates a broad principle that applies to a 
wide variety of factual patterns. 
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So it is here. The Strickland principles for deciding ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
are "clearly established" for purposes of the AEDPA. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 371-74. 120 
S.Ct. 1495. Because the Supreme Court has yet to adopt more particularized guidelines for 
ineffectiveness of counsel claims, it is helpful to examine precedents from lower federal 
courts to determine how the general standard applies to a particular set of facts. Although 
such decisions are not themselves binding on a state court under the AEDPA framework, see 
id at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495. resort to them is appropriate for the purpose of discerning the 
27 requirements of Strickland in factually similar cases. See Mountiov v. Warden. N.H. State 
Prison. 245 F.3d 31 35-36 (1st Cir. 2001). 
Another category of state-court errors that may be remedied on federal habeas review 
involves unreasonable determinations of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Under this 
standard, the state court's factual findings are entitled to a presumption of correctness that 
can be rebutted only by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Mastracchio v. Vose, 
27A F.3d 590. 597-98 (1st Cir.2001). But the special prophylaxis of section 2254(d)(2) 
applies only to determinations of "basic, primary, or historical facts." Sanna v. Dipaolo, 265 
F.3d 1t 7 (1st Cir.2001). Inferences, characterizations of the facts, and mixed fact/law 
conclusions are more appropriately analyzed under the "unreasonable application" prong of 
section 2254(d)(1). Cf. Townsend v, Sain, 372 U.S. 293. 309 n. 6. 83 S.Ct. 745. 9 LEd.2d 
770 (1963) (stating that mixed questions of fact and law do not fall within the purview of 
section 2254(d)(2)); Sanna. 265 F.3d at 7 (suggesting that only witness credibility and recitals 
of external events qualify as basic or primary facts for purposes of section 2254(d)(2)). 
Inasmuch as "both the performance and the prejudice components of the ineffectiveness 
inquiry are mixed questions of law and fact" for the purposes of federal habeas review, 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. 104 S.Ct. 2052, section 2254(d)(2) is of limited utility in this case. 
III. ANALYSIS 
Consistent with the Strickland paradigm, we divide our analysis into two parts: performance 
and prejudice. 
A. Performance. 
At the heart of this appeal lies a broken promise (or, more precisely put, a series of broken 
promises): defense counsel's repeated vow that the jurors would hear what happened from 
the petitioner herself. Thus, the error attributed to counsel consists of two inextricably 
intertwined events: the attorney's initial decision to present the petitioner's testimony as the 
centerpiece of the defense (and his serial announcement of that fact to the jury in his 
opening statement) in conjunction with his subsequent decision to advise the petitioner 
against testifying. Taken alone, each of these decisions may have fallen within the broad 
universe of acceptable professional judgments. Taken together, however, they are 
indefensible. Neither the state court nor the Commonwealth has managed to identify any 
benefit to be derived from such a decisional sequence, and we are unable to see the 
combination as part and parcel of a reasoned strategy. We therefore conclude that, in the 
absence of unforeseeable events forcing a change in strategy, the sequence constituted an 
error in professional judgment. Cf. Anderson v. Butler 858 F.2d 16. 19 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding 
a mistake, rather than a strategic choice, where nothing could be gained from counsel's 
approach). 
This assessment does not end our inquiry. The complex dynamics of trial engender numerous 
missteps, but only the most inexcusable will support a finding that counsel's performance was 
so substandard as to compromise a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to proficient legal 
representation. Seef e.g., Nix v. Whiteside. 475 U.S. 157. 164-65. 106 S.Ct. 988. 89 LEd.2d 
123 (1986) (quoting Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687. 104 S.Ct. 2052). To separate wheat from 
chaff — lapses of constitutional dimension from garden-variety bevues — we must assess 
the gravity of the error and then consider potential justifications for the attorney's actions, 
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26 given what he knew or should have known at each relevant mo-ment in time. See Natanel, 
938 F.2d at 309. And, finally, because this case comes to us on habeas review, we must 
examine the reasonableness of the state-court conclusion that counsel's performance was 
not constitutionally deficient. We turn to these interrelated tasks. 
It is apodictic that a defendant cannot be compelled to testify in a criminal case, see U.S. 
Const, amend. V, and criminal juries routinely are admonished — as was the jury here — not 
to draw an adverse inference from a defendant's failure to testify. But the defendant has the 
right to testify in her own defense, and, when such testimony is proffered, the impact on the 
jury can hardly be overestimated. See Green v. United States, 365 U.S. 301, 304, 81 S.Ct 
653, 5 LEd.2d 670 (1961) ("The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a 
defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself"). When a jury is 
promised that it will hear the defendant's story from the defendant's own lips, and the 
defendant then reneges, common sense suggests that the course of trial may be profoundly 
altered, A broken promise of this magnitude taints both the lawyer who vouchsafed it and the 
client on whose behalf it was made. 
The Commonwealth argues that a defendant's decision about whether to invoke the right to 
remain silent is a strategic choice, requiring a balancing of risks and benefits. Under ordinary 
circumstances, that is true. It is easy to imagine that, on the eve of trial, a thoughtful lawyer 
may remain unsure as to whether to call the defendant as a witness. If such uncertainty 
exists, however, it is an abecedarian principle that the lawyer must exercise some degree of 
circumspection. Had the petitioner's counsel temporized — he was under no obligation to 
make an opening statement at all, much less to open before the prosecution presented its 
case, and, even if he chose to open, he most assuredly did not have to commit to calling his 
client as a witness — this would be a different case. See Phoenix v. Matesanz, 233 F.3d 77, 
85 (1st Cir.2000) (finding no ineffectiveness where, in the absence of an express promise, 
counsel chose not to call a potentially important witness). 
Here, however, the circumstances were far from ordinary. The petitioner's counsel elected to 
make his opening statement at the earliest possible time. He did not hedge his bets, but, 
rather, acted as if he had no doubt about whether his client should testify. In the course of 
his opening statement, he promised, over and over, that the petitioner would testify and 
exhorted the jurors to draw their ultimate conclusions based on her credibility. In fine, the 
lawyer structured the entire defense around the prospect of the petitioner's testimony.^! 
In the end, however, the petitioner's testimony was not forthcoming. Despite the fact that the 
lawyer had called the petitioner to the stand in both prior trials, he did a complete about-face. 
The lawyer states in his affidavit that he only realized that keeping his client off the witness 
stand was an option after the first day of trial. This realization came much too late. Indeed, 
the attorney's delayed reaction is sharply reminiscent of the situation in Anderson, in which 
we observed that even "if it was ... wise [not to have the witness testify] because of the 
29 damaging collateral evidence, it was inexcusable to have given the matter so little thought at 
the outset as to have made the opening promise." 858 F.2d at 18. 
The Commonwealth argues that defense counsel's mid-trial decision should be excused as a 
justified reaction to unfolding events. The theoretical underpinnings for this argument are 
sound: unexpected developments sometimes may warrant changes in previously announced 
trial strategies. See, e.g., Dutton v. Brown, 812 F.2d 593. 598 (10th Cir.1987). But although 
we cannot fault counsel for not guarding against the unforeseeable the case at hand does 
not fit that description. Here, everything went according to schedule; nothing occurred during 
the third trial that could have blindsided a reasonably competent attorney or justified a retreat 
from a promise previously made. After all, the petitioner's lawyer had represented her during 
two previous trials for the same offense; the prosecution's case in chief did not differ 
significantly at the third trial; and the situation that confronted the attorney when he changed 
his mind about the desirability of presenting the petitioner's testimony was no different from 
the situation that existed at a comparable stage of the earlier trials. 
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The Commonwealth suggests that the tenor of Shea's testimony justified counsel's last-
minute change of heart. Shea's testimony, it says, was stronger and more consistent this 
time around. The record belies this claim; it shows beyond hope of contradiction that the new 
wrinkles in Shea's testimony were of marginal significance. Some uncertainties were clarified 
on direct examination in preparation for the defense's cross-questioning, but this slight 
tightening-up of the prosecution's case should readily have been anticipated. What is more, 
even if Shea's testimony was less vulnerable than originally predicted, it remains a mystery 
why, in response to adverse evidence that proves stronger than expected, a lawyer should 
decide to abandon the only available avenue of controverting it. 
The Commonwealth has another arrow in its quiver: it asserts that, had the petitioner 
testified, she would have been heavily impeached (and, thus, the decision not to testify was a 
legitimate one). Because of the damaging evidence that was available for impeachment had 
the petitioner testified — the drugs and cash found in the search — this argument has a 
patina of plausibility. The difficulty, however, is that counsel knew of this sword of Damocles 
— the threat that the impeaching evidence would be introduced — when he made his 
opening statement.^ Indeed, that evidence was used to cross-examine the petitioner during 
the two prior trials, and counsel appeared ready, willing, and able to handle that contingency. 
The Commonwealth next argues that enough of the petitioner's story was presented through 
Gisleson that counsel reasonably could have advised the petitioner not to testify. This is little 
more than whistling past the graveyard. Gisleson was not present when Shea and the 
petitioner met on March 8, and so could only relate what she saw and heard before the 
petitioner left the house and after the petitioner returned. Thus, Gisleson's testimony, on its 
own, neither provided an adequate defense for the petitioner nor fulfilled the explicit promises 
made to the jury in the lawyer's opening statement.^-
30 In all events, Gisleson had testified at each of the earlier trials, and defense counsel knew 
the substance of her testimony when he promised the jury that the petitioner would testify at 
the third trial. We add that, to the extent that Gisleson's testimony at the third trial contained 
variations from her two previous appearances as a witness, those variations do not change 
the calculus. Some of them — such as the more detailed account of her conversation with 
the petitioner after she (the petitioner) returned from the parking lot — were probably helpful 
to the defense, while others — such as her failure to explain that Tsoleridas often made his 
sister run errands related to his carpentry business —were perhaps detrimental. The 
inescapable fact, however, is that a witness's testimony is rarely identical two times running. 
Cf. Beachum v. Tansy, 903 F.2d 1321. 1326 (10th Cir.199Q) (noting that "uncertainties and 
minor variations [are] normal to the recollection of honest witnesses after lapse of time"). 
Thus, the dispositive question must be whether, viewed as a whole, the testimony may be 
characterized as materially different. We think not: comparing Gisleson's testimony at the 
second and third trials, the differences are minor and amounted to neither a qualitative 
change nor an unexpected event justifying an abrupt switch in strategy.^ 
If more were needed—and we doubt that it is — the lawyer's about-face regarding the need 
for his client's testimony took place between the first and second day of trial. In other words, 
he changed his mind before Gisleson even testified. This chronology erases any suspicion 
that differences in Gisleson's testimony may have prompted the reversal of strategy. 
The short of it is that, without exception, the events that occurred at the third trial should 
have been easily foreseeable to competent counsel at the time he made his opening 
statement There were no surprises — and, thus, the lawyer's tergiversation could not be 
excused by changed circumstances. Compare, e.g., Maaill v. Dagger, 824 F.2d 879, 887-86 
(11th Cir. 1987) (finding ineffective assistance because counsel's strategy failed to account 
for foreseeable testimony), with Drake v. Clark 14 F.3d 351. 356 (7th Cir. 1994) (reaching the 
opposite conclusion when counsel's strategy was frustrated by an unforeseeable 
development). 
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Were we sitting in direct review, the foregoing analysis would lead us to find counsel's 
performance constitutionally unacceptable. In the exercise of habeas jurisdiction, however, we 
must take another step and evaluate the reasonableness of the Appeals Court's contrary 
conclusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Strickland constitutes the established Supreme 
Court precedent, and the state court purported to apply the functional equivalent of 
3 1
 Strickland's performance prong.1^ Because it did so — and because the facts of this case 
differ significantly from those of Strickland — this case does not fit within the confines of 
section 2254(d)(1)'s "contrary to" clause insofar as counsel's performance is concerned. 
Rather, the crux of the matter is whether the state court applied Strickland's performance 
standard in an objectively reasonable manner when it determined that the lawyer's 
performance did not fall below the constitutional minimum. 
We start this phase of our analysis with the text of the state-court decision. The state court 
first absolved the attorney from responsibility for failing to present the petitioner's testimony 
because the petitioner herself possessed enough sophistication to make such a decision. 
This determination misses the point of the petitioner's constitutional claim. While a decision 
about whether to testify ultimately rests with the defendant, see Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 
44. 49-53. 107 S.Ct. 2704. 97 LEd.2d 37 (1987). a defendant's waiver of the right to testify 
must be knowing, informed, and intelligent. This implies an understanding of the 
consequences of the decision. See United States v. Maniarrez, 258 F.3d 618. 623-24 (7th 
Cir.2001). Yet, the affidavits of both the petitioner and her trial counsel make it clear that she 
was not informed about the potential impact that the broken promises might have on the jury 
should she decide not to testify.^ 
A second problem with the state-court decision lies in its characterization of defense 
counsel's approach in his opening statement. Despite the unambiguous, emphatic, and oft-
repeated comments regarding both the imminence and the salience of the petitioner's 
testimony, the state court asserted that "counsel approached cautiously the question of [the 
petitioner] testifying." Here, however, the record makes manifest that trial counsel's approach 
to the question of calling the petitioner as a witness — making an unconditional promise, 
repeating it four times over, and then breaking it without justification — was the antithesis of 
caution. Because the state-court's characterization is not borne out by any plausible reading 
of the record, we deem it unreasonable. See O'Brien. 145 F.3d at 25 (stating that if a state-
court determination is devoid of record support, it fits within the "unreasonable application" 
prong of section 2254(d)(1)). 
Finally, the state court offered only a single reason why counsel might legitimately have 
changed his mind about calling the petitioner to the witness stand, namely, that the barbed 
cross-examination of Gisleson intimated that the petitioner would undergo an even fiercer 
attack. That hypothesis does not withstand scrutiny. For one thing, counsel reversed course 
32 before Gisleson testified. For another thing, the Commonwealth's strongest attack on 
Gisleson relied on her knowledge of the suppressed evidence. Because Gisleson's cross-
examination put some of that same information before the jury, see supra note 2, her 
testimony actually removed part of the rationale for not putting the petitioner on the witness 
stand. In other respects, Gisleson's testimony was no more severely impeached than in the 
previous trials —trials in which both Gisleson and the petitioner had testified and had held 
their own under withering cross-examination. At the very least, the petitioner's counsel 
should have anticipated the ferocity of potential cross-examination when he was deciding 
what to tell the jury in his opening statement. The Appeals Court's attempted justification is, 
therefore, plainly insupportable. 
To sum up, counsel committed an obvious error, without any semblance of a colorable 
excuse. There is simply no record support for the state court's finding that the attorney's 
conduct constituted a reasonable strategic choice. To the contrary, the only sensible 
conclusion that can be drawn from this record is that the attorney's performance was 
constitutionally deficient under Strickland — and severely so. We hold, therefore, that the 
state-court finding on this point constituted an unreasonable application of the Strickland 
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performance prong. 
B. Prejudice. 
The remaining issue involves the state court's determination that counsel's performance, even 
if constitutionally deficient, did not prejudice the petitioner. The district court found fault with 
the state court's application of Commonwealth v. Saferian, supra, positing that, insofar as 
prejudice is concerned, Saferian articulates a standard contrary to Strickland. Ouber. 158 
F.Supp.2d at 154 (arguing that Saferian concentrates on whether counsel's mistake deprived 
the accused of a substantial ground of defense rather than whether the mistake altered the 
outcome of the trial). We disagree with this assessment 
Although Strickland and Saferian do not employ identical phraseology, we have described 
those variations as "minor" and have concluded that, for habeas purposes, Saferian is a 
functional equivalent of Strickland, Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 7-8. That is the law of the circuit 
Moreover, that interpretation squares with the relevant Massachusetts case law. While 
Saferian predated Strickland, the SJC since has concluded that Saferian is at least as 
solicitous of Sixth Amendment rights as Strickland. See Commonwealth v. Urena, 417 Mass. 
692. 632 N.£.2d 1200. 1202 (Mass.1994): Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251. 475 
N.E.2d 381. 385 n. 3 (Mass.1985). In light of these precedents, we are unable to sustain the 
district court's conclusion that Saferian runs contrary to Strickland (and, thus, that the Appeals 
Court's decision is contrary to settled Supreme Court case law). 
The district court committed another error when it ruled that the state court's "no prejudice" 
decision was unreasonable because prejudice must be presumed when an attorney 
inexcusably fails to carry out an announced promise to present an important witness. Ouber. 
158 F.Supp.2d at 155. To the extent that the district court meant that the prejudice inquiry 
demanded by Strickland is superfluous In such a case, that holding is not grounded in any 
established Supreme Court precedent. To the contrary, the Court repeatedly has emphasized 
the limited nature of any exceptions to the general rule that a defendant must demonstrate 
actual prejudice. See Mickens v. Taylor U.S. . 122 S.Ct 1237. 1246. 152 LEd.2d 
33 291 (2002): Smith, 528 U.S. at 287. 120 S.Ct 746; Strickland. 466 U.S. at 692. 104 S.Ct 
2052. 
As recently as May 28, 2002, the Court reiterated that prejudice may be presumed only in 
three narrowly circumscribed situations. Bell. 122 S.Ct. at 1850. First, a trial is presumptively 
unfair if the accused is completely denied the presence of counsel at a critical stage of the 
proceedings. Id. (citing, inter alia, Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S> 52, 54. 82 S. Ct. 157, 7 
LEd.2d 114 (1961)). Second, such a presumption is warranted if "counsel entirely fails to 
subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Id. at 1851 (quoting United 
States v. Cronic. 466 U.S. 648. 659. 104 S.Ct. 2039. 80 LEd.2d 657 (1984)). Third, prejudice 
may be presumed in the presence of circumstances under which a competent lawyer would 
likely not be able to render effective assistance. Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45. 
53 S.Ct 55. 77 LEd. 158 (1932)). 
In this case, the district court did not assert that any of these exceptions apply, and, in all 
events, the record would not support such an assertion. Instead, the district court appeared to 
read Anderson as carving out a new exception. Ouber, 158 F.Supo.2d at 154. Whether or 
not Anderson intended to do so is beside the point, since the weight of recent Supreme Court 
precedent is to the contrary. See, e.g., Bell, 122 S.Ct. at 1850-51: Mickens, U.S. at , 
122 S.Ct. at 1246. We have heeded the Court's clear message in the past, e.g., Scarpa, 38 
F.3d at 11, and we are constrained to heed it here. Because the circumstances of this case 
do not fall within the contours of any of the three recognized exceptions to the Strickland 
formulation, a presumption of prejudice cannot be condoned. 
Setting the misplaced presumption to one side, we turn to the task of determining whether, on 
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the facts of this case, the error was prejudicial. For this purpose, an error generally is 
considered prejudicial if there is a strong possibility that it affected the outcome of the trial. 
See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 693-94. 104 S.Ct. 2052. Consequently, we must consider, on 
whole-record review, whether the trial might have ended differently absent the lawyer's 
blunder. This is normally a difficult endeavor, but we are aided here by a unique 
circumstance: this was the petitioner's third trial, and the only substantial difference among 
those trials relates to the omission of her testimony at the third trial. Thus, unlike in the vast 
majority of cases, we have actual rather than hypothetical reference points to guide our 
inquiry.MI-
When the petitioner testified, two different juries found the prosecution's case so evanescent 
that they were unable to reach a verdict Even without the petitioner's testimony, the jury in 
the third trial was deadlocked for a time. Given these facts, we are bound to conclude that 
the case was exceedingly close. 
In a borderline case, even a relatively small error is likely to tilt the decisional scales. See, 
e.g., Frev v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 369 (3d Cir.1992). The error here — failing to present 
the promised testimony of an important witness — was not small, but monumental. See, e.g., 
Anderson. 858 F.2d at 18-19: cf. United States v. Gonzalez-Maldonado. 115 F.3d 9. 15 (1st 
Cir.1997) (finding reversible error when the trial judge initially agreed that 
34 an important witness could testify, but later barred that witness from testifying). The net result 
of the failure to call the petitioner to the witness stand was that the jury heard only Shea's 
version of what transpired in the car. Yet, the petitioner's version would have been materially 
different with respect to certain critical aspects, such as whether Shea opened the envelopes 
in front of her and whether any verbal exchange regarding the contents (e.g., the weight and 
quality of the cocaine) occurred. Because these contradictions were not introduced into 
evidence, the jury never had an opportunity to assess the conflicting testimony or to weigh 
the petitioner's credibility against Shea's. What is worse, counsel's belated decision not to 
present the petitioner's testimony sabotaged the bulk of his efforts prior to that time (and, in 
the process, undermined his own standing with the jury, thereby further diminishing the 
petitioner's chances of success). Because the error was egregious, we are fully persuaded 
that, but for its commission, a different outcome might well have eventuated. Accordingly, the 
case satisfies the prejudice prong of the Strickland framework. 
Under the AEDPA, an erroneous determination is not necessarily an unreasonable 
determination. Williams. 529 U.S. at 410. 120 S.Ct. 1495. Thus, it remains for us to address 
whether the state court's finding of no prejudice was not only incorrect but also unreasonable. 
The test is an objective one. See id. It focuses on the state court's ultimate conclusion rather 
than on the strength of the court's announced rationale. See Bui v. DiPaolo. 170 F.3d 232, 
243-44 (1st Cir. 1999) (stating that "state courts are not required to supply the specific 
reasons that a federal court thinks are most persuasive for upholding the judgment"), cert, 
denied, 529 U.S. 1086, 120 S.Ct. 1717, 146 LEd.2d 640 (2000); accord Hurtado v. Tucker 
245F>3d 7. 19 (1st Cir.). cert, denied, 122 S.Ct 282, 151 LEd.2d 208 (2001); O'Brien. 
145 F.3d at 25. In other words, the hallmark of a reasonable determination is the result 
reached by the state court, not the ratiocination leading to that result. 
Here, the Massachusetts Appeals Court's "no prejudice" determination is not a credible 
outcome. That tribunal dealt with the question of prejudice vel non in a single paragraph, 
which reads: 
To omit to call a witness who has been promised can, of course, be a serious mistake, but 
whether it is such in any given case is dependent on the circumstances, as the law 
recognizes, [string citations omitted] The promise here was not made dramatically or 
memorably, as it was in [Anderson ]. Counsel's apology in closing was brief and subdued. 
That the jury were not overcome by the unfulfilled promise is indicated by the fact that it took 
a [dynamite] charge to inspire the verdict The verdict itself found solid support in the 
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evidence, The judge charged against any invidious implication from the defendant's silence. 
As can be seen, this paragraph contains several assertions — but these assertions are either 
irrelevant or devoid of record support. We explain briefly. 
The state court opined that defense counsel's opening promises were not "dramatic" or 
"memorable." We find it hard to imagine, however, how the court could have reached that 
conclusion. The attorney made the promises explicitly and repeatedly. He also exhorted the 
jurors to base their ultimate decision on their collective assessment of the contrasting 
accounts that would be given by Shea and the petitioner, respectively. This call for a 
35 credibility judgment was the crowning element of the lawyer's opening statement and could 
not have failed to make an impression on the jury. The single promise in Anderson, 858 F.2d 
at 17 — a case in which counsel did not urge the jurors to rest their decision on the 
credibility of the witness who was promised but not produced — was certainly far less 
dramatic and memorable. 
The state court also implied that the alleged error was inconsequential because the jury 
initially deadlocked and therefore was not immediately overborne by the detrimental effect of 
the broken promises. This argument effectively assumes that because a blunder did not lead 
to a summary conviction, it was of negligible effect. We believe that such an assumption is 
unreasonable; the fact that the jury convicted the petitioner only after prolonged deliberations 
and a supplemental "dynamite" charge necessarily underscores the closeness of the case 
(and, therefore, the gravity of any error). 
The Appeals Court also posited that the petitioner's case was "intrinsically weak," and that 
the jury's verdict rested on solid evidence. The court, however, did not buttress these 
conclusory statements with any specific findings, and they are belied by the record. Indeed, 
the very fact that the first two trials ended in hung juries is powerful proof that those 
statements are insupportable. At each of those trials, the evidence marshaled against the 
petitioner was so underwhelming that the jurors were unable to reach a decision. The state 
court failed to consider this fact, or to suggest why doing so might be unhelpful. 
The remaining factors mentioned by the Appeals Court bear little relevance to the prejudice 
inquiry. The fact that counsel's apology to the jury was "subdued" neither establishes the 
insignificance of the original promises nor palliates the effect of the mistake. The fact that the 
jury was advised not to draw a negative inference from the petitioner's failure to testify is 
likewise irrelevant; the attorney's mistake was not in invoking the petitioner's right to remain 
silent, but in "the totality of the opening and the failure to follow through." Anderson, 858 F.2d 
at 17. 
To sum up, this was the petitioner's third trial and the only salient difference between it and 
the two prior trials was the absence of her testimony. This time around, defense counsel 
made a promise, hammered it home, and then broke it. The first two trials, at which the 
petitioner testified, offer a prime example of how this trial likely would have ended in the 
absence of this stunning error. We believe that it was unreasonable for the state court not to 
have taken such obvious reference points into account. Had it done so, it would have been 
bound to conclude that the case was a close one in which counsel's egregious error was 
likely to have made a dispositive difference. 
That ends the matter. Since neither the state court's opinion nor our own careful 
perscrutation of the record reveals an objectively reasonable ground for the state court's "no 
prejudice" determination, we are constrained to set it aside. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
We need go no further. Had the state court applied Strickland in an objectively reasonable 
manner, it would have been bound to conclude that defense counsel's abandonment of the 
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oft-repeated promise that the petitioner would testify, enunciated in his opening statement, 
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment. The 
lawyer was intimately familiar with the case before he made this promise (having represented 
the petitioner in two prior trials on the same charges). Yet, he staked his client's defense on 
the strength of her testimony and then, with no discernible justification, changed his mind and 
decided that she should not testify. No significant change in circumstances occurred between 
the time of the lawyer's opening statement and the time of his about-face. This was a serious 
error in professional judgment, and the state court's contrary determination represented an 
unreasonable application of Strickland's performance prong. 
Here, moreover, the prior trials serve as a meaningful benchmark for determining the 
likelihood that the outcome of the third trial was affected by the lawyer's mistake. Those 
trials, neither of which was marred by the same error, produced results materially different 
from the one reached in the third trial. Yet, the state court inexplicably failed to undertake this 
comparative analysis. We conclude, therefore, that the state court's harmlessness 
determination represented an unreasonable application of Strickland's prejudice prong. 
For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court. The petitioner shall be entitled 
to a writ of habeas corpus unless the Commonwealth affords her a new trial within the period 
prescribed. 
Affirmed. 
HI The ground rules vis-a-vis the illegally seized evidence were essentially the same as for the first two trials, 
that Is, the trial justice ruled that the Commonwealth could introduce evidence from the search only if the 
petitioner testified (and then, only for impeachment purposes). 
[2], During the second trial, the defense, apparently anticipating that the previously suppressed evidence 
garnered during the warrantless search would be used to impeach the petitioner, brought out some information 
concerning that evidence on Gisleson's direct examination. During the third trial, defense counsel spurned this 
tactic, but the prosecution was able to bring before the jury, in the course of Gisleson's cross-examination, 
essentially the same information. 
[3] The priests assisted in this endeavor, but the petitioner claims, without contradiction, that the priests were 
merely advocating for the position that the lawyer espoused. 
14], Counsel's subsequent actions reinforced this perception. He called twenty-four character witnesses who 
testified as to the petitioner's reputation for veracity. This procession set the stage for her testimony by 
enhancing her credibility. When she did not testify, this stage-setting quite likely intensified the negative impact 
on the jury. 
[51 The fact of the matter is that the lawyer alluded to the evidence that would be adduced for impeachment 
purposes in his opening statement, cautioning the jury to keep in mind that such evidence would be admitted 
only for a limited purpose. 
161 To be sure, Gisleson related some of what the petitioner allegedly had told her about the events that 
occurred in the parking lot. Her testimony, however, failed to contradict Shea's on three crucial issues: whether 
there was any conversation regarding the contents of the envelopes, whether he opened the envelopes in front 
of the petitioner, and whether the latter counted the money in his presence. At any rate, Gisleson's testimony 
about the petitioner's statements was rank hearsay, and did not afford the factfinders an opportunity to see and 
hear the petitioner's detailed, first-hand account of the transaction. 
[71 This conclusion is also buttressed by defense counsel's summation to the jury in which he made light of the 
added details in Gisleson's testimony. 
]81 Although the state court did not refer to Strickland by name, it applied a similar standard articulated in 
Saferian. 315 N.E.2d at 882-83. We have indicated that the Saferian standard is roughly equivalent to the 
Strickland standard, see Scarpa, 38 F.3d at 7-8, and the Massachusetts courts have noted that Saferian is at 
least as favorable to the defendant as Strickland, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fuller, 394 Mass. 251, 475 
N.E.2d 381, 385 n. 3 (Mass.1985). Thus, the state court applied a constitutionally proper performance standard 
(and, accordingly, the state-court decision is not "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent). 
I§1 We add, moreover, that if the attorney improperly counseled his client to eschew appearing as a witness 
after having promised the jury that she would testify, the fact that the client "voluntarily" embraced this 
erroneous advice seems insufficient to palliate the constitutional effects of the attorney's error. But we need not 
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probe this point too deeply, as the Commonwealth has made no developed argument to the effect that the 
petitioner's independent choice forecloses the ineffective assistance ciaim. See United States v. Zannino, 895 
F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir.1990) (noting that "issues..., unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation, 
are deemed waived"). 
f1Q| We caution that the likelihood of a different outcome may not always be synonymous with prejudice. See 
Strickland. 466 U.S. at 695. 104 S.Ct. 2052 (noting that when acquittal wouid be likely only because of 
improper collateral considerations a defendant should not reap the benefit of a new trial). That caveat is not 
applicable in this instance. 
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Justice HOPKINS delivered the opinion of the court: 
Following a jury trial, the defendant, Brandon Briones, was convicted of criminal damage to 
property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a) (West 2002)) and sentenced to two years in prison. On 
appeal, the defendant argues that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
On May 30, 2002, the State charged the defendant by an amended information with criminal 
damage to property worth more than $300 (720 ILCS 5/21-1(1)(a), (2) (West 2002)) and 
aggravated discharge of a firearm (720 ILCS 5/24-1.2(a)(1) (West 2002)). 
At the defendant's jury trial, the State presented the following evidence. 
In the early morning hours of May 11, 2002, Darrel Moulton, with another man who stood in 
the darkness, knocked on the door of Michael Peyton and Daria Wynn's mobile home. When 
Michael opened the door, Darrel and Michael argued. 
Daria was lying in bed where she could view the door. When Michael and Darrel moved 
away from the door, Daria recognized the defendant, her nephew, poking his head around 
Darrel to smile in the light Michael, who had a vision problem and was not wearing his 
glasses, was unsure of the accompanying man's identity. 
Michael shut the door but anticipated danger, so he began to dress. After five minutes, 
gunshots were fired at the mobile home. Daria and Michael exited the home and drove away 
in their truck. Daria and Michael recognized the defendant's voice when the defendant 
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shouted that Darla and Michael were leaving. 
Michael saw Darrel jump onto the back of the truck, after which the rear window on the 
truck's camper shell shattered. When she heard the window break, Darla saw the defendant 
standing on the rear bumper of the truck. After the window shattered, Michael stopped the 
truck and saw two men running down the road. When Darla shouted at the defendant, he 
stopped and turned. The defendant was not wearing a shirt. 
Approximately seven minutes later, after Michael and Darla had driven to an unmanned 
police station, they returned to their residence. Their mobile home was on fire, the windows in 
their other two vehicles and in Darla's daughter's vehicle were broken, and police and fire 
personnel were on the scene. As a mechanic, Michael estimated that the cost to replace the 
windows exceeded $300. 
Don Tate, Darla and Michael's neighbor, testified that on the night in question, he returned 
home after midnight and heard yelling, gunshots, and windows smashing. He entered his 
home, telephoned the police, and returned outside. Don saw Darrel and Brian Thompson 
enter the mobile home, saw a "big flash of light," and saw the two men run from the mobile 
home. Don also witnessed another male, wearing no shirt, running near the mobile home, 
but Don could not positively identify the man as the defendant. 
In denying the defendant's motion for a directed verdict, the circuit court noted that the 
evidence was "not overwhelming." 
1122 During opening statements, the defendant's counsel stated; 
"The evidence will show that [the defendant] gave a statement to Officer 
Squibb. He told Officer Squibb[:] [']l wasn't there. I was over here at Conrad 
and Tina Wynn's house.['] 
* * * 
[The defendant] has no obligation to testify. * * * But he's going to get up here 
on this witness stand and he's going to testify and he's going to tell you the 
truth and he's going to subject himself to rigorous cross-examination by the 
State and he's going to do that because he's going to tell you the truth." 
The defense called Darrel Moulton, who had pled guilty to residential arson with regard to the 
present case. Darrel testified that on the night in question, he approached Michael and 
Darla's mobile home with Avery Swarms, the defendant's cousin, not the defendant. Darrel 
testified that he and Avery had been drinking at Brian Thompson's house, that they 
approached Michael and Darla's mobile home, that Darrel argued with Michael, and that 
Brian Thompson shot at the mobile home. Darrel testified that when Michael and Darla 
attempted to leave, he and Avery chased them. Darrel testified that he broke Michael and 
Darla's truck window with a baseball bat and that Avery ran behind him. 
Darrel testified that after he had broken Michael's truck window, he threw the baseball bat in 
a field, kicked in the front door of the mobile home, and ignited the home. Darrel testified 
that he then approached neighbors for a ride to town, including Conrad Wynn, whose window 
he approached for his request. Darrel then saw the defendant driving in his vehicle. Darrel 
asked the defendant for a ride, the defendant agreed, and the police later apprehended them 
together. 
During cross-examination, Darrel admitted that in a handwritten statement, given to police on 
May 30, he stated: 
"The last I saw of [the defendant] before he picked me up at the church was 
when I was in Brian's back yard and Darla and Mike were leaving. He picked 
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up something and broke out their back window on their camper shell on the 
truck. That's when Brian's in the house getting another weapon." 
Conrad and Tina Wynn, the defendant's brother and sister-in-law, lived near Darla and 
Michael. Conrad and Tina testified that at least 30 minutes before the fire started at Michael 
and Darla's home, the defendant arrived at the Wynn home and watched a movie with them. 
While the defendant was in their home, they heard pounding noises and saw the fire through 
their window. Before the defendant left their home, Darrel appeared at the window, and 
Conrad declined Barrel's request for a ride to town. 
Conrad testified that approximately two weeks later, Avery admitted to him that the defendant 
was charged with crimes Avery had committed. Conrad testified that Avery and the defendant 
looked similar and that he sometimes confused the two. 
Ramona Forbes, the defendant's mother, testified that Avery, who was her nephew, admitted 
to burning Michael and Darla's mobile home. 
Avery Swarms testified that he lived two blocks from Darla and Michael's mobile home. Avery 
testified that on the night of the fire, he alternated between his home and William DeMain's 
home and that he witnessed the fire from across the street. Avery began walking toward the 
1123 fire but returned home when he saw the fire and emergency vehicles. Avery denied 
involvement in the activities that damaged Michael and Darla's mobile home and vehicles. 
Avery also denied telling Conrad or the defendant's mother that the defendant was charged 
with crimes he had committed. Avery testified that he did not see Darrel, Brian, the 
defendant, Michael, or Darla that night 
William DeMain testified that on the night of the fire, Avery was at his home early in the 
evening and William fell asleep on his couch. When William woke, he stepped outside, saw 
the fire, and walked toward it Heading that way, William encountered Avery, who was also 
walking toward the fire. The police and fire vehicles arrived thereafter. 
The defendant did not testify. 
During the State's rebuttal, the State recalled Officer Robert Squibb. Defense counsel 
objected to the State's questions to Officer Squibb regarding the defendant's postarrest 
statement In his statement, the defendant asserted that on the night of the fire, he spoke 
with Chrystal Logsdon until approximately 10:45 p.m., went to his grandmother's to watch 
television, drove around, saw the fire, went to Conrad's home, and watched the fire. The 
court held the defendant's statements admissible as admissions by a party opponent, an 
exception to the hearsay rule. 
The circuit court also stated: 
"You said yesterday in opening statements your client was going to testify, so I 
kind of anticipated that * * * I want to at least make a record on that" 
In response to the circuit court's questioning, the defendant stated that it was his decision, 
along with his counsel's, that he not testify. 
During the jury instruction conference, defense counsel tendered a jury instruction regarding 
the weight to be given identification testimony (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 
3.15 (4th ed.2000)). The circuit court suggested including "or" between each element, the 
State agreed, and defense counsel withdrew the proposed instruction, which had omitted the 
word "or." As a result, the jury was instructed as follows: 
"When you weigh the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider 
all the facts and circumstances in evidence, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
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The opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the offense, 
or 
The witness's degree of attention at the time of the offense, or 
The level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant, or 
The length of time between the offense and the identification confrontation." 
The jury found the defendant guilty of criminal damage to property over $300 but not guilty of 
aggravated discharge of a firearm. On December 5, 2002, the circuit court sentenced the 
defendant to two years in prison. The defendant filed a timely notice of'appeal. 
ANALYSIS 
Pursuant to both the United States Constitution (U.S. Const, amend.VI) and the Illinois 
Constitution (III. Const 1970, art. I, § 8), an accused has a due process right to the effective 
assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution. People v. Connor. 82 lll.App.3d 652, 657, 37 
III.Pea 860. 402 N.E.2d 862 (1980). A defendant raising an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
claim must meet the two-part test enunciated in Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 104 
1124 S.Ct 2052. 80 LEd.2d 674 (1984). and adopted by the Illinois Supreme Court in People v, 
Aibanese, 104 lll.2d 504. 85 III. Dec. 441 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). To prevail on a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that his counsel's performance 
was so seriously deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under 
prevailing professional norms, that is, counsel made errors so serious that he no longer 
functioned as the "counsel" guaranteed by the sixth amendment Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 
104 S.Ct at 2064. 80 LEd.2d at 693; Albanese, 104 lll.2d at 525. 85 III.Dec. 441. 473 N.E.2d 
1246, To establish deficiency, the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that 
counsel's challenged action or inaction was the product of sound trial strategy. Strickland. 466 
U.S. at 689. 104 S.Ct at 2065. 80 LEd.2d at 694-95. 
The defendant must also show that his counsel's deficient performance so prejudiced him that 
it denied him a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct 
at 2064. 80 LEd.2d at 693: Albanese. 104 lll.2d at 525. 85 III.Dec. 441 473 N.E.2d 1246. To 
show prejudice, the defendant must establish a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 694. 104 S.Ct at 2068. 80 LEd.2d at 698. A reasonable probability is a probability 
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Albanese. 104 lll.2d at 525. 85 III.Dec. 
441 473 N.E.2d 1246. 
"[A] defendant is entitled to a fair trial, not a perfect one." People v. Easiev. 192 III.2d 307, 
344, 249 III.Dec. 537, 736 N.E.2d 975 (2000). Likewise, the right to the effective assistance 
of counsel refers to competent, not perfect, representation. Easiev, 192 lll.2d at 344. 249 
III.Dec. 537. 736 N.E.2d 975: People v. Stewart, 104 lll.2d 463. 492. 85 III.Dec. 422. 473 
N.E.2d 1227 (1984). Only the most egregious of tactical or strategic blunders may provide a 
basis for a violation of a defendant's right to the effective assistance of counsel (People v. 
Kubik, 214 lll.App.3d 649. 661 158 III.Dec. 152. 573 N.E.2d 1337 (1991)). such as when trial 
counsel's chosen strategy was so unsound that counsel completely failed to conduct any 
meaningful adversarial testing (People v. Raid. 179 lll.2d 297. 310, 228 III.Dec. 179. 688 
N.E.2d 1156(1997)). 
The defendant argues that his counsel was deficient because she set the defense up to be 
discredited by promising the jury that the defendant would testify to the truth and, 
inexplicably, failing to call him. We agree. 
In United States ex rei Hampton v. Leibach. 347 F.3d 219, 257 (7th Cir.2003), contrary to 
trial counsel's promise to the jury in opening statements, the defendant did not testify. The 
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federal appellate court held, "[W]hen the failure to present the promised testimony cannot be 
chalked up to unforeseeable events, the attorney's broken promise may be unreasonable, for 
little is more damaging than to fail to produce important evidence that had been promised in 
an opening."' Leibach, 347 F.3d at 257 (quoting Anderson v. Butler, 858 F.2d 16, 17 (1st 
Cir.1988)). The court continued: 
"Promising a particular type of testimony creates an expectation in the minds of 
jurors, and when defense counsel without explanation fails to keep that 
promise, the jury may well infer that the testimony would have been adverse to 
his client and may also question the attorney's credibility. In no sense does it 
serve the defendant's interests." Leibach. 347 F.3d at 259. 
1125 Similarly, in Ouber v. Guarino, the federal appellate court stated; 
"When a jury is promised that it will hear the defendant's story from the 
defendant's own lips, and the defendant then reneges, common sense suggests 
that the course of trial may be profoundly altered. A broken promise of this 
magnitude taints both the lawyer who vouchsafed it and the client on whose 
behalf it was made." Ouber v. Guarino. 293 F.3d 19. 28 (1st Cir.2002). 
See also People v. Patterson. 192 lli.2d 93. 121. 249 Hl.Dec. 12. 735 N.E.2d 616 (2000) (the 
defendant was entitled to a postconviction evidentiary hearing involving an ineffective-
assistance claim because defense counsel failed to produce evidence he had promised in 
opening statements); People v. Lewis. 240 lll.App.3d 463, 468, 182 ill. Dec. 139, 609 N.E.2d 
673 (1992) (defense counsel was incompetent for promising, during opening statements, to 
produce the defendant's pretrial exonerating statement when the statement was actually 
inadmissible hearsay); People v. Chandler, 129 lll.2d 233, 249, 135 Hl.Dec. 543. 543 N.E.2d 
1290 (1989) (defense counsel failed to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful 
adversarial testing, in part because counsel failed to call the defendant to testify, despite his 
opening statement to the contrary). 
In People v. Manning, contrary to defense counsel's promise during opening statements, the 
defendant informed the trial court that he did not want to testify. People v. Manning. 334 
lll.App.3d 882. 892. 268 Hl.Dec. 600. 778 N.E.2d 1222 (2002). The appellate court stated that 
because it could not determine from the record whether counsel's decision was based upon 
the defendant's choice not to testify, sound trial strategy, or incompetence, the court 
presumed it was the result of trial strategy and rejected the defendant's ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim. Manning. 334 HI.App.3d at 893. 268 Hl.Dec. 600, 778 N.E.2d 
1222. 
We agree with Manning that if the defendant, contrary to defense counsel's previous 
assertion, decided not to testify at the trial, his counsel's performance was not deficient. 
However, we decline to presume that defense counsel's decision not to present the 
defendant's testimony, after promising to do so in opening statements, was the result of trial 
strategy. 
Although the defendant must overcome the strong presumption that his counsel's challenged 
action or inaction was the product of sound trial strategy (Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 
S.Ct. at 2065. 80 LEd.2d at 694-95), once defense counsel promised the jury that the 
defendant would tell the truth from his own lips and then counsel reneged on that promise, in 
no sense could it serve the defendant's interests (see Leibach, 347 F.3d at 259). When 
defense counsel promised the jury in opening statements that the defendant would testify but 
counsel later determined that the promise would go unfulfilled, it was counsel's responsibility 
to evidence in the record that she was not deficient, i.e., that the determination was a result 
of the defendant's fickleness or of counsel's sound trial strategy due to unexpected events. 
Because defense counsel in the case subjudice failed to show in the record that the 
defendant inexplicably changed his decision to testify or that, because of unexpected events, 
sound trial strategy required her to break her promise that the defendant would testify, we find 
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that counsel's performance, in failing to present the defendant's testimony that she had 
promised in opening statements, was deficient 
The defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for allowing the jury to be 
1126 improperly instructed regarding the weight to be given the identification testimony of Darla 
and Michael, We agree. 
In People v. Gonzalez, the trial court had instructed the jury as follows: 
"'When you weigh the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider 
all the facts and circumstances in evidence, including but not limited to the 
following: 
The opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the offense; 
or 
The witnesses] degree of attention at the time of the offense; or 
The witnesses] earlier description of the offender; or 
The level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant; or 
The length of time between the offense and the identification confrontation.' 
(Emphasis added.)" People v. Gonzalez, 326 lll.App.3d 629. 637. 260 lll.Pec. 
354. 761 N.E.2d 198 (2001). 
In Gonzalez, as in the present case, the controversy surrounding the wording of the 
instruction involved the trial court's use of the word "or" between each of the five factors. 
Gonzalez, 326 lll.App.3d at 637. 260 lll.Pec. 354. 761 N.E.2d 198. The Illinois pattern 
instruction states the following: 
"When you weigh the identification testimony of a witness, you should consider 
all the facts and circumstances in evidence, including, but not limited to, the 
following: 
[1] The opportunity the witness had to view the offender at the time of the 
offense. 
[or] 
[2] The witness's degree of attention at the time of the offense. 
im 
[3] The witness's earlier description of the offender 
[or] 
[4] The level of certainty shown by the witness when confronting the defendant 
[or] 
[5] The length of time between the offense and the identification confrontation." 
Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 3.15 (4th ed.2000). 
The appellate court in Gonzalez held that the incorporation of the word "or" between each 
factor incorrectly implied, as a matter of law, that the identification testimony of an eyewitness 
may be deemed reliable if just one of the five factors weighs in favor of reliability. Gonzalez, 
326 lll.App.3d at 640. 260 UI.Dec. 354. 761 N.E.2d 198. The appellate court held that the trial 
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court's error in so instructing the jury was improper and prejudicial. Gonzalez, 326 IH.App.3d 
at 641. 260 lll.Dec. 354. 761 N.E.2d 198. 
Similarly, in the present case, the circuit court erred in including the word "or" between the 
factors the jury was to consider in evaluating the eyewitness identification testimony. 
Although defense counsel submitted a proper instruction, she accepted the court's suggestion 
that her instruction was in error and withdrew it. Defense counsel was deficient in failing to 
cite Gonzalez to support the correct, proposed jury instruction and in withdrawing it, 
The defendant also cites the following tactical or strategic errors by his counsel: (1) his 
counsel allowed into evidence his statement to Officer Squibb when the statement was 
inconsistent with the defense, i.e., in the statement, the defendant claimed that he did not 
1127 arrive at his brother's home until after the fire had started, (2) his counsel called Avery 
Swarms as a witness even though counsel knew that Avery would not admit his culpability for 
the crimes, (3) his counsel failed to request that Darrel Moulton's oral statements to Officer 
Squibb be limited as impeachment evidence, (4) his counsel called Darrel to testify for the 
defense when Darrel's testimony allowed the State to show on cross-examination that Darrel 
had previously lied to the police and that Darrel had previously told the police that the 
defendant had accompanied him during the crime, and (5) his counsel provided alibi 
testimony that was impeached with the defendant's prior inconsistent statement 
Such tactical or strategic errors by counsel cannot support a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel unless trial counsel's chosen strategy was so unsound that counsel completely failed 
to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. See Reid. 179 lll.2d at 310, 228 lll.Dec. 179, 
688 N.E.2d 1156. Although we find that counsel's strategy was not so unsound that counsel 
completely failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial testing, trial counsel's strategy was 
refutable, and in conjunction with trial counsel's errors in failing to present promised testimony 
by the defendant and in allowing the jury to be misinstructed, we find that the defendant was 
prejudiced. 
The prosecution's case primarily involved the testimony of Michael and Darla and their 
opportunity to identify their assailants under low light and while fleeing from their home. At 
the conclusion of the State's case, the circuit court noted that the evidence against the 
defendant was not overwhelming. From our review of the proceedings as a whole, 
considering the aggregate errors of defense counsel, we find that the verdict cannot be relied 
upon with confidence. See People v. Moore. 279 lll.App.3cl 152, 162. 215 lll.Dec. 479. 663 
N.E.2d 490 (1996) ("[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not 
have received a different result without the professional errors of counsel but whether, with 
their presence, he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of 
confidence"). We hold that the defendant was denied his right to the effective assistance of 
counsel. 
On the other hand, although not overwhelming, the evidence against the defendant was 
sufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We therefore find no double 
jeopardy impediment to a new trial. See People v. Fornear. 176 lll.2d 523. 535, 224 lll.Dec. 
12. 680N.E.2d 1383(1997). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Marion County is reversed, and 
the cause is remanded for a new trial. 
Reversed; cause remanded. 
CHAPMAN, P.J., and KUEHN, J. , concur. 
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September 24, 1991 
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Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Merrilyn Feirman, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, 
Guy Dotson, Atty. Gen., Murfreesboro, for State. 
No Application for Permission to Appeal to the Supreme Court. 
OPINION 
WADE, Judge. 
The defendant, Laurie Zimmerman, appeals her conviction of second degree murder. She 
was sentenced to 15 years. The issue presented for review is whether her trial counsel was 
ineffective. 
We find in favor of the defendant, reverse the conviction, and remand the cause for a new 
trial. 
Attorney David Vincent initially represented the defendant. Two days before trial, he 
associated Herbert Rich as co-counsel. The defense strategy was that the defendant, a 
battered wife, stabbed her husband in self-defense. The defendant, a clinical psychologist, 
the defendant's nine and eleven-year-old children, and other witnesses were scheduled to 
testify on the defendant's behalf. Before the trial began, the state agreed to stipulate that the 
victim had a blood alcohol content of .11 percent when examined after his death. 
During the opening statement, Attorney Rich announced to the jury that the defendant would 
testify; he stated that a psychologist who had treated the defendant would explain the 
222 "battered wife syndrome" and testify favorably for the defense. This was in accordance with 
the strategy mapped out by Attorney Vincent and otherwise met with Vincent's approval. As a 
part of its proof-in-chief, the state presented portions of a pretrial statement made by the 
defendant The victim's brother, a next-door neighbor, two officers, and the emergency room 
physician also testified for the prosecution. When the state rested, Attorney Vincent, over the 
private objections of his co-counsel, recommended to the defendant that she not testify. The 
defendant confirmed her approval of the decision in a jury-out hearing. The defense rested. 
Neither the psychologist nor the other defense witnesses were called to give testimony. After 
final argument the jury returned with a verdict of guilt 
I 
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The victim, Mark Zimmerman, was 30 years old. He and the defendant had been married for 
approximately three years and had a two-year-old son, Brian. The defendant had two minor 
children by a prior marriage. The Zimmermans operated a business from their home called 
Marketing World, Incorporated, a publication which advertised video movies. 
Just before midnight on Saturday, March 17, 1990, Tony Benton, a neighbor to the victim and 
the defendant, thought someone was trying to break into his home. When he went to the 
door, he found the victim wounded and bleeding. Benton directed his wife to call 911, noticed 
the victim was not breathing, and attempted CPR. Police arrived first, then an ambulance. 
Within minutes of the stabbing, the victim was transported to the Middle Tennessee Medical 
Center. An emergency physician attempted resuscitation but was unsuccessful. 
Medical evidence established that the knife wound was to the victim's back, just to the left of 
the spinal cord and below the sternum. The wound was four inches in diameter and extended 
into the chest cavity. The aorta was severed and the victim bled to death. Death probably 
occurred within five to eight minutes of the wound. 
Officer Randy Garrett of the Murfreesboro Police Department investigated. When he arrived 
at defendant's residence, he found her upset and crying. She immediately stated, "I stabbed 
him ... it was an accident" The defendant told the officer that the victim had been drinking 
and had tape recorded their conversation. Upon further questioning, the defendant related 
that the victim threatened to take the two-year-old child and leave. She said there was a 
brief struggle, she somehow wound up with a butcher knife, and stabbed the victim as he 
reached for their child. She stated that the victim ran out of the residence, apparently 
removing the knife as he did so. The officer searched the area and found a 12 inch butcher 
knife in the driveway between the defendant's residence and that of Tony Benton. 
The officer found a coat near the open closet door of the master bedroom. Photographs 
showed blood stains on clothing and the carpet near the Zimmermans' closet, and on the 
floor and wall near the door of the Benton residence. Another officer detected that the 
defendant had red marks on her arms, one shoulder, and her lower back. The defendant told 
that officer that she received the marks in her struggle with the victim prior to the stabbing. 
On cross-examination, the first officer testified from his report to portions of the defendant's 
statements. He acknowledged that the defendant had told him that the victim, prior to the 
stabbing, took hold of her hand and said, evidently for purposes of the tape recording, "Let 
me go." On redirect, the officer read from his report of the incident: 
Mr. Zimmerman started grabbing her arm, stating "I am tape recording this," 
talking as he grabbed her saying, "You're accosting me...." Zimmerman shut 
their two-year-old son, Brian, in a closet in the master bedroom and then asked 
Laurie where he was. Mr. Zimmerman got the butcher knife from the kitchen, 
and a brief struggle occurred, with Laurie retrieving the knife. Zimmerman 
223 opened the closet door, reaching for Brian, stating "I am going to take him, 
you're unfit" Laurie stated she then stabbed Mr. Zimmerman, 
Officers recovered the tape recording the victim made of his conversation with the defendant 
just prior to the stabbing. The day before, the defendant had gone to court to ask for a 
protective order against the victim. The victim had not appeared to defend and a hearing was 
scheduled for the following Monday. The victim prefaced the recording with the following 
statement: 
Today's date is March 17, 1990, and I'm using this as my protection against 
Laurie in the event that she accuses me of any type of verbal abuse or 
physically abuses me. 
The tape recording, which lasted about 27 minutes, was played for the jury. Some of the 
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recorded conversation related to business operations. There was discussion about why the 
defendant had taken out the protective order. The defendant accused the victim of being an 
alcoholic, having punched her while she slept at 3:00 A.M. in the morning, and having passed 
out the same evening on their two-year-old son's bed. At various points, the defendant and 
the victim called each other liars. The defendant accused the victim of having embezzled 
money from a prior employer; referred to him as "Mr. Alcoholic"; and stated, in reference to 
the hearing on the protective order, she had his "ass" and "little dick in a ringer." Both were 
angry. Voices were raised during much of the taped conversations. The victim accused the 
defendant of building her "case on lies" and of perpetuating a fraud on the court. He 
announced that he was getting some clothes and leaving. As the victim walked out the door, 
the defendant pled with him to talk some more. She repeatedly professed her love for the 
victim. He refused to talk further. The tape, found by officers in the victim's jacket, ends when 
the victim walks back into the residence, expressing concern for their son's whereabouts, and 
the victim's response, "Oh, stop it." From all appearances, the stabbing occurred only 
minutes after the tape recorder was turned off. 
ii 
The defendant discharged her trial attorneys prior to the motion for new trial. Through her 
new counsel, she contends that she was ineffectively represented at trial. She argues that her 
counsel misled the jury by promising a specific defense in the opening statement and then 
presenting no proof after the state completed its case. She asserts that her trial counsel 
failed to utilize her witnesses and other available evidence which would have been helpful in 
her defense; she submits that her trial counsel was ineffective by his recommendation that 
she not testify. 
After a lengthy hearing on the motion for new trial, the trial court found that the defendant 
made a conscientious decision not to testify based on inconsistencies or inadequacies in her 
pre-trial statements; there was sufficient investigation; there was no ineffectiveness by the 
failure to negotiate a plea since the defendant had directed her counsel that she would not 
accept any offer involving the service of any sentence; reliance upon the discovered material 
excused any failure on trial counsel's part to interview any state witnesses; the failure to 
interview defense witnesses did not constitute ineffectiveness; the decision to deviate from 
the strategy announced in the opening statement was a sound decision; the failure to point 
out the differences in the size of the victim versus the defendant was not ineffective; the 
failure to cross-examine the state's witness, Dr. Thrush, who not only treated the victim but 
also the defendant after a March 8, 1990, incident, was not prejudicial; the failure to place in 
evidence that the defendant had made a 911 call after the stabbing was not prejudicial; the 
failure to place certain photographs into evidence was not prejudicial; the failure to get into 
evidence the stipulation of the victim's blood alcohol was not ineffective assistance; the 
failure to place into evidence the victim's business records, indicating both drug and alcohol 
use, was not prejudicial; the failure to call witnesses to testify as to the relationship of the 
defendant and the victim between 1986 and 1988 was too remote to have been prejudicial; 
224 the failure to call other witnesses, including the defendant's children, was not prejudicial; and 
the failure to present the testimony of the psychologist, who had counseled with the 
Zimmermans during the marriage, was a reasonable strategy decision. 
m 
In order to establish that her counsel was ineffective, the defendant must show in the post-
conviction proceeding that the advice given or the services rendered were not within the 
range of competence of attorneys in criminal cases. Baxter v. Rose. 523 S.W.2d 930 (Tenn. 
1975). She must also establish that but for her counsel's deficient performance, the results of 
the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668. 104 S.Ct 2052, 
80LEd.2d674(1984). 
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The burden is on the petitioner to show that the evidence preponderates against the findings 
of the trial judge who, in this instance, found in favor of the state. Clennv v. State. 576 
S.W.2d 12 (Tenn. Grim. App.. 1978). The findings in the trial court on questions of fact may 
not be reversed on appeal unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. Graves v. State, 
512 S.W.2d 603 (Tenn. Crim. A P P . 1973). 
In Strickland, the standard of review on the issue of assistance of counsel was stated as 
follows: 
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This 
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not 
functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. 
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to 
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. Unless a 
defendant makes both showings, \i cannot be said that the conviction or... 
sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the 
result unreliable. 
466 U.S. at 687. 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 
To establish prejudice, the evidence stemming from the failure to prepare a sound defense or 
present witnesses must be significant, but it does not necessarily follow that the trial would 
have otherwise resulted in an acquittal. Id. at 2071; see Nealv v. Cabana, 764 F.2d 1173 
(5th Cir. 19.85): Code v. Montgomery. 799 F.2d 1481 (11th Cir.1986). 
In our review of this record, both of the trial and the hearing on the motion for new trial, we 
have adhered to the clear warnings of Strickland "to eliminate the distorting effects of 
hindsight... and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." 466 U.S. at 
689. 104 S.Ct. at 2065. We are nonetheless constrained to hold that the efforts of trial 
counsel were deficient, not necessarily with respect to preparation or investigation, but by the 
peremptory abandonment of the pre-established and reasonably sound defense strategy — 
providing for the testimony of the defendant, a psychologist, certain stipulated proof, and 
supportive witnesses — and the cumulative effect of related errors. At the same time, we 
must conclude that the evidence presented at the motion for new trial preponderates against 
the finding of the trial court. 
IV 
In this case, there was an indictment for second degree murder. The state presented its 
proof in an effective, orderly manner and rested at the conclusion of the first day of trial. A 
case had been made for the offense charged. 
The defense strategy was to use the defendant as a witness, to support her testimony with 
that of the psychologist and other witnesses that she was a physically abused and battered 
wife under unusual stress at the time of the incident. Documentary evidence had been 
prepared to establish that the victim was a heavy drinker. The state stipulated that the 
victim's blood alcohol content was over the presumptive level of intoxication. There were no 
surprises in the presentation of the state's case. Yet, in spite of the protests of Attorney 
225 Rich, the lead counsel at trial, conceding that an acquittal was an impossibility, advised his 
client to "shut down" the case. The state's stipulation regarding the victim's intoxication was 
not admitted into proof; upon questioning at the motion for new trial, Attorney Vincent 
responded, "I forgot." 
The first component of the test established in Strickland is as follows: 
A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the 
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acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of 
reasonable professional judgment The court must then determine whether, in 
light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the 
wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that 
determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's function, as 
elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing 
process work in the particular case. 
Id., 466 U.S. at 690. 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (emphasis added). 
As to the second component, there must be a reasonable probability that but for counsel's 
unprofessional error, "the result of the proceeding would have been different," not that it 
necessarily would have been different. 466 U.S. at 693. 104 S.Ct. at2Q68 (emphasis added). 
The probable result need not be an acquittal. A reasonable probability of being found guilty of 
a lesser charge, or a shorter sentence, satisfies the second prong in Strickland. Chambers v. 
Armontrout 907 F.2d 825. 832 (8th Cir.1990). 
A. OPENING STATEMENT 
Rich, with the approval of lead counsel, delivered the opening statement. The defendant was 
described as a battered and abused woman who had suffered through three years of 
marriage to the victim. The jury was told that it would "hear from Laurie in this case" and that 
it would "hear from Dr. Victor O'Bryan, who would explain the battered wife syndrome, would 
confirm the defendant's efforts to get help for the victim's drinking habits," and would assist 
the jury to understand that the defendant "didn't intend to kill her husband." The theme was 
repeated throughout the opening statement and the jury was advised that there were other 
options in addition to second degree murder, such as manslaughter or criminally negligent 
homicide. 
Opening statements are relatively new to the criminal law in this state. As late as 1963, in 
the case of Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464. 370 S.W.2d 523. our Supreme Court held that 
there could be no opening statement in a criminal case. In the same year, the legislature 
enacted a statute permitting opening statements in both civil and criminal trials. Tenn. Code 
Ann. § 20-9-301. Either overstatement or misstatement during this presentation, despite 
curative efforts, may have adverse effects: 
The trial attorney should only inform the jury of the evidence that he is sure he 
can prove.... His failure to keep [a] promise [to the jury] impairs his personal 
credibility. The jury may view unsupported claims as an outright attempt at 
misrepresentation. 
McCloskey, Criminal Law Desk Book, § 1506(3)(O) (Matthew Bender, 1990). 
In State v. Moorman. 320 N.C. 387. 358 S.E.2d 502 (1987). the North Carolina Supreme 
Court found ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the failure to present evidence 
promised during the opening statement; 
A cardinal tenant of successful advocacy is that the advocate be unquestionably 
credible. If the fact finder loses confidence in the credibility of the advocate, it 
loses confidence in the credibility of the advocate's cause. 
The defense's failure to produce any evidence to support the theories proffered 
at the outset of the trial formed the basis of the closing arguments made by the 
state in favor of conviction. 
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Id 358 S.E2d at 510-511. 
We note here that the district attorney general, in closing argument, reminded the jury that 
228 the opening statement made on behalf of the defendant was nothing more than a "smoke 
screen — they were going to show you that this woman had been abused and battered." The 
defect was underscored by the final argument made by Mr. Vincent He referred to facts, 
obviously intended to be, but never presented to the jury during the course of the trial; the 
state's objection to any factual reference to the March 8, 1990, protective order was 
sustained. We also note that Mr. Rich, who vehemently disagreed with the change in 
strategy, declined to participate in the final argument on the basis that he "couldn't face the 
jury." 
The state concedes that if the decision to abandon its promised course of defense was 
arbitrary, the defendant was provided ineffective assistance of counsel; but it argues that the 
plan was based upon wellreasoned logic. That is, that the defendant was a very risky witness 
and that there were inconsistencies in her explanation of the events. While those assertions 
may be so, nothing changed during the course of the trial with regard to either the pre-trial 
statements she had made to officers or the defendant's ability to articulate her defense. In 
other words, there appears to have been no basis for the sudden change in strategy. Those 
inconsistencies were just as apparent during the opening statement as they were at the 
conclusion of the state's proof. 
B. FAILURE TO CALL WITNESSES 
Secondly, we hold that if trial counsel's failure to follow through with the promise made in the 
opening statement had been neither deficient nor prejudicial, the failure to call the 
defendant's favorable witnesses available would call into question the performance of trial 
counsel. As to this point, the state makes an innovative if not altogether credible argument 
that this decision not to call supportive witnesses was a sound trial tactic. By explanation, the 
defendant, upon advice of her trial counsel, had elected not to testify. Consequently, the 
rationale not to use the other witnesses is best reflected by a portion of Mr. Vincent's 
testimony at the hearing on the motion for new trial; 
Well, it was my opinion, and in every criminal case, the jury wants to hear from 
the defendant, regardless of the charge. This was a case where self-defense 
was the defense. The defense was not battered wife syndrome. The defense 
was self-defense.... She was the centerpiece of that defense. Dr. O'Bryan's 
testimony and the other witnesses' testimony would only complement hers. And 
my feeling was that Dr. O'Bryan's testimony would heighten their desire to hear 
from Ms. Zimmerman and would have an adverse effect 
(Emphasis added.) 
The logical conclusion of this reasoning, of course, is that in any case where the defendant 
does not testify, no defense witnesses should be called. The effect here was that no 
evidence at all, favorable or otherwise, was presented by the defense. Not only did the 
defendant and her witnesses fail to testify, but matters which the defense should have 
routinely placed into evidence, such as the victim's level of intoxication, the details of the 
assault resulting in the protective order, the defendant's 911 call for help after the stabbing, 
the nature of bruises or abrasions to the defendant, the relative size of the defendant and the 
victim, as well as other matters, were never placed into evidence. 
We conclude that the proof introduced by the defendant at the motion for new trial met the 
standard for deficient performance: 
When a petitioner contends that trial counsel failed to discover, interview, or 
present witnesses in support of his defense, these witnesses should be 
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presented by the petitioner at the evidentiary hearing. As a general rule, this is 
the only way the petitioner can establish that (a) a material witness existed and 
the witness could have been discovered but for counsel's neglect in his 
investigation of the case, (b) a known witness was not interviewed, (c) the 
failure to discover or interview a witness inured to his prejudice, or (d) the 
failure to have a known witness present or call the witness to the stand resulted 
227 in the denial of critical evidence which inured to the prejudice of the petitioner. 
Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752. 757 (Tenn. Crim. APP. 1980). 
Trial counsel has a duty to use witnesses who may be of assistance to the defense. In this 
instance, those witnesses which could have been produced by the defendant might not have 
persuaded the jury to acquit. There is a reasonable probability, however, that if the witnesses 
had been used in accordance with the original plan, the defendant might have been 
convicted of a lesser offense. In summary, we find no reasonable basis for the defendant to 
have changed strategy and decided not to call Dr. O'Bryan, neighbors who knew that the 
victim had assaulted the defendant previously, or the defendant's two older children. 
Dr. O'Bryan, for example, had treated the defendant, and to a lesser degree the victim, as 
early as October 5, 1987. Days before this incident, he treated the defendant for "post-
traumatic stress disorder," a form of the battered woman syndrome. The substance of his 
testimony would have offered mitigating circumstances as to the defendant's culpability. It 
was Dr. O'Bryan's opinion that the defendant's reaction was due to a sense of 
"hypervigilance," a characteristic of her stress, and that her reaction "was just sheer survival 
response." 
Further, trial counsel did not cross-examine the emergency room physician about the March 
8th incident Dr. Thrush, who examined the victim after the stabbing and testified to his 
findings, had also treated the defendant for a cervical strain due to the victim's earlier attempt 
"to strangle her last night." Obviously, evidence of the earlier incident would have been 
consistent with the defense. 
Although the jury may have rejected Dr. O'Bryan's testimony, the point is that they were 
never afforded the opportunity to hear from the psychologist. The several other witnesses 
presented by the defendant during the motion for new trial hearing would have given 
testimony consistent with the defense theory and, at the very least, provided the jury a 
reasonable opportunity to consider a lesser degree of homicide. The failure to call these 
witnesses was, we think, indicative of deficient performance by trial counsel. 
C FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO TESTIFY 
Finally, the cumulative effect of the misleading opening statement and the failure to present 
favorable witnesses and other evidence was exacerbated by the trial counsel's 
recommendation to the defendant not to testify. Trial counsel knew that it was generally 
important for the defendant to testify. His testimony established that. Moreover, the failure of 
a defense attorney to call the defendant is often a key factor on the issue of ineffective 
assistance. In a similar case, this court, in its remand for a new trial, cited factors which 
would tend to indicate ineffective assistance in that regard: 
(1) only the victim and the defendant were present when the offense was 
committed; 
(2) only the defendant could present a "full version of her theory of the facts"; 
(3) the defendant's testimony could not be impeached by prior criminal 
convictions; 
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(4) the defendant could give an account of the relationship with the victim; and 
(5) the attorney had let in objectionable, prejudicial testimony with the intention 
of clarifying it with the testimony of the defendant. 
State v. Gfeller, No. 87-59-111, 1987 WL 14328 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, July 24, 1987). 
The first four factors are applicable here. The announcement of trial counsel that the 
defendant would testify and explain the circumstances of the stabbing are analogous to the 
fifth factor. Further, there was other evidence favorable to the defendant that would have 
come into the record, including the intoxication level of the victim, that did not because of trial 
counsel's decision to rest the case. 
The Gfeller case involved an abused female defendant who had been charged with the 
228 murder of her husband. Because so many of the circumstances are similar to those 
presented here, the case is practically indistinguishable. 
Moreover, it is a rare situation indeed where there are not some inconsistencies in the pre-
trial statements made by any defendant. For the most part, those made by this defendant 
were relatively consistent. The only possible inconsistency was in regard to how the stabbing 
itself occurred. While that was and is clearly a problem for the defense, the pre-established 
strategy was to confront the issue with the defendant's testimony. We see nothing in the 
state's proof that would have warranted such a dramatic change in tactics. The testimony of 
Dr. O'Bryan and others would have helped explain the reactions of the defendant and any 
possible inaccuracies in her recollection of the events, 
Whatever inconsistencies existed were well known to defense counsel prior to the trial. 
Nothing in this record indicates that an abrupt change of strategy was in order. If it was 
appropriate for the defendant not to testify, that decision could and should have been made, 
in this particular situation, at the beginning of the trial. 
It may be that none of these three areas of deficient performance, standing alone, would 
have justified the grant of a new trial. Yet, we think that the cumulative effect of these errors 
deprived the defendant of a meaningful defense. The reliability of the verdict is in question. 
We reiterate that these circumstances may not have justified an acquittal; there is 
considerable evidence indicating guilt of the crime charged. There is, however, a thin line 
between second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Had the defendant's proof been 
presented to the jury, as planned, there is a reasonable probability that the results would 
have been more favorable to the defendant. 
The judgment is reversed. The matter is remanded for a new trial. 
PEAY, J. , and JOE D. DUNCAN, Special Judge, concur. 
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10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-5555 
Facsimile: (801)322-5558 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF TOOELE 
—oooOooo— 
THE STATE OF UTAH, . : MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
REMAND HEARING RECORD 
Plaintiff/Appellee. : 
-vs- : 
Appellate Case no. 20060336-SC 
DONALD MILLARD, : 
Trial Court Case No. 041300401 
Defendant/Appellant. : Judge Mark S. Kouris 
—oooOooo—-
COMES NOW defendant/appellant (hereinafter "Don'"), through counsel, and pursuant to 
Rule 12, U.R.Crim.P., moves this Court for an order allowing Don to supplement the remand hearing 
record to include a letter from David Drake to Tara Isaacson, dated September 22,2006, in order to 
refute Ms. Isaacson's cross-examination testimony concerning two points, viz., that David Drake. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
never told her that he requested her whole file and that she never received his Septeniber 22,2006 
letter. This letter indicates that Mr. Drake did request her whole file and emphasized this several 
times in his letter and that she did receive the letter since that letter contained a check in the amount 
of $506,25- to settle Bugdeivs and Isaacson's billing statement of $1,012.50 for supposedly 
photocopying their whole file. Obviously Ms. Isaacson, to whom David Drake's letter was 
addressed, received the September 22,2006 letter since she cashed the $506/25 check. Don is also 
requesting that the record be supplemented with a copy of the Zions Bank statement showing that 
she received and negotiated the $506.25 check, It is in the interest of justice and fair play that the 
record be supplemented as requested since State's Exhibit 4 (prepared by Tara Isaacson but never 
delivered to David Drake) was received into evidence and which these two documents requested to 
supplement the record can refute. 
A.s set forth in the accompanying memorandum, Ms. Isaacson's testimony and State's Exhibit 
4 took Don by surprise. On or about September 30, 20Q8, David Drake personally met with Gary 
Searle in Tooele, Utah and asked him whether he had any exhibits he would submit during the 
remand hearing. Mr. Searle told Mr. Drake that the state would not be offering any exhibits into 
evidence at the remand hearing. Consequently, the testimony of Tara Isaacson, based upon the 
exhibits she prepared (State's proposed Exhibits 5 and 6 were not accepted into evidence) and which 
the State succeeded In placing Exhibit 4 into evidence, took Don by surprise which could not have 
been cured by any amount of due diligence. Therefore, it is respectfully requested that Don be able 
to supplement the record with David Drake's September 22, 2006 letter and the Zions Bank 
statement demonstrating receipt of this letter, contrary to the testimony of Tara Isaacson. 
This motion is based upon the accompanying and supporting verified memorandum of points 
and authorities. 
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DATED October 16. 2008. 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C. 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
David Drake 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigaed hereby certifies that on October 1.6,2008 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
motion to supplement the remand hearing record, was served by facsimile and mailed, first class postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
Gary K. Searle, Esq. 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
47 South 100 East 
Tooele, UT 84074 
(Fax: 435/843-3127) 
with the original mailed to: 
Clerk, 3d District Court 
74 South 100 East Suite 14 
Tooele, UT 84074 
By: 1 % , ^ |J44iM, 
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David Drake 
Utah State Bar #0911 
6905 South 1300 East #248 
Midvale, UT 84047 
Telephone: (801) 205-9049 
Facsimile: (801)233-3575 
Peter W. Guy on 
Utah State Bar #1285 
614 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)322-5555 
Facsimile: (801)322-5558 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF TOOELE 
—oooOooo— 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO SUPPLEMENT 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : REMAND HEARING RECORD 
(VERIFIED) 
-vs-
DQNALD MILLARD, 
Appellate Case No. 20060336-CA 
Trial Court Case No. 041300401 
Defendant/Appellant. : Judge Mark S. Kouris 
—oooOooo— 
COMES NOW defendant/appellant (hereinafter "Don "), through counsel, and pursuant to 
Rule 12, U.R,Crim.P., submits this Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supplement Remand 
Hearing Record by supplementing and including in the record the September 22,2006 letter sent by 
David Drake to Tara Isaacson, the effect of which refutes the testimony of Tara Isaacson as set forth 
nofi 
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in Don's Motion To Supplement Remand Hearing Record and the Zions Bank statement showing 
that Tara Isaacson negotiated the $506-25 check included in the September 22, 2006 letter, This 
letter is attached hereto, incorporated hereat, and marked Exhibit A. The Zions Bank statement is 
attached hereto, incorporated, hereat and marked Exhibit B. This memorandum is being filed 
pursuant to Rule 12(a), U.R.Crim.P. Motion and is based upon the following: 
L At the remand hearing and during her cross-examination concerning State's proposed 
exhibits 45 5, and 6 which Tara Isaacson testified that she prepared, Tara Isaacson testified under oath 
that David Drake had never requested her whole file.! Mr. Guyon was then handed David Drake's 
laptop computer from which he read to Ms. Isaacson David Drake's September 22, 2006 letter: 
I received a copy of your September 7\ 2006 statement from Duane Millard. 
Needless to say, the amount of your statement was disconcerting since some of your 
billing entries are subject to question. 1 can understand the amount of time in your 
first entry to review the files for appeal in order to identify documents for me to 
organize and index. However, your billing entry implies I did not receive the whole 
file, only an edited version. Since I am doing the appeal for Don Millard and as I 
requested from you during our initial conversation, I wanted copies of your whole 
file, not the documents you deem are necessary for the appeal it is necessary that I 
receive all documents in order to frame the issues I deem, are relevant to the appeal. 
Have I received your whole file? Please lax me the answer to this inquiry as soon as 
possible. (I do thank you for your cooperation to date.) [Emphasis in the original] 
2, After this letter being read to her by Mr. Guyon. Tara Isaacson stated she never 
received the letter, even though it was addressed to her. Again, that statement is completely false 
1
 Ms. Isaacson attempted to introduce into evidence various documents that had never been delivered 
to Mr. Drake when Mr. Drake began his representation of Don in order to file an appeal of his conviction 
and requested on April 12, 2006 that her whole file be submitted to him (and which she is mandated to do 
under ike Rules ofProfessional Responsibility). These documents had never been seen by Mr. Drake and 
had never been forwarded to Mr. Drake when Mr. Drake became Don's attorney of record in order to file 
the appeal (the notice of appeal was filed April 12,2006). Shortly after becoming Don's appellate attorney, 
he requested that Tara Isaacson submit her whole file to him. When it became apparent she had not done 
so, Mr. Drake sent her the September 22, 2006 letter again emphasizing he wanted her whole file. Yet, at 
the remand hearing, Tara Isaacson, through the State, attempted to introduce into evidence documents (which 
supposedly exonerated her) which had never been provided Mr. Drake and had never been seen, by Mr. Drake 
until October % 2008. This Court can draw its own conclusions. 
-2-
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based upon the fact that this letter also contained a check in the amount of $506.25 as a settlement 
and compromise of the $1,012.50 she was billing for her speaking to David Drake about the file and 
photocopying the file to be delivered to David Drake. Again, Exhibit B is a copy of the Zknf s Bank 
checking account statement showing that check number 1953 in the amount of $506.25 made 
payable to Bugden and Isaacson had been negotiated by Tara Isaacson and/or her firm. This is 
irrefutable evidence that contrary to her testimony at the remand hearing, Tara Isaacson received the 
September 22, 2006 letter from David Drake wherein he emphasized that the whole file must be 
produced and which contained the settlement amount check of S506.25 which she and/or her firm 
neptiated. 
1 With the whole file being requested and which was subsequently delivered, the 
testimony of Tara Isaacson concerning State's proposed Exhibits 4 5, and 6 is highly suspect. The 
need to supplement the record as requested by Donald Millard is even more compelling to refute this 
testimony and in light of the fact that State's proposed Exhibit 4 was received into evidence. 
4. Again, with Exhibit 4 being received into evidence, this supplementation of the record 
is necessary and is in the interest of justice. This supplementation balances the record especially in 
view of the fact that State's Exhibit 4 was never provided Mr. Drake when he requested that Tara 
Isaacson submit to him her whole file concerning Donald Millard and the introduction of such caught 
Donald Millard and his counsel unawares through no fault of their own and through no amount of 
due diligence. 
5, Ms. Isaacson's testimony and her supporting exhibits took Don and his counsel by 
surprise. On or about September 30,2008, David Drake personally met with Gary Searle in Tooele, 
Utah and asked him whether he had any exhibits he would submit during the remand hearing. Mr. 
Searle told Mr. Drake that the State would not be offering any exhibits into evidence at the remand 
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hearing. Consequently, the testimony of Tara. Isaacson, based upon the exhibits she prepared and 
which the State attempted to place into evidence, took unfair advantage of Don and his counsel. 
Moreover, the fact that Tara Isaacson testified the way she did regarding these suspect exhibits 
mandates that the record be supplemented to correct this disadvantage* 
& Since the purpose of the remand hearing is to supplement the record with facts not 
actually appearing in the original record and based upon the truth-seeking objective of this Court, 
the remand record should be supplemented by Exhibits A and B, 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that Don be able to supplement the record with David 
Drake's September 22,2006 letter (Exhibit A) and with Zions Bank statement (Exhibit B)> 
DATED October 16, 2008. 
DAVID DRAKE, P.C 
Attorney for Appellant/Defendant 
W.NM jvvttf iu^ 
David Drake 
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VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
County of Salt Lake ) 
David Drake, being first duly sworn upon oath, states that he has read the foregomg 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Supplement Remand Hearing Record, that he has personal 
knowledge of the statements made in said memorandum, and that the statements made in said 
memorandum are true according to his personal knowledge, information, and belief, 
DATED October 16, 2008. 
ilk/til £)dJ^„„ ' . 
David Drake 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 16* day of October, 2008. 
•
 /
 " • / ' v /""^ 
Notary Public /{/ v "~ 
My Commission Expires: 
It'Of'tO 
< AT, | 
"
4
*
i
**" -i^r&l 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on October 16,2008 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
memorandum in support of motion to supplement remand hearingrecord was served by facsimile and mailed, 
first class postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gary K. Searle, Esq. 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
47 South 100 East 
Tooele, UT 84074 
(Fax; 43-5/843-31.27} 
with the original mailed to: 
Clerk, 3d District Court 
74 South 100 East, Suite 14 
Tooele, UT 84074 
By: tUfrAflJj | S i 4 ^ ^ 
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LAW OFFICE OF DAVID DRAKE, P.C 
6905 South 1300 East, #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phmm. (801) 205-9049 Facsimile: (801) 233-3575 
Email: kingd rake@ms.n .com 
September 22,2006 
Tara L. Isaacson, Esq. 
BUGDEN & ISAACSON, LLC 
623 East 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84106 
RB; Your September 7, 2006 statement to Duane Mil lard 
Dear Tara: 
I received a copy of your September 79 2006 statement from Duane Millard. Needless to say> the amount of 
your statement was disconcerting since some of your billing entries are subject to question. I can understand 
the amount of time in your first entry to review the files for appeal in order to identify documents for me. to 
organize and index.. However, your billing entry implies I did not receive the whole file, only an edited 
version. Since 1 am doing the appeal for Don Millard and as 1 requested from you during our initial 
conversation, I wanted copies of your whole file, not the documents you deem are necessary for the appeal. 
It is necessary that I receive all documents in order to frame the issues I deem are relevant to the appeal. 
Have I received your whole file? Please fax me the answer to this inquiry as soon as possible. (I do thank 
you for your cooperation to date.) 
Your second entry indicates you billed 2.25 hours to finalize your short letter to me and prepare an index, 
The preparation of an index appears to duplicate the first entry. Moreover, it would have been, a simple and 
less expensive matter to just photocopy your whole file and provide me with it, not an edited version. The 
Rules of Professional Conduct mandate that I receive the whole file. 
Your third entry states that we had a .75 hour phone conversation. As I recall, our conversation lasted 
approximately .5 hours. Be that as it may and based upon the foregoing, Mr. Millard proposes an offer and 
compromise since he h contesting the $1,012.50. Enclosed herewith is his check in the amount of $506.25 
as payment in frill of your September 1,2006 statement. Endorsement of this check constitutes an agreement 
that the payment of $506.25 is a full settlement and compromise of the amount you claim is owed by Mr. 
Millard as indicated by your September 7, 2006 statement. 
If you have any questions or comments, please call me at 801/205-9049. 
Cordially. 
H. 
David Drake 
DD/la 
ee; Duane Millard 
n/12 
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. ,AUI vUTKIC" COURT -TOCE:.; 
David Drake 
Utah State Bar #0911 
6905 South 1300 East #248 
Midvale/UT 84047 
Telephone: (801)205-9049 
Facsimile: (801)233-3575 
Peter W. Guy on 
Utah State Bar # 1285 
614 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT84111 
Telephone: (801) 322-5555 
Facsimile: (801) 322-5558 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
TOOELE DEPARTMENT, COUNTY OF TOOELE 
—oooOooo— 
THE STATE Of UTAH, ; ORDER ON MOTION TO 
SUPPLEMENT REMAND 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ; HEARING RECORD 
-vs- : 
Appellate Case no. 20060336-SC 
DONALD MILLARD, •: 
Trial Court Case No. 041300401. 
Defendant/Appellant. : Judge Mark S. KLouris 
—oooOooo— 
Based upon defendant/appellant's Motion to Supplement Remand Hearing Record and good 
cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendant/appellant's motion be and is hereby granted and 
tliat the remand hearing record in the above-captioned matter be and is hereby supplemented: to 
2009 K. AMII:2l» 
FILED BY.. Jj$ 
m it) 
r 
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include a copy of the letter from David Drake to Tara Isaacson dated September 22,2006 which is 
attached to this Order, incorporated hereaf and becomes part of this Order, and a copy of the Zions 
Bank statement showing that a check made payable to Bugden and Isaacson in the amount of 
$506.25 and was negotiated by the aforementioned payee indicating receipt of those funds by 
Bugden and Isaacson, which is also attached to this Order, Incorporated, hereat and. becomes part of 
this Order, the result of which supplements the remand hearing record. 
I * < & * ^ v 
DATED this jo day of^ebetrfOe&r / \ f J&tf t 
• HONORABLE M A R T ^ J^URIS ' ' 
Third District Court Judae 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that, on October 11,2008 a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
order on motion to supplement the remand hearing record was served by facsimile and mailed, first class 
postage prepaid, to the following: 
Gary K. Searle, Esq. 
Deputy Tooele County Attorney 
47 South 100 East 
Tooele, UT 84074 
(Fax: 435/843-3]27) 
with the original mailed to: 
Clerk, 3d District Court 
74 South 100 East Suite 14 
Tooele, UT 84074 
By:_y(^ 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• • / 4 m \ _ 
Exhibit "A " 
01027 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
l - $ * \ \ / \ v r' 
^ V P * —^"*' "* f 
V \ /> . < * ' " * I 
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID DRAKE, P . C 
6905 South 1300 East #248 
Midvale, Utah 84047 
Phone; (801) 205-9049 Facsimile: (801) 233-3S7S 
Email: kiwgri rake@msii.eoM 
September 22, 2006 
TaraL. Isaacson, Esq. 
BUGDEN &.ISAACSON, LLC 
623 Easi 2100 South 
Salt Lake City, LIT 84106 
Hi: Your September ?, 2006 statement to Dua-ne Mi I lard 
DearTara; 
1 received a copy of your September 7, 2006 statement fern Duane Millard. Needless to say, the amount, of 
your statement was disconcerting since some of your biliingentries are subject to question. 1 can understand 
the amount of lime in your firsi entry io review die files for appeal in order to identify documents for me to 
organize and index. However, your billing entry implies 1 did nor receive the whole -file, only an edited 
version. Since I am doing the appeal for Don Millard and as 1 requesied from you during our initial 
conversation, I wanted copies of your whole file, not the documents you deem are necessary for the appeal 
It is necessary that I receive al! documents in order lo frame the issues I deem are relevant to die appeal. 
Have 1 received your whole file? Please fax me the answer to this inquiry as soon as possible, (.1 do thank 
you for your cooperation to date.) 
Your second entry indicates you billed 2,25 hours to finalize your short leuer to me and prepare an index. 
The preparation of an index appeal's to duplicate the first entry. Moreover, it would have been a.simple and 
less expensive matter to just photocopy your whole file and provide me with it. not an edited version. The 
Rules of Professional Conduct mandate thai I. receive the whole file. 
Your third entry states that we had s .75 hour phone conversation. As I recall* our conversation tasted 
approximately .5 hours. Be that as it may and based, upon the forcgoiim. Mr. Millard proposes an offer and 
compromise since he is contesting the Si >0 12.50. Enclosed herewith is his check in the amount of SS06.25 
as payment: in full of your September 7V 2006 statement. Endorsement ofthls check constitutes an agreement 
that the payment of $506,25 is a full settlement and compromise of the amount you claim is owed by MIY 
Millard as indicated by your September 7, 2006 statement. 
If you have any questions or comments, please call me at 801/205-9049, 
Cordially, 
tavid Drake 
• DD/la 
cc; Duanc Millard 
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20,700.56 
.40,80 
23.44 
Numbar....... 
1973* 
1974 
1977* > 
....... Dam., 
10/30 
1.IAT6 
11/09 
.2.100.00 
52,27 
65.27 
DAILY BALANCES 
Date Arnnmt 
10/13 2,410.59 
10/16 2,73559 
10/17 4,608.12 
10/18 31.60y.iy 
10/19 30,242.^ 
10/23 9,541.75 
10/24 9.4-89.99 
10/25 
10/27 
10/30 
10/31 
11/01 
11/02 
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20,772.51 
8,440.70 
8,306:. 70 
7.880.45 
11.91S.4S 
11/03 
11/06 
n/07 
n/oa 
11/0$ 
11/10 
,.. ,„... Amowii 
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10,7 05.14 
l0,7t$C7 
9,725.89 
INTEREST 
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$8.02 
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0.50% 
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Annual Percentage Yield Eatmci' 
29 
0.64% 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the day of April, 2010, a true and correct 
copy of the above Addenda to Reply Brief of Appellant was hand-delivered to the following 
counsel of record: 
Ryan D. Tenney, Esq. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
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